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A few years ago, it was fanciful to imagine a world where
intellectual property owners - such as record companies,
soft ware owners, and publishers - were capable of invading the
most sacred areas of the home in order to track, deter, and
control uses of their products. Yet, today, strategies of copyright
enforcement have rapidly multiplied, each strategy more
invasive than the last. This new surveillance exposes the
paradoxical nature of the Internet: It offers both the consumer
and creator a seemingly endless capacity for human
expression - a virtual marketplace of ideas- alongside an
insurmountable array of capacities for panoptic surveillance. As
a result, the Internet both enables and silences speech, often
simultaneously.
This paradox, in turn, leads to the tension between
privacy and intellectual property. Both areas of law face
significant challenges because of technology's ever-increasing
pace of development. Yet courts often exacerbate these
challenges by sacrificing one area of law for the other, by eroding
principles of informational privacy for the sake of unlimited
control over intellectual property. Laws developed to address
the problem of online piracy- in particular, the DMCA -have
been unwittingly misplaced, inviting intellectual property
owners to create private systems of copyright monitoring that I
refer to as piracy surveillance. Piracy surveillance comprises
extrajudicial methods of copyright enforcement that detect,
deter, and control acts of consumer infringement.
In the past, legislators and scholars have focused their
attention on other, more visible methods of surveillance, namely
those relating to employment, marketing, and national security.
Piracy surveillance, however, represents an overlooked fourth
area that is completely distinct from these other types, yet
incompletely theorized, technologically unbounded, and,
potentially, legally unrestrained. The goals of this Article are
threefold: first, to trace the origins of piracy surveillance
through recent jurisprudence involving copyright; second, to
provide an analysis of the tradeoffs between public and private
KATYAL 223
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enforcement of copyright; and third, to suggest some ways in
which the law can restore a balance between the protection of
copyrigh t and civil liberties in cyberspace.
This paper was selected as the winning entry for the 2004
Yale Law School Cybererime and Digital Law Enforcement
Conference writing competition, sponsored by the Yale Law
School Information Society Project and the Yale Journal of Law
and Technology.
Nearly twenty years ago, in a casual footnote at the end of
an important essay, renowned property scholar Charles
Donahue drew a distinction between "property as a sword," and
"property as a shield."'  Donahue's distinction symbolized an
important difference between two facets of the institution-as
well as the execution-of property rights; suggesting that
property rights can be used for both defensive and offensive
purposes in relationships with third parties.
Today, Donahue's distinction offers us a rich metaphor for
understanding the transformation that has taken place in the
digital era, particularly with respect to the relationship between
intellectual property and privacy in cyberspace. As is now clear,
the Internet is no longer a smooth-functioning patchwork of
anonymous communication between peers. Instead, lurking
behind the fagade of such potential connections lies an
increasing and subtle host of opportunities for legal
accountability and detection, particularly where the use (or
misuse) of intellectual property is concerned. The result, this
paper argues, heralds an important shift in property rights in
the digital era: compared to real space, where property rights
tended to serve as a shield from harm, property rights in
cyberspace serve to form the basis for a host of potentially
offensive strategies that have deleterious implications for
privacy, anonymity, and freedom of expression.
In recent months, strategies of copyright enforcement
have rapidly multiplied, each strategy more invasive than the
last. Today, the Recording Industry Association of America
1 Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property
Predicated From its Past, in PROPERTY 28, 67-8 n.104 (J. Roland Pennock &
John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
224 2004-2005
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(RIAA) and other copyright owners maintain automated Web
crawlers that regularly survey and record the Internet Protocol
addresses of computers that trade files on peer-to-peer
networks. 2  After the RIAA's initial victories, hundreds of
subpoenas were issued- sometimes numbering seventy-five per
day-each unveiling the digital identities of various Internet
subscribers. 3 Schools, responding to threats from the recording
industry, have implemented programs that track and report the
exchange of copyrighted files.4 A few have even decided to audit
and actively monitor files traded by their students, at the
RIAA's request. 5 And in recent sessions, there were proposals
2 See infra Part II.
3 Ted Bridis, Music Lawsuits Amass 75 Subpoenas Per Day, AP
ONLINE, July 19, 2003; Katie Dean, RIAA Legal Landslide Begins, WIRED
NEWS, Sept. 8, 2003, at http ://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/
0, 1412,60345,00.html.
4 See, e.g., Leonie Lamont, Firms Ask to Scan University Files,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Feb. 19, 2003, at 3 (reporting that recording
companies asked for permission to scan all computers at the University of
Melbourne for sound files, in order to gather evidence of alleged breaches of
copyright); see also VIRGINIA E. REZMIERSKI & NATHANIEL ST. CLAIR II, FINAL
REPORT NSF-LAMP PROJECT: IDENTIFYING WHERE TECHNOLOGY LOGGING
AND MONITORING FOR INCREASED SECURITY END AND VIOLATIONS OF
PERSONAL PRIVACY AND STUDENT RECORDS BEGIN (2001), available at
http://www.nacua.org/documents/NSF-LAMP.pdf (on file with the Yale
Journal of Law and Technology); Electronic Frontier Foundation,
Universities Should Resist Network Monitoring Demands, at
http://www.eff.org/lP/P2P/university-monitoring.pdf (on file with the Yale
Journal of Law and Technology) (last visited Dec. 6, 2004); Letter from
Electronic Privacy Information Center on P2P Monitoring to Colleges and
Universities, Nov. 6, 2002, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
student/p2pletter.html (on file with the Yale Journal of Law and Technology);
Kristen Philipkoski, University Snoops for MP3s, WIRED NEWS, Nov. 13,
1999, at http://www.wired.com/news/ technology/0, 1282,32478,00.html.
5 See Lamont, supra note 4, at 3; Kelly McCullom, How
Forcefully Should Universities Enforce Copyright Law on Audio Files?.,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Nov. 19, 1999). In April 2003, the RIAA
also filed suits directly against four college students accused of operating file
sharing networks for the purposes of copyright infringement. See RIAA Sues
College File Traders, WIRED NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003, at
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,58340,00.html. Many more
suits have followed since. See Recording Industry Association of America,
Illegal File Sharing Targeted in Wave of New Lawuits, Nov. 18, 2004, at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/111804.asp (describing suits against
peer-to-peer network users on college and university campuses in
Massachusetts, Iowa, Virginia, and Washington D.C.); Electronic Frontier
Foundation, RIAA v. The People, at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-
thepeople.php (last accessed Dec. 6, 2004) (comprehensive list of suits
brought by RIAA and member companies) (on file with the Yale Journal of
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before Congress that placed intellectual property owners in a
virtually unrestrained position of authority over ordinary
consumers and intermediaries. 6  The latest of these, the
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Against Theft and
Expropriation (PIRATE) Act, sought to lower the burden of proof
to impose criminal penalties on individuals that engaged in acts
of file-sharing, including sentences of up to 10 years.7
Law and Technology).
6 In 2002, Rep. Howard Berman introduced the Peer-to-Peer
Piracy Prevention Act (2002), which would have protected copyright owners
who engaged in acts of self-help to protect their works, H.R. 5211, 107th
Cong. (2002), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030; see also Howard L. Berman, The Truth
About the Peer to Peer Piracy Prevention Act: Why Copyright Owner Self-
help Must Be Part of the P2P Piracy Solution, FIND LAW, Oct. 1, 2002, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021001 -berman.html. During
the summer of 2003, Senator Orrin Hatch proposed destroying the computers
of individuals who illegally download material, pointing out that damaging
someone's computer "may be the only way you can teach somebody about
copyrights." Senator Takes Aim at Illegal Downloads, AP ONLINE, June 18,
2003 (on file with the Yale Journal of Law and Technology). Representative
John Carter (R-TX) also suggested that jailing college students for piracy
would deter other infringers. Katie Dean, Marking File Traders as Felons,
WIRED NEWS, Mar. 19, 2003, at http://www.wired.com/news/business/
0,1367,58081,00.html. In 2004, Congress considered the Inducing
Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004, which aimed to hold software creators
liable for the infringing activities of their consumers. See 2003 CONG US S.
2560, introduced June 22, 2004; Xeni Jardin, Induce Act Draws Support,
Venom, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 26, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/
news/print/0,1294,64723,00.html; Katie Dean, Copyright Proposal Induces
Worry, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 11, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0, 1283,64870,00.html; Katie Dean, Big Anti-Induce Campaign
Planned, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 14, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,64935,00.html. Eventually the Induce Act was shelved,
ostensibly due to the outcry among technology companies. See Katie Dean,
Senate Shelves Induce Review, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 7, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/ news/politics/0,1283,65255,00.html. Just a week later,
however, former Attorney General John Ashcroft vowed to "build the
strongest, most aggressive legal assault against intellectual property crime in
our nation's history," see Katie Dean, Ashcroft Vows Piracy Assault, WIRED
NEWS, Oct. 14, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1283,65331,00.html.
7 See Xeni Jardin, Congress Moves to Criminalize P2P, WIRED
NEWS, Mar. 26, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/
0,1412,62830,00.html; Xeni Jardin, Feds Crank up Heat on P2P, WIRED
NEWS, Mar. 31, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/
0,1412,62895,00.html; Declan McCullogh, Pirate Act' Raises Civil Rights
Concerns, May 26, 2004, at http://news.com.com/'Pirate+Act'+raises+civil+
rights+concerns/2100-1027_3-5220480.html; Roy Mark, Conservatives Aim to
Sink Pirate Act, INTERNETNEWS, Nov. 12, 2004, at
http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/343542 1. See also the
226 2004-2005
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All of these different strategies share one thing in
common: they rely on, invariably, private mechanisms of
surveillance for their execution and control. And these
techniques of surveillance-whether instituted by private
entities, or public law enforcement-demonstrate copyright's
increasingly tenuous relationship with information privacy. In
the past, legislators and scholars have focused their attention on
other, more visible methods of surveillance relating to
employment, marketing, and national security. 8 This paper,
however, explores the phenomenon of "piracy surveillance," an
emerging area that is completely distinct from these other
modes of consumer monitoring, and is incompletely theorized,
technologically unbounded, and, potentially, legally
unrestrained. As I will show, recent developments in copyright
law- in particular, the DMCA - have invited intellectual
property owners to create extrajudicial systems of monitoring
and enforcement that detect, deter, and control acts of consumer
infringement. As a result, this paper argues that intellectual
property rights have been fundamentally altered-from a
defensive shield into an offensively oriented type of weapon that
can be used by intellectual property creators to record the
activities of their consumers, and also to enforce particular
standards of use and expression, proscribing activities that they
deem unacceptable.
This outcome is not solely attributable to the development
of peer-to-peer technologies, or the explosion of piracy in
cyberspace, as some might suggest. Rather, the outcome
involves the comparatively more subtle failure of law to resolve
the troubling and often rivalrous relationship between the
protection of intellectual property and privacy in cyberspace.
The irony, of course, is that both areas of law are facing
enormous challenges because of technology's ever-expanding
pace of development. Yet, while both areas of law have
enormously rich and well-developed areas of scholarly work and
Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act of 2004,
S. 2237 (108th Congress); John P. Mello, Jr., Proposed Bill Would
Criminalize File Sharing, TECHNEWSWORLD, Mar. 30, 2004, at
http://www.technewsworld.com/ story/33262.html (on file with the Yale
Journal of Law and Technology).
8 David Lyon, The World Wide Web of Surveillance: The
Internet and Off-World Power Flows, in THE MEDIA READER: CONTINUITY AND
TRANSFORMATION 353, 355 (Hugh MacKay & Tim O'Sullivan eds., 2000)
(asserting the proliferation of three main categories of cyberspace
surveillance relating to employment, security and policing, and marketing).
KATYAL 227
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analysis, their interactions, particularly across the Internet,
have been underappreciated by scholars. Today, however, they
are on a collision course that cannot be overlooked much longer,
sparked by two major developments in digital space: the rise of
consumer surveillance, and the problem of rampant piracy.
The motivation behind piracy surveillance may lie in the
protection of copyrighted works, a laudable goal, but the end
result, I shall argue, sacrifices the most valuable aspects of
cyberspace itself, eviscerating principles of informational
privacy for the sake of unlimited control over intellectual
property. While some intellectual property owners might herald
the development of protective frameworks for intellectual
property owners, I argue that it destabilizes a critical balance
between privacy, property, and expression. For the new piracy
surveillance exposes the paradoxical nature of the Internet: it
offers both the consumer and creator a seemingly endless
capacity for human expression-a virtual marketplace of ideas-
alongside an insurmountable array of capacities for panoptic
surveillance. As a result, the Internet both enables and silences
speech, often simultaneously.
The goals of this paper are threefold: first, to trace the
origins of piracy surveillance though recent jurisprudence
involving copyright; second, to provide an analysis of the
tradeoffs between public and private modes of piracy
surveillance; and third, to suggest the necessity for the law to
restore a balance between the protection of copyright and civil
liberties in cyberspace. As I will show, piracy surveillance has
inverted the relationship between privacy and property,
subordinating the protection of privacy to the protection of
property. This has occurred in two basic ways: first, piracy
surveillance enables copyright owners to utilize a type of
monitoring that demonstrably trespasses on a person's
expectations of informational privacy and anonymity; and
second, the use of piracy surveillance strategies, without
conventional substantive and procedural due process
constraints, has a harmful tendency to chill free expression in
cyberspace.
In the first section of this paper, I review some basic
principles of the relationship between privacy and property in
real space, and then apply them to cyberspace. I begin by
surmising some of the basic assumptions that are both
descriptively and aspirationally present in property ownership,
228 2004-2005
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and then argue that the architecture of cyberspace has
destabilized the preexisting balance between privacy and
property by eliminating the material conditions that permit the
exercise of spatial privacy. Unlike property ownership in real
space, which presupposes a degree of privacy by virtue of
material seclusion, the public and private nature of property in
cyberspace-coupled with its immense digital mobility and
decentralization-often come into conflict with one another,
interacting within a sphere of confusing uncertainty. Instead of
material seclusion, individuals operate under an assumption of
anonymity, which significantly expands their expressive
potential in cyberspace. At the same time, however, information
harvesting is rampant, a factor which alters any presumption of
balance between privacy and property in cyberspace.
Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the context of
peer-to-peer transmissions. Here, I describe how peer-to-peer
transmissions have enabled the rapid transmission of content,
such as music, film and other types of copyrighted material,
facilitating a crisis of intellectual property. But it has also
created a sort of crisis for privacy and security, as well. By
making one's online activities, identities, and preferences
transparently visible, peer-to-peer frameworks create a culture
of panopticism by other individuals. This culture of
panopticism, in turn, enables a variety of entities-government,
private individuals, and copyright owners-to exploit the power
of peer-to-peer frameworks to develop an increasingly invasive
system of surveillance to guard against piracy.
In the second section, I turn to the origins of piracy
surveillance, and describe the myriad ways in which private
entities have successfully monitored transmissions in cyberspace
to control uses of their copyrighted materials. Following the
DMCA, I argue, court opinions have unwittingly facilitated the
creation of a private regime wherein copyright owners and
intermediaries engage in self-help surveillance of consumers.
Piracy surveillance regimes take on three basic types, each
displaying varying degrees of unilateral aggression: monitoring,
which involves the use of automated systems to search for
protected material; management, which involves a host of
actions taken in real space and cyberspace to limit certain uses
of cultural products; and interference, which involves a degree of
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In the third section, I assess the costs and benefits of such
regimes, and argue that current, private regimes of copyright
enforcement carry significant disadvantages, among them the
potential to transform copyright law into a regime of "panoptic
publication," where future creators are essentially monitored by
third parties for the infringing potential of their activities.
Regimes of panoptic publication have especially deleterious
(indeed chilling) effects on creations that rely on fair use for
their validity, particularly transformative works. 9 As I will
show, piracy surveillance carries the potential to transform the
nature of copyright from a liability-based regime into a regime
that governs the creation of all cultural products in cyberspace,
both illegitimate and legitimate. This affects both speaker and
audience in three primary ways: first, piracy surveillance
enables ISPs to monitor and record the activities of their
subscribers, thereby affecting the autonomy, anonymity, and
privacy individuals enjoy in cyberspace; second, piracy
surveillance overdeters copyright infringement, affecting both
the expression and fair use of non-offenders; and third, piracy
surveillance affects the audience's ability to access information
without interference.
This paper takes the view that this conflict between
privacy and piracy is important not just because it showcases a
new, overlooked mode of surveillance, but also because it
demonstrates the need to resolve conflicts between them in ways
that are reflective-and protective-of the relationship between
modern technology and personal freedoms. I conclude,
therefore, by pointing out the need for greater public oversight
over these private realms of surveillance, and suggest a number
of ways in which we can envision a more protective sphere for
individual autonomy in cyberspace. Towards that end, Part IV
argues for greater judicial supervision over the DMCA and offers
a potential solution that is derived from the Privacy Protection
Act and that balances protections for freedom of speech and
privacy with the interests of law enforcement.
9 See, e.g., recent discussions concerning fan fiction, Rebecca
Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law,
17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997) (arguing for applicability of fair use defense
to fan fiction, insofar as it adds value and does not displace the commercial
viability of the underlying rights).
230 2004-2005
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I. COMPETING FRAMEWORKS OF PRIVACY AND PROPERTY
As Professor Jonathan Zittrain has pointed out, both
intellectual property and privacy have something significant in
common: "both are about balancing a creator's desire to control a
particular set of data with consumers' desires to access and
redistribute that data." 10  This Article is concerned primarily
with "informational privacy," the details about our lives that we
would most often like to keep free from public view.11 Although
a detailed study of the right to informational privacy-in all of
its emanations-is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to introduce a few major points regarding the
conceptions of privacy law itself before progressing to its
tensions with intellectual property and speech in the digital age.
Informational privacy is rooted in the Fourth Amendment's
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as
the conception of privacy outlined by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis in their famous 1890 article in the Harvard Law
Review,12 where they used the phrase "right to privacy" to
denote a constellation of different interests, most of which
involved the right not to have personal information exposed to
the general public. 13
10 Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the
Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (abstract) (2000).
11 This type of privacy is distinguishable in source and in form
from "substantive privacy," which generally can be thought of as a freedom
from state interference into matters of marriage, procreation, and child-
rearing . Substantive privacy is thought to be a "right held against the
state's power to legislate." See Adam Hickey, Between Two Spheres:
Comparing State and Federal Approaches to the Right to Privacy and
Prohibitions Against Sodomy, 111 YALE L. J. 993, 994 n.8 (2002); and Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 749 (1989). At the
same time, however, much of the justification for substantive privacy
overlaps with the ones often used to justify informational privacy. Id., citing
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and his intellect .... They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be left alone-the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.").
12 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
13 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A
Farewell to Warren and Brandeiss Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291
KATYAL
10
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/7
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Today, over 100 years after Warren and Brandeis' critical
formulation, informational privacy entitlements derive their
force from a panoply of federal, state, and regulatory
guidelines, 14 many of which emerged from the Code of Fair
Information Practices over twenty years ago. 15  Despite the
lingering confusion about the definition of informational privacy
itself, these guidelines, along with other decisions, have created
a set of norms of entitlements and expectations of informational
privacy. Perhaps as a result of this patchwork of protections,
informational privacy has been besought with complications
regarding its scope. 16  These complications-both definitional
and functional-have only been exacerbated as technology has
grown more complex, revealing the law's utter inability to keep
(1983).
14 See, e.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a (2004)); see also the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2004) (encompassing the Wiretap act and the
Stored Communications Act); The Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5
U.S.C. § 522; The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20
U.S.C. §1232(g); The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§
3401-02; The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2002);
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
Pub. L. No. 104-191 (1996). In the state context see ROBERT E. SMITH,
COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS (1992).
15 See Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare, Records,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, July 1973, at
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm. The
Code is considered to be the governing principles of modern, informational
privacy, and include the following directives: (1) Personal data record-keeping
practices should not be kept secret; (2) An individual should have the ability
to find out what information about him or her is on record and how it is
disclosed, and should have the ability to correct it; (3) An individual should
have the ability to correct or amend a record of identifiable information about
him or her; (4) An individual should have the ability to limit the disclosure of
information about her or him that was obtained for one purpose from being
disclosed for other unrelated purposes; and (5) An organization creating,
maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal data
must guarantee the reliability of the data for their intended use and must
take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
16 Others contend that the concept of informational privacy
involves a much broader formulation. For example, Robert Ellis Smith,
editor of the Privacy Journal, has defined privacy as "the desire by each of us
for physical space where we can be free of interruption, intrusion,
embarrassment, or accountability and the attempt to control the time and
manner of disclosures of personal information about ourselves." Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Privacy & Human Rights 2002, at 2, citing
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN'S WEB SITE 6 (2000).
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pace with technology to ensure the protection of privacy,
property, and identity, particularly in cyberspace.
As the first section will argue, in real space, property
rights coupled with architecture serve as a defensive shield to
protect privacy. In contrast, as the second section will argue,
the nature of cyberspace decouples the relationship between
property and privacy, creating a host of challenges for the
protection of privacy. Unlike real space, which is characterized
by reified boundaries between private and public space,
boundaries in digital space are largely permeable and
transparent, engendering a nearly limitless potential for
consumer surveillance.
A. A SYMBIOTIC VIEW FROM REAL SPACE
While property and privacy protect different interests,
they enjoy a mutually reinforcing relationship that has been
historically validated by the law-and architecture-governing
real space. Historically, some scholars argue that at least one
source of the right to privacy actually originated through
property rights themselves. 17  In his treatise Of Property,
written in the last decade of the seventeenth century, John
Locke observed that, "every Man has a Property in his own
Person. This no Body has any right to but himself."18 Lockean
notions of property in one's person are inextricably linked to the
protection of privacy. Because they presuppose the ability to
exclude others from bodily invasion, they suggest that protection
of bodily privacy also involves a metaphor of ownership. 19
Adding to this, Locke also powerfully recognized that
property rights should extend to the products of one's labor;
17 Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight:
Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BER. L. TECH. J. 1, 26
(1996).
18 Id. at 14, quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON
GOVERNMENT 328-29 (Peter Laslett, ed. 1965). For a substantive due process
analysis of Locke's work, see Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process
Analysis and the Lockean Liberal Tradition: Rethinking the Modern Privacy
Cases, 65 IND. L. J. 723 (1990) (observing that Locke's emphasis on the
interests of society are "key pillars in the Lockean framework against which
modern assertions of fundamental privacy rights under the Constitution
must be judged").
19 See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80
B.U. L. REV. 359, 422 (2000).
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"that which he mixes his labor becomes 'his property."' As
Professor Wendy Gordon has explained, this linkage between
labor and personality is a key principle justifying much of
contemporary and historical property law.20 The basic structure
of Locke's reasoning is that labor belongs to a particular person
and that when a person uses her labor to appropriate objects
from the public commons, she attaches an ownership right to the
objects in question. 21 Because of the intermingling of her labor
with these objects, she may be said to have obtained a "property
right" in the objects themselves. 22 In turn, others have a duty to
restrain themselves from gathering the fruits of her labor and to
leave these objects alone. 23
Therefore, the notion of a property right, as Gordon
explains, means two different things: a vested entitlement, or a
complex collection of rights associated with the nature of
ownership. 24 These rights usually mean that a property owner
20 See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533, 1608 (1993). See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S.
986, 1002-03 (1984) (citing Locke in holding that intangible products of one's
"labour and invention" can be considered "property" subject to the Takings
clause); Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of
Liberal Property Rights, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1350-51 (1996) ("The core of
Locke's argument is that one has a property right in one's person, thus in
one's labor, and by extension, in the objects of one's labor.").
21 Gordon, supra note 20, at 1544-45.
22 Id.
23 Id. Indeed, according to Jeremy Waldron, Locke used the term
'property' in a broad sense to cover a wider range of possible rights, which
encompassed a much wider swath than property rights alone-for example,
Locke included personal rights of life, liberty, and security, as well as other
rights in relation to the use of resources. This observation suggests that
Locke may have even viewed personal information-whether the product of
historical record or fanciful creation-to be one's personal property, because
he viewed it as an extension of one's personality. JEREMY WALDRON, THE
RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 158 (1988). Locke's observations about
property-as the fruit of labor and as an extension of self-greatly affected
early philosophical justifications for intellectual property rights. Intellectual
property law developed around the conception of the 'romantic author,"' the
author that "mixes her unique personality with ideas," and who displays
novelty and creativity in her expressions. See Daniel J. Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1112 (2002) (quoting JAMES
BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
THE INTERNET SOCIETY 54 (1996)). This central facet of intellectual property,
according to Dan Solove, "embodies Locke's idea that one gains a property
right in something when it emanates from one's self." Id.
24 Gordon, supra note 20, at 1547.
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has the power to consume the property and use it harmlessly, to
transfer the property, and to exclude anyone from entering,
infringing, or interfering with her use and enjoyment of the
property.25 In this manner, property rights confer a certain
amount of sovereignty and separation in the property owned. In
turn, the right of ownership directly translates into the right to
be left alone, or, put a different way, the right to exclude others
from the object owned.
Just as the term private property suggests, the two enjoy
a symbiotic relationship stemming from Blackstonian ideals of
"sole and despotic dominion."26 For, just as every person enjoys
a property right in her person, she enjoys the right to exclude
others from treading or trespassing on her privately owned
property.27 By creating a boundary between private and public
ownership, the law permits an owner, by virtue of the right of
exclusion, to confer a certain level of privacy on those objects.
Consider, for example, the significance of the home in
constructing a boundary between private and public space. The
core of the private sphere lies in the home, deemed by the Court
as "the most private of places," 28 a world where an individual
may safely retreat from others' gaze and scrutiny. The private
sphere, according to Edward Shils, involves a sphere where a
person "is not bound by the rules that govern public life... The
'private life' is a secluded life, a life separated by the compelling
burdens of public authority."29  Similarly, as Hannah Arendt
points out:
"... [T]he four walls of one's private property offer
the only reliable hiding place from the common
public world, not only from everything that goes on
in it but also from its very publicity, from being
seen and being heard. A life spent entirely in
public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we
would say, shallow. While it retains visibility, it
loses the quality of rising into sight from some
25 Id. at 1550.
26 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND at 2 quoted in Julie Cohen, Does Copyright Trump Privacy 2002
U. ILL. J. LAW, TECH. & POL'Y 375, 383 n.14.
27 See WALDRON, supra note 23, at 158.
28 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
29 See Edward Shils, Privacy.' Its Constructions and
Vicissitudes, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 283 (1966).
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darker ground which must remain hidden if it is
not to lose its depth in a very real, non-subjective
sense ... "30
Arendt's metaphors of visibility and depth help us to
understand the functions of spatial privacy in constructing a
deeper, more self-actualized existence for individuals.
Ownership of private property constructs, and underpins,
notions of privacy and autonomy by ensuring a degree of
solitude that is necessary for true human self-actualization.
In this way, property and privacy are each grounded in
territorial metaphors which construct boundaries that define
realms of physical or social immunity from state interference. 31
Property rights confer a certain amount of spatial sovereignty in
the property owned, 32 a factor which directly complements the
right to be left alone. This is why the Supreme Court, at various
points, has emphasized that "one who owns or lawfully
possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to
exclude." 33 As Professor Charles Reich has echoed:
"Property draws a circle around the activities of
each private individual or organization. Within
that circle, the owner has a greater degree of
freedom than without. Outside, he must justify or
explain his actions, and show his authority.
Within, he is master, and the state must explain
and justify any interference. Thus, property . . .
creates zones within which the majority has to
yield to the owner."34
Citing this passage, Professor Radhika Rao has asserted
that precisely the same observation could be made regarding the
right of privacy.35 She observes that the right to property, like
30 HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958), quoted in
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 26 (2003).
31 See Rao, supra note 19, at 425. Scholars also cite this
passage for the concept of defining the body as property. See, e.g., RUSSELL
SCOTT, THE BODY AS PROPERTY (1981).
32 Id.
33 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
34 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771
(1964).
35 Rao, supra note 19, at 423.
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privacy, decentralizes decision-making power by placing it into
the hands of owners, thereby policing "the fragile boundary
between individual autonomy and government authority."
36
This brief discussion illustrates that privacy and property
are inextricably entwined with one another, even if they take on
different degrees of relative importance depending on the
property in question. The law, too, has embraced this view,
noting that both entitlements are equally necessary in the law:
one cannot exist without the other. 37 In real space, for example,
property law, architecture, and the strong protections afforded
by the Fourth Amendment are able to strike an important
balance between privacy and property, as reflected in the
substantial jurisprudence stemming from the Fourth
Amendment that required some evidence of a trespassory
invasion. This tendency also reflected the traditional, oft-
repeated presumption that "a man's house is his castle,"38 which
formed a critical cornerstone in the development of the
unreasonable search and seizure jurisprudence. 39 In the early
eighteenth century, for example, the protection of property
rights served as a reasonable proxy for privacy interests: Proof
of trespass on one's private property, for example, was necessary
to establish the search and seizure liability of government
agents. 4O Early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence further
36 Id.
37 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 at 159-160, observing,
"Though the Amendment protects one's liberty and property interests against
unreasonable searches of self and effects, 'the primary object of the Fourth
Amendment [ ... ] the protection of privacy."' (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 589 (1974))
38 Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
39 Part of this conception was attributable to the presence of
limited technologies of surveillance. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the
Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (1996).
40 One English case cited often by the Supreme Court, Entick v.
Carrington, 19 How. ST. TR. 1029 (C.P. 1765), involved the search of a
person's home and papers. The plaintiff had been suspected of authoring
several seditious publications, and the government searched and seized his
private papers (some unrelated to the charges at issue). The plaintiff sued
under a trespass theory, and the court agreed with him, observing that
property rights played a fundamental and determinative role in modern
society. The court concluded that "every invasion of private property, be it
ever so minute," could be considered to be a trespass. Id. at 1066. Lord
Camden stated:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his
dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that
KATYAL 237
16
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/7
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
emphasized property-based conceptions of privacy, producing an
indelibly trespass-based construction of this right.41  More
recently, however, the Supreme Court has relaxed this
requirement, and embraced a much more protective version of
the Fourth Amendment within the home and other 'private'
places. 42
Nevertheless, while our loyalty to property remains
stated-and has even expanded-through the law, our
commitment to privacy in American law is far less apparent
when we move outside of the boundaries of real property.43
Without a brick-and-mortar architecture, the very concept of
privacy law is replete with both theoretical and practical
conflicts-between agencies, statutes, and popular expectation. 44
For example, there is no specific constitutional right to privacy,
informational or otherwise. 45  Cases like Griswold and Roe
they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye
cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet
where private papers are removed and carried away, the
secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the
trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that
respect. Id.
The court also stated that because the government had no right to
seize one's private papers, such acts would be considered tantamount to a
government taking. Id. at 1044. Commenting on this section in Entick,
William C. Heffernan has observed that property rhetoric served as the
primary category of analysis for the inviolability of a person's privacy. Even
though the doctrine of privacy was not well-developed at this point, Lord
Camden's treatment of trespass, according to Heffernan, "evinced a profound
respect for informational privacy," further demonstrating that property rights
served as an adequate, though awkward, proxy for privacy interests where
government searches were concerned. William C. Heffernan, Fourth
Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13-14 (2002).
41 See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment
Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 308
(1998). For a very interesting discussion of the relationship between privacy,
property and the Fourth Amendment, see Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment
and New Technologies, 102 MICH L. REV. 801 (2004); Sherry Colb, A World
Without Privacy, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889 (2004); Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead,
LongLive Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904 (2004).
42 See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
43 PAUL SCHWARTZ & JOEL REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A
STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION (1996); see also Joel Reidenberg,
Setting Standards for Fair Information Practices in the U.S. Private Sector,
80 Iowa L. Rev. 497, 545-48 (1995); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH, L. REV. 119 (2004).
44 See Robert Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEORGETOWN
L. J. 2087 (2001).
45 For example, the Supreme Court has developed a limited,
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postulated a substantive type of privacy that is thought to be a
"right held against the state's power to legislate," 46 thereby
honoring strands of personhood in protecting the deliberative
choices of individuals in areas like marriage, conception, and
child-rearing. But the Supreme Court has traditionally been
quite reluctant to extend the same rationale to the protection of
informational privacy, drawing a firm line between
informational and substantive privacy.47
Consider the 1977 case of Whalen v. Roe, where the
Supreme Court dealt with a New York law that required the
government to collect and store the names and addresses of
patients whose doctors prescribed drugs that could potentially
be abused. The question was whether this storage and
dissemination in government databases implicated a
constitutional right to privacy. 48  In an insightful opinion,
Justice Stevens deftly characterized the growing case law
concerning privacy into two different kinds of interests, one
informational and one substantive. The first, he points out,
involves the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of certain
"penumbral" conception of this right flowing from a variety of constitutional
sources-the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, and a host of later decisions that outline (and often complicate)
the borders of this right. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1, 111, IV, V, IX, XIV. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan v. Director, Miss.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Loving v. Virginia;
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In addition,
numerous federal and state enactments affect the enforcement of privacy
rights in various ways. See e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000); CAL. PENAL CODE §
630 (Deering 2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B (Law. Co-op 2002); N.Y.
CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (2002);
WIS. STAT § 895.50 (2002).
46 Adam Hickey, Note, Between Two Spheres: Comparing State
and Federal Approaches to the Right to Privacy and Prohibitions Against
Sodomy, 111 YALE L.J. 993, n.8 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld The Right to Privacy,
102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 748-50 (1989).
47 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
48 See Francis S. Chalpowski, Note, The Constitutional
Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 145-50 (1991)
(noting that the balancing test outlined in Whalen has created a split in
interpretations of the right to informational privacy); Lisa Jane McGuire,
Comment, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High Tech Method of
Identification May Mean Giving Up Your Privacy 33 AKRON L. REV. 441,
460-61 (2000) (calling Whalen the "closest the Court came to identifying a
right to information privacy").
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matters; and the second involves the "interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions." Both of these
interests were implicated in this case, Stevens observed, because
the patients, rightfully so, feared disclosure of the information
and its reputational effects just as much as the risk of public
disclosure impaired their ability to make decisions
independently.
Yet despite the Court's insightful recognition of the
various types of interests that illuminated the protection of
sensitive information, the Court upheld the program, finding
that neither the immediate nor threatened impact of disclosure
was sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right or liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees.
Nevertheless, in an interesting observation, the Court noted
that, "We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in
computerized data banks or other massive government files." 49
It then observed that the right to collect and use such data for
public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures,
and "in some circumstances, that duty arguably has its roots in
the Constitution," the Court observed. 50 However, since the
New York statutory scheme (in its view) evinced a proper
respect for an individual's privacy, it declined to consider the
effects of an unwarranted disclosure, preferring instead to limit
its holding under the Fourteenth Amendment to the facts before
it, holding that neither the immediate nor threatened impact of
disclosure was sufficient to constitute an invasion of any right or
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees. 51
Indeed, Whalen's distinction between informational and
substantive privacy heralded the development of two different
regimes to protect privacy: one statutory and one constitutional.
As the following section will point out, the unanswered question
the Court left open in Whalen-that is, whether there is a
49 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
50 Id at 605; see also SOLOVE AND ROTENBERG, supra note 30, at
189 (2002) (expressing confusion as to whether Whalen suggests a broad
constitutional right to information privacy, or a narrow constitutional right
that pertains to a personal information involving one's health, family,
children and other interests protected by the Court's substantive due process
right to privacy decisions).
51 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
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constitutionally protected right to informational privacy-is the
very question that informs the relationship between intellectual
property and privacy in the digital age.52 Instead of definitively
providing an answer to this question, the law has opted to
expand property rights to third parties, rather than to create a
comprehensive scheme to protect individuals from unwanted
surveillance.5 3 Moreover, the relationship between property and
privacy becomes even more complicated by the concomitant rise
of piracy in cyberspace, a factor which sets the stage for conflicts
between them.
B. A HIERARCHICAL VIEW FROM CYBERSPACE
Property in cyberspace is largely intangible, thus, the
architectural conditions that support the "private" nature of
ownership in real space-locks, borders, territorial space and
seclusion-are widely varying in their power and efficacy.
Initially, writing on the future of the Internet, John Perry
Barlow triumphantly declared, "legal concepts of property,
expression, identity, movement and context do not apply to us.
They are based on matter. There is no matter here."54  As
Barlow's powerful rhetoric suggests, the nature of both property
and identity have been transformed by their intangible,
evanescent character in cyberspace. And yet, at the same time,
several scholars have observed the prevailing tendency of
individuals to behave as if cyberspace is a "place" like any
other. 55 Cyberspace is often characterized in terms of "private"
52 After Whalen, the Court affirmed a related notion of privacy
in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), in which
the Court concluded that President Richard M. Nixon enjoyed a
constitutional privacy interest in private communications with his family, but
not in records that involved his official duties. After these cases, however,
the notion of a constitutional right to informational privacy has remained
distinctly unclear. As a result, some courts have drawn analysis from other
types of privacy law. See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 30, 189 (2003)
(observing the right to information privacy's resemblance to common law
prohibition against unreasonable publicity) (citing Smith v. City of Artesia,
772 P.2d 373, 376 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989)).
53 For a helpful treatment of these issues, see Pamela
Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (2000),
along with the other articles in the symposium.
54 John Perry Parlow, A Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace, in CRYPTOANARCHY, CYBERSTATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS 27, 29
(Ludlow ed., 2001).
55 See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the
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and "public" spaces: some parts of the Web are public, as are
many chatrooms, whereas email is private.56 The law, too, has
embraced this approach: recent case law is replete with
examples of territorial metaphor, as well. 57
Nevertheless, the preexisting balance between property
and privacy in real space dramatically changes when one enters
the intangible domain of cyberspace. For the intangibility of
digital space underlies many of the current debates facing
digital intellectual property, and creates the opportunity for
tradeoffs between the protection of privacy and property that
ordinarily do not exist in real space. 58 Cyberspace changes the
symbolic equation of privacy and property: the absence of
physical boundaries in cyberspace enables others to regularly
invade the privacy of others "with greater ease, efficiency, and
power than has been experienced in the physical world." 59
Since the law confers property rights over profiles of
consumer information to collectors, rather than the individual
Digital AntiCommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 453-54 (2003); Mark A. Lemley,
Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521 (2003). Hunter observes:
At its most fundamental, think of the term WEB, an
allusion to the 'web-like' connections between computers.
Then there is the NET, referring to the network of
connections as well as the net-like character of the material
caught in the network. We SURF this WEB, MOVING from
one site to the next, ENTERING or VISITING the site, or, in
the slightly old-fashioned nomenclature, we access someone's
HOMEPAGE. We HANG OUT IN CHATROOMS
communicating with our ONLINE buddies. We ROAM
AROUND Multiple User DUNGEONS and DOMAINS
("MUDs") and MUDs Object Oriented ("MOOs"). Software
programs called ROBOTS, AGENTS, or SPIDERS are allowed
to CRAWL over websites unless they are barred by terms and
conditions of ENTRY or ACCESS, or by the robot
EXCLUSION standard. We NAVIGATE the WEB using
computer programs with names like NAVIGATOR and
EXPLORER.... We log INTO or log ONTO our Internet
Service Provider ("ISP"). Malignant wrongdoers ACCESS our
accounts by hacking INTO the system using BACKDOORS,
TRAPDOORS, or stolen KEYS, and engage in computer
TRESPASSES.
56 Hunter, supra note 55, at 456.
57 Id. at 480-493.
58 See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property. Rights and
Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135 (2004).
59 Natalie L. Regoli, A Tort for Prying Eyes, 2001 J.L. TECH. &
POL'Y 267, 269 (2001).
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subject herself, it creates substantial incentives for surreptitious
monitoring of consumer activity. 60 And this, in turn, alters the
fragile balance of privacy and property by permitting
accumulation of data that is often enabled by careless
consumers who unwittingly consent to such collections, but who
continue to retain expectations of informational privacy. This
transition towards third-party ownership, in turn, has radically
altered the preexisting balance between privacy and property
contemplated in real space by subordinating the protection of
informational privacy to the accumulation of database
property.61
Some of these changes are attributable to an innate
transformation in the value of information itself. Although
information has always served as a resource, it was always
"relegated to the position of supporting other resources."6 2
Today, however, since the advent of digital technology,
information has become a valuable commodity in and of itself,
leading to a shift towards its commercialization. As a result, the
economic base of society has shifted from industry to
information, giving rise to such labels as the "Information
Revolution" or the "Information Society."63  Vast amounts of
personal information are now primed for harvest, distribution,
and disclosure to third parties on the Internet, often without the
individual's knowledge.6 4  Use of this information allows
companies to perfect the creation of a "virtual persona," or
"electronic persona"65 that comprises a profile of an individual
user's tastes, purchasing habits, Web sites visited, and other
identifying information. And, in perhaps the most ironic result
of the informational privacy debate, intellectual property rights
in such information are granted to the gatherer of the
information, instead of to the subject herself.66 As a result,
60 See, e.g., Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E. 2d 337 (1975); In re
DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F.Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
61 See J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property Rights in Data, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997); Jacqueline Lipton,
Information Wants to Be Property, 16 Int'l Rev. L. Computers & Tech 53
(2002).
62 Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight:
Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1,
12 (1996).
63 Id. at 18.





Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/7
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
property and privacy have developed a hierarchical relationship
to one another, a factor which enables tradeoffs between them.
1. PLACE AND PANOPTICISM
Our persistent tendency towards territorial metaphor is
certainly understandable; after all, both property and privacy
are inextricably linked to concepts of spatiality and exclusion.
Yet these tendencies pose troubling questions when we apply
them to cyberspace, because they often assume that the
architecture of cyberspace, like real space, adequately balances
protections for both privacy and property. Unlike real space,
where architecture and simple geography precluded neighbors
and the government from peering in on each other's activities,
today, the architecture of the Internet (quite unlike its brick and
mortar counterpart) facilitates, rather than prevents,
informational invasions.67
To begin with, the changing architecture of cyberspace
plays a vital and active role in facilitating consumer
surveillance-architectural elements like borders and fences
have extremely different capabilities when they are protecting
information, rather than tangible goods. 68 For example, most
content on the Internet-music, text, video, and other fixed
media-tends to be "served" from a central system that responds
to requests from a user. The user, or "client" requests
information, or content, from a server; the server then transmits
the information to the user.6 9 In this model, visitors to a Web
site do not interact with each other.70  Information simply
passes from one entity to another, and the recipients of the
information do not connect.7 1 Consumers connect to the Web
67 See Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63-64 (1999); Natalie L. Regoli, A Tort for Prying Eyes,
2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 267, 269 (2001) (the absence of physical
boundaries enables others to regularly invade the privacy-and property-of
others "with greater ease, efficiency and power than has been experienced in
the physical world.").
68 Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:
The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1378-84 (1989).
69 William W. Fisher III & Christopher Yang, Peer-to-Peer
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sites from intermittently connected personal computers ("PCs"),
which are usually at the edges of a network.7
2
This form of client-server Web architecture, predicated on
hierarchical principles, has yielded extremely successful
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), which provide information
to clients from servers always connected to the Internet. 73 Over
time, a few of these privileged servers, serving millions of
clients, have increasingly dominated the Internet.74 This model
works for almost all content, from streaming videos to
interactive games to online shopping. 75 As a result, ISPs have
developed into a private form of governance in cyberspace
because they maintain a substantial amount of consumer
information regarding users' online activities, and because they
often control the transmission and distribution of requested
information. 76 For these reasons, many consider the ISP the
principal repository for all identifying information regarding
individual users and their Web activities.
In contrast, a peer-to-peer framework essentially erases
the hierarchical division between client and server, thus turning
the idea of a network of Internet governance on its head. 77 A
peer-to-peer model creates a mode of communication that treats
each machine as a separate and equal entity in the sharing of
72 Clay Shirky, Listening to Napster, in PEER-TO-PEER:
HARNESSING THE POWER OF DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 21, 35 (Andy Oram
ed., 2001) [hereinafter PEER-TO-PEER].
73 ISPs can further be broken down into two separate groups:
Online Service Providers-such as America Online, Prodigy and Compuserve,
who provide both Internet access as well as a system for posting and
exchanging content-and Internet Access Providers, who simply provide
direct access to the Internet.
74 Nelson Minar & Marc Hedlund, A Network of Peers, in PEER-
TO-PEER, supra note 72, at 3-9.
75 Id. at 9.
76 See SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS'N, STRETCHING THE FABRIC
OF THE NET: EXAMINING THE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL OF PEER-TO-PEER
TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2001) [hereinafter SIJA].
77 See Minar & Hedlund, supra note 74, at 3. There are three
main categories of peer-to-peer systems: centrally coordinated, hierarchical,
and decentralized. Id. at 4-8. In a centrally coordinated system, a central
server, like Napster, mediates coordination between peers. Id. A
hierarchical peer-to-peer system organizes peers into different levels, and a
local coordinator mediates communication among peers in the same group.
Id. at 7-8. In a decentralized system (a true peer-to-peer framework), the
program provides users with a virtual underground railroad to exchange and
share files, and to evade direct, centralized control. Id. at 5-7.
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information.7 8  This model enables individual computers to
interact with one another by making it possible for one computer
to "ask" other computers directly for a specified type of file.
7 9
Each computer then forwards the request to a second tier of
computers, which in turn forwards the request to a third tier,
and so on.80  When the requested file is located, it is
automatically transmitted to the original user.8 1  In this
manner, peer-to-peer fragments transform each node on the
network into both client and server, allowing a file transfer (or
download) to be performed by a direct connection between both
users, instead of through a single channel.8 2
Although peer-to-peer frameworks seem deceptively
simple, their implications, both legally and socially, are
extraordinarily complex. They signal, for some, the end to the
power of censorship, copyright, and other types of legal
governance. Because these networks are extremely difficult to
control, it is possible for individuals to store and exchange
information freely without government intervention, even if the
information has been censored in some manner.8 3 True peer-to-
peer networks are also extremely difficult to shut down because
the nature of the technology makes it nearly impossible to track
the movement of information.8 4
Peer-to-peer networks, however, also potentially
transform the boundaries between public and private. Since
property in cyberspace is almost always wholly intangible in
nature, the material conditions that support the "private"
78 Id. at 4.
79 Fisher & Yang, supra note 69, at Introduction. These peer-to-
peer "nodes" operate outside of the traditional registry of domain names and
with significant autonomy from central servers. Shirky, supra note 72 at 22.
80 Fisher & Yang, supra note 69, at Introduction.
81 Id.
82 Kathy Bowrey & Matthew Rimmer, Rip, Mix, Burn: The
Politics of Peer to Peer and Copyright Law, 7 FIRST MONDAY 8, (Aug. 2002),
at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue7_8/bowrey/index.html; see also
Gene Kan, Gnutella, in PEER-TO-PEER, supra note 72, at 94, 94-95 (describing
how Gnutella, which uses a decentralized framework, transfers files from one
user to another); Minar & Hedlund, supra note 74, at 17 (describing how
Napster operates).
83 Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will
Napster, Gnutella and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehanna?, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1763-66 (2001); see also PEER TO PEER, supra
note 72, at 35.
84 Fisher & Yang, supra note 69, at Introduction.
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nature of ownership in real space-locks, borders, territorial
space, and seclusion-vary widely in their power and efficacy. 85
Actual seclusion is effectively impossible, since everything is
linked through networks, software, and hardware. As a result,
privacy and security in cyberspace depend most often on
consumer sophistication and technical knowledge, rather than a
simple preference for seclusion.
Consider the implications of a program called "Desk
Swap." Desk Swap is a program that makes a person's online
desktop visible to others across the Internet. When the software
begins, it takes a photograph of whatever is on a person's
desktop and sends it to the developer's computer, where it then
joins a host of other images that are then made visible to others.
Given the extent to which individuals often place personal
information on their desktops, the possibility of unintended
exposure is enormous. Yet the point of the program is not to
reveal others' personal information; there is another objective.
The programmer's purpose is to enable its users "to feel anew
this sense of panic about the loss of privacy and control in the
digital age, which may inspire them to be more cautious about
protecting their digital selves." 86 Likewise, since peer-to-peer
systems reconfigure the boundaries of private and public space,
they necessarily raise concerns about security, as well as trust
between peers. As one study notes on peer-to-peer systems:
85 See Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217. For excellent background reading on this topic,
see HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER (1993); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996);
Timothy Wu, When Law and the Internet First Met, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 171
(2000).
86 See Matthew Mirapaul, A Reality Show for Your Desktop, But
There s a Catch, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2001, at E2.
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"How secure can one feel in a decentralized
network? Is it possible for someone to look at
what's on your hard drive when you log into a peer-
to-peer network? The answers to these questions
lie in which peer-to-peer environment one joins.
Some have built in firewall-like mechanisms to
warn of hackers trying to access your computers,
while others leave your computer wide open....
Most consumer applications request that you leave
your PC on and accessible all the time. In such
'open' systems, you are permanently leaving a back
door open to your PC with all of the attendant
issues of privacy, virus attacks and other security
concerns."8 7
Although it is technically possible to employ some measures,
such as firewalls, to protect one's computer from unwanted
invasion, they are usually considered to be counterproductive to
a file-sharing environment.88 Moreover, one study found that a
majority of peer-to-peer users of Kazaa (a popular peer-to-peer
service) "were unable to tell what files they were sharing, and
sometimes incorrectly assumed they were not sharing any files
when in fact they were sharing all files on their hard drive."89
Such lack of knowledge raises the risk that other peers are
capable of accessing extremely personal information stored on
one's hard drive, particularly one's credit card, email
correspondence, and financial or social security information.9 0
Indeed, from both an architectural as well as a
philosophical perspective, cyberspace networks, particularly of
the peer-to-peer variety, bear much similarity to the Panopticon.
The Panopticon refers to the design of a prison that facilitates
constant surveillance by placing guards in a central tower,
thereby creating a sense of "conscious and permanent visibility
that assures the automatic functioning of power."91  The
87 SIIA, supra note 76, at 12.
88 Id.
89 Nathaniel S. Good & Aaron Krekelberg, Usability and
Privacy. A Study of P2P File-Sharing, at 1, available at
http://www.hpl.hp.com/shl/papers/kazaa/KazaaUsability.pdf (last visited Dec.
05, 2004).
90 Id.
91 OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 9 (1993).
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panoptic design, first mentioned by Jeremy Bentham and then
further developed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault,
applied to many different types of disciplinary surveillance,
including rehabilitation and education. 92  Foucault's
commentary is consciously tied to Bentham's own description,
which consists of a central tower, bordered by windows that are
made capable of gazing into various cells; each of those cells is
also made capable of looking into each others' spaces. 93 Each
cell, therefore, creates an illusion of solitariness, but ensures
that the person senses that he or she is being watched at the
same time. 94
The primary effect of this combination of space and
enclosure is for individuals to internalize the overseeing gaze of
authority figures, and eventually to discipline their behavior to
comport with expectations of these figures, irrespective of
whether or not they were actually present and watching at the
time. By creating the illusion of constant surveillance,
individuals begin to internalize the feeling of being observed.
"[I]t is at once too much and too little," Foucault wrote, "that the
prisoner should be constantly observed by an inspector."
Rather, "the inmate must never know whether he is being
looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may
always be so." 95
Any individual can operate the Panopticon, and no motive
is required; anyone was eligible, wrote Foucault, including "the
curiosity of the indiscreet, the malice of a child, the thirst for
knowledge of a philosopher who wishes to visit this museum of
human nature, or the perversity of those who take pleasure in
spying or punishing."96  Indeed, the more anonymous and
temporary observation can be, the greater the anxiety of the
person who is being watched.97 As Professor Daniel Solove
notes, "by constantly living under the reality that one could be
observed at any time, people assimilate the effects of
surveillance into themselves. They obey not because they are
92 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF
THE PRISON 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE
PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995).
93 FOUCAULT, supra note 92, at 200.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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monitored but because of their fear that they could be watched.
This fear alone is sufficient to achieve control."9 8 Surveillance is
prophylactic: it prevents legal transgressions by transforming an
external gaze into an internal one.99
While the panoptic metaphor has been crucial to
understanding disciplinary processes in real space, I would
argue that it is especially useful when applied to the effects of
surveillance on the Web. In a peer-to-peer environment, the
traditional distinction between private and public space readily
collapses, leaving open a minefield of possibilities for invasion
and observance. The identities and activities we adopt in
cyberspace can become transparently visible, compromising
privacy and identity. Many of our activities in cyberspace-
communications, files, stored pictures, online activities-can be
monitored, revealed, and recorded at the same time. As a result,
the file sharing revolution renders certain files stored on
individual computers potentially accessible, 100 from the most
personal to the most public information, enabling "invasion
without physical invasion."10 1  Moreover, in a peer-to-peer
system, there is no hierarchy: every computer has the same
authority to access data as every other computer, whether
owned by a state or private entity. In a world where individuals
store more and more personal information on computers, peer-
to-peer searches can become especially intrusive, particularly
since many individuals may not realize what they are sharing
online. 102  Consequently, the possibilities for information
gathering are enormous, irrespective of who authorizes or
initiates the investigation. 103
98 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases
and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1415 (2001).
99 Martin Jay, In the Empire of the Gaze: Foucault and the
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth -century French Thought, in FOUCAULT: A
CRITICAL READER 192 (David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986).
100 Indeed, while some peer-to-peer programs allow a person to
segregate shared files from private ones, the dependability of these barriers
varies according to the program. STIA, supra note 76, at 12 (discussing the
characteristics of various file sharing technologies).
101 Lessig, supra note 67, at 59.
102 Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General Searches, and
Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-Wide Search, 105
YALE L.J. 1093, 1096 (1996).
103 Aside from Kazaa's widely publicized use of spyware, one
recent study reports that forty-five percent of the executable files traded on
Kazaa, one of the most popular file sharing services, contain malicious code-
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2. THE DIGITAL PERSONA AS PROPERTY
As I have argued, the permeable boundaries between
private and public space clearly alter the relationship between
intellectual property and informational privacy. Here, Arendt's
distinction between the private sphere-as invisible, hidden,
and full of depth-and the comparatively more shallow public
sphere, offers us little solace. Many individuals attach privacy
expectations to their activities, identities, and expressions in
public space, particularly where the sharing of information is
concerned, even if the law fails to validate them.
Here, intellectual property principles play an inherently
contradictory role: on one hand, they serve as a theoretical
foundation for viewing the collection of consumer information as
property that can (and should) be treated like any other
commodity; on the other hand, the very same principles also
theoretically justify granting consumers greater control over
their personal information. 10 4 This tension between intellectual
property as a protective foundation for consumers, on one
hand-and data harvesters, on the other-creates an added, and
underlying, conflict regarding the propertization of personal
information. On one hand, as Rochelle Dreyfuss has pointed
out, intellectual property protections exist so that companies can
assert private control over personal information used publicly,
such as the copyright protection afforded to databases. 10 5 Yet,
today, intellectual property is now being considered as a
framework for individuals to assert rights over private activities
conducted publicly-such as surfing the net, purchasing by
computer, or through appearances in public places surveilled by
like viruses and Trojan horses. Some code was designed to infect other files
marked for sharing; others installed programs that enabled the sending of
spam through the computer; and still others stole personal information and
passwords saved on the computer. See Kim Zetter, Kazaa Delivers More
Than Tunes, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 9, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,61852,00.html/wn ascii.
104 See Samuelson, supra note 53; see also Vera Bergelson, It's
Personal But Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379 (2003); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in
Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO L. J. 2381
(1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies 54
HASTINGS L. J. 877 (2003).
105 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren and Brandeis Redux:
Finding (More) Privacy Protection In Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN.




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/7
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
video cameras. 10 6 As Dreyfuss points out, these activities take
place in public or semipublic spaces, even though privacy
advocates continue to analyze these activities under the rubric
of privacy principles.10
7
The nature of cyberspace also ushers in a contradictory
complication: we act as though we have perfect anonymity in
cyberspace, when in fact, much of the information we produce is
not only owned by others, but also subject to a great degree of
surveillance. Despite clear risks of panopticism, as Daniel
Solove has observed, the Internet "gives many individuals a
false sense of privacy. The secrecy and anonymity of the
Internet is often a mirage."10 8  Put another way, the Internet
offers an almost limitless possibility of identities, expressions,
and activities; on the other, it promises a vast array of
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the work of record-
keeping quietly continues.
The more strongly people perceive their informational
privacy and anonymity, the more likely they are to feel free to
fully create and express different identities and views in
cyberspace. Perceptions of anonymity in cyberspace have
enabled a level of participation in public discourse unlike
anything before, allowing individuals with limited financial
resources to "publish" information and opinions on matters of
public concern. 10 9 As Professor Sherry Turkle has written,
"[w]hen we step through the screen into virtual communities, we
reconstruct our identities on the other side of the looking
glass."110 Even outside of structured forums, a user can adopt a
multiplicity of gender, sexual, racial, or other categorical
identities, invent accompanying personal histories, and engage
in an assortment of acts that she would probably not perform in
real life.111 In other words, virtual space allows individuals to
construct identities they choose for themselves, rather than the
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1092 (2002).
109 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation
& Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 861 (2000).
110 Turkle argues that the Internet has enabled us to think about
identity in terms of multiple selves, rather than in terms of a singular,
unitary self. SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF
THE INTERNET 177 (1995).
111 id. at 212.
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ones they are born with.112 This ability to adopt transitory and
multiple identities is at the heart of cyberspace's limitless
possibility. 113
Obviously, the creation of such identities draws heavily
on perceptions of informational privacy. Initially, informational
privacy evolved under the notion that personal papers "fully and
transparently identified the people whose lives they
represented."'1 14  Yet today, the perception of informational
privacy extends, at least in cyberspace, to something quite
different: it covers the very act of creating personalities and
accessing information, in addition to the possibility of
anonymously publishing information. Suppose person Y chooses
to open an email account under an assumed name, and with
that identity to surf the Web, make purchases, sign on to
listservs, and engage in online conversation. Her online
identity, conversations, and activities are all "public" in the
sense that they can be subject to varying degrees of
transparency in cyberspace. However, her true identity, or her
personal information-preferences, shopping habits, web
searches-are all "private" in the sense that she might prefer
them to be secluded from public knowledge. Her perception of
anonymity permeates her expressions and activities in
cyberspace, in countless ways-from the words she chooses and
the identities she uses, to her choices in accessing
information. 115
In a related observation, Julie Cohen has argued for the
protection of "intellectual privacy," a principle that embraces the
privacy-related aspects of consumer acquisition and use of
materials as well as protection from disclosure. 116 Central to
this principle are three underlying themes: autonomy,
112 Id. at 226, 240.
113 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
33 (1999) (Whereas real space requires that you reveal "your sex, your age,
how you look, what language you speak, whether you can see, whether you
can hear, [and] how intelligent you are," cyberspace requires only that you
reveal your computer address.).
114 Philip E. Agre, The Architecture of Identity, INFORMATION,
COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY, at 1, 3 (1999).
115 See A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information
Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15
J.L. & COM. 395 (1996).
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informational privacy, and spatial privacy. 117  Intellectual
privacy, in Cohen's formulation, applies to protect the
consumption of intellectual property products within
presumptively private spaces, as well as the nexus between
intellectual exploration and private physical space. 118 As Cohen
points out:
Just as spatial privacy allows for physical nudity,
so it also allows for metaphorical nudity; behind
closed doors, one may shed the situational personae
that one adopts with co-workers, neighbors, fellow
commuters, or social acquaintances, and become at
once more transparent and more complex than any
of those personae allows. Spatial privacy affords
the freedom to explore areas of intellectual interest
that one might not feel as free to explore in public.
It also affords the freedom to dictate the
circumstances - the when, where, how, and how
often - of one's own intellectual consumption,
unobserved and unobstructed by others. 119
In response to these interests, privacy advocates, along
with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), have espoused
concrete norms to protect personal data. 120  As a result,
interactions between commercial Web sites and their visitors are
framed in terms of visible, declaratory assurances of
informational privacy. 12 1 Many individuals have felt a growing
sense of entitlement to their informational privacy, despite the
technology that exists for massive information-gathering on the
Internet. 122 Moreover, in addition to the FTC regulations,
117 Id.
118 Id. at 576.
119 Id. at 579.
120 Steven A. Hetcher, Commentaries on Eric Posner's Law and
Social Norms: Cyberian Signals, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 327, at 337-38 (2002),
citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1), 41-58 (observing that the Federal Trade
Commission has spearheaded a number of efforts to protect consumer privacy
on the Web pursuant to its authority under the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which mandates that the agency respond to "unfair" and "deceptive"
trade practices). For a discussion of the FTC's role in protecting privacy, see
Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV 1609
(1999); Jeff Sovern, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305 (2001).
121 Hetcher, supra note 120, at 331.
122 For example, some Web sites are capable of collecting
"clickstream data," which tracks a user's computer as it navigates through
the Web, monitoring the time, order and duration the computer spent on each
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Congress has enacted The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, which restricts the interception of oral, wire, and
electronic communications while in transit; and the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, as well as other provisions. 123
Yet, despite the laudable principles behind the
entitlement to informational privacy, the reality of protection is
quite different. Instead of ensuring consumer protection, the
technological means for consumer monitoring have grown even
more advanced-and more subtle-with the passage of time. 124
Today, techniques of data collection are especially pernicious
because they are subtle, ongoing, largely unregulated, and
inextricably linked to a person's online activities. 125 Various
entities collect an enormous amount of personal information
from users with scant attention to the moral and legal privacy
implications raised by its collection. 126 Web sites use "tracking
software" that logs information about users, which is then used
Web page as well as any files downloaded or accessed.
123 See, e.g., the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (regulating government record-
keeping); and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (protecting the disclosure of
credit information).
124 Id. Although many Net users operate under an illusion of
anonymity, the reality is often that one's online activities can very easily be
monitored. Richard T. DeGeorge, Law and Ethics in the Information Age, 20
BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL ETHICS JOURNAL 5, 12-18 (2001) (concluding,
"[t]he voluntary approach to privacy protection does not work, and often
raises false beliefs and expectations.")
125 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1195-99 (1998) (discussing how the
private sector seeks to exploit data commercially for database marketing);
Jonathan Krim, Web Firms Choose Profit over Privacy, Policies Can Hide
Sale of Customer Data, WASH. POST, July 1, 2003, at Al (noting that many
Web sites promise to protect consumer information from sale to a third party,
but instead often rent the information to others). For other studies on the
surreptitious collection of information in cyberspace, see generally Roger
Clarke, Information Technology and Data veillance, available at
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM88.html (1988); A.
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacyl 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000); Paul
M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609
(1999).
126 One study conducted by the FTC found that ninety-two
percent of the 674 Web sites it visited collected personal information from
their visitors, but eighty-six percent of those did not disclose their reasons for
collecting the information or share what they did with the data after
collection. Michelle Z. Hall, Note, Internet Privacy or Information Piracy.
Spinning Lies on the World Wide Web, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 609, 610
(2002) (citing FTC, FTC Releases Report on Consumers' Online Privacy, at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/06/privacy2.htm (June 4, 1998)).
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for a variety of purposes. 127  ISPs are capable of tracking
software downloaded by individuals. 128 These records are a form
of identification: Web server logs show that an individual using
a particular ISP visited a Web site on a certain date and time,
and the ISP usually keeps records of the identity of the IP
address holders. 129 Others use "Web bugs," which are small,
invisible graphics placed on Web sites or email messages to
monitor the activities of individual users. 130 On email messages,
Web bugs allow the creator of the message to know when the
message was read, to detect the IP address of an anonymous
user, and to determine if and when the message is forwarded to
others. 131 These examples suggest that companies are routinely
harvesting consumer information, ironically even as the FTC
requires them to profess a public commitment to protecting
consumer privacy.
The most significant illustration of this development
stems from the growing expansion of property rights over
consumer information to the harvesters themselves, rather than
the individual. 132  Without a corresponding architectural
structure to supplement the human desire for seclusion, it
becomes extremely difficult to discern a clear dividing line
between public and private information.
This situation is best demonstrated by reference to web
browsing information, which reflects a similar hierarchical
divergence between expectations of privacy and property. As
127 In a tracking software system, every time a user requests
certain information from a content provider, that request is stored on an
"access log" that stores the user's Internet address, computer type, requested
page, date, and time, most of which are transmitted back to the provider in
order to track the Web site requested, the information found, and levels of
activity on the site, along with other types of information. See Hall, supra
note 126, at 616.
128 Marc Waldman ET AL.., Trust, in PEER-TO-PEER 242, 244
(Andy Oram ed., 2001).
129 Id. at 250-51.
130 John MacDonnell, Exporting Trust: Does E-Commerce Need a
Canadian Privacy Sea] of Approval, 39 ALTA. L. REV. 346, 355-56 (2001)
(describing the various ways third parties employ "Web bugs" online).
131 Lynn Chuang Kramer, Private Eyes Are Watching You:
Consumer Online Privacy Protection - Lessons from Home and Abroad, 37
TEX. INT'L L.J. 387, 394-95 (2002); see also ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAWS AND
DEVELOPMENTS 60 (2002) (additional privacy concerns).
132 Bergelson, supra note 104, at 383.
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Professor Solove has pointed out, individuals are not the lone
creators of their web-browsing information, partly because so
much of that information is created by the interaction between
the user and various web sites. 133  Moreover, much of the
information that is used is likely to be considered public
information-names, addresses, telephone numbers, or e-mail
addresses. 134 Yet, at the same time, however, it is undeniable
that a consumer might consider a significant amount of a
person's online activities-surfing particular sites, for
example-to be private and sensitive information. 135
Nevertheless, in perhaps the most ironic result of the
informational privacy debate, intellectual property rights in
such information are granted to the gatherer of the information,
instead of to the subject herself.136 Indeed, an individual, at
least doctrinally speaking, has little power to control, own, or
prevent disclosure of personal information held by third parties
to other, institutional information-seekers. 137 For example, in
United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that a person
had no legitimate "expectation of privacy" in his bank records
after they were turned over to a third party. 138 Given the
absence of a clearly defined, legislative enforcement mechanism
to protect informational privacy, constitutional or otherwise, in
cyberspace, a system of self-regulation has sprung up to
ostensibly honor a governing principle: a Web site should leave a
person's consumer information alone, except to the extent that
the person consents to the use and collection of his or her
personal data. 139 Yet, despite this praiseworthy proposition,
once an item of information has been recorded in an online
133 Solove, supra note 23, at 1112.
134 Jessica Thill, The Cookie Monster: From Sesame Street to
Your Hard Drive, 52 S. CAR. L. REV. at 924, 938 (2001). See Electronic
Privacy Information Center, Privacy and Consumer Profiling, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling; James P. Nehf, Recognizing the
Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2003);
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1424-25 (2001), and JEFFREY
ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8
(2001).
135 Id.
136 See Bergelson, supra note 104, at 383 ("Under the current
law, individuals neither own their personal information, nor have a
recognized privacy interest in it.").
137 Mell, supra note 17, at 20
138 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
139 See Hetcher, supra note 120, at 335.
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computer system, no consistent rules govern the ownership of
such information not already protected by copyright or other
intellectual property doctrines. 140
The most apt symbol of this development involves legal
claims over database property, which are considered a robust
form of commodifiable property, even though they raise strong
privacy implications. For example, in In re Toysmart.eom, a
bankruptcy court permitted the sale of personal consumer
information to a third party, despite the fact that its original
privacy policy expressly promised that "personal
information .... is never shared with a third party," and that "all
information obtained by toysmart.com is used only to
personalize your experience online." 141  Despite these
guarantees, a bankruptcy court permitted the sale of
Toysmart.com's database to a third party entity, pursuant to the
third-party's assurances to the FTC that it would maintain the
same privacy standards of Toysmart.com itself.142 In response, a
dissenting commissioner curtly observed, "[i]f we really believe
that consumers attach great value to their personal information
and that consumers would be able to limit access to such
information through private agreements, we should compel
businesses to honor the promises that they make to consumers.
.In my view, such a sale should not be permitted because
never' really means never."143
Clearly, the commodification of personal information,
particularly in the Internet context, has powerful implications,
altering the incentives for protection for consumer privacy.
Here, the construct of information as property-particularly as
database property-actively subordinates the protection of
privacy to property principles. 144  This observation seems
relatively straightforward in the context of a sale of database of
personal information (like Toysmart.com), but it is equally
140 See Mell, supra note 17, at 22.
141 See In re Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr.
D.Mass. July 20, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/
toysmarttbankruptcy. 1.htm.
142 Id.
143 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Swindle, In re
Toysmart.com, LLC, No. X000075, available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2000/07/toysmartswindlestatement.htm.
144 For a wonderful discussion of the relationship between
privacy and property in the data context, see Paul M. Schwartz, Property,
Privacy and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004).
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applicable to other contexts as well. Cookies, for example, are
pieces of code that provide a Web site with information about a
user and that can be used to identify her computer to create
personalized marketing information. 145  In one of the first
privacy cases regarding web browsing information, In re
DoubleCick, the plaintiffs contended that DoubleClick's cookies
illegally collected information that Web users considered to be
personal and private information,-including a user's name,
email address, home and business address, telephone number,
searches performed, and Web sites visited. This information
was then aggregated and compiled to build demographic profiles
of the users, eventually resulting in 100 million profiles. 146 Just
before the case was filed, DoubleClick purchased Abacus Direct
Corp., a direct marketing service company that maintained a
database of names, addresses, telephone numbers, retail
purchasing habits, and other personal information of
approximately 90 percent of U.S. households. 147  Certain
members of the public feared, perhaps justifiably, that a merger
between the two companies might result in their matching
information about the on and off-line behavior of individual
households. 148 Later, a number of plaintiffs filed suit in federal
court, making claims under federal and state law, including
allegations that DoubleClick had violated the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the Federal Wiretap Act,
145 Seth R. Lesser, Privacy Law in the Internet Era: New
Developments and Directions, in FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW:
STRATEGIES FOR LEGAL COMPLIANCE IN A HIGH TECH AND CHANGING
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course, Handbook Series No. GO-OGO, 2000), available at
WL 607 PLI/PAT *141, at *143 (2000).
146 Id. at *144. The first time a user accesses a Web site that is
part of the DoubleClick network, composed of over 11,000 sites, a cookie with
a globally unique identifier (GUID) is placed on her computer. Every time
she accesses any of the Web sites connected to the network, the information
is automatically transmitted back to DoubleClick, thus allowing the company
to build a portfolio of information about an individual consumer. Seth R.
Lesser, Privacy Law in the Internet Era: New Developments and Directions,
607 PLI/Pat 141 at 144 (2000); See also In re DoubleCliek Privacy Litigation,
No. 00 CIV 0641 NRB, 2001 WL 303744 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2001)..
147 See Doubleelick, 2001 WL 303744, at *505.
148 Indeed, shortly after it acquired Abacus, DoubleClick removed
its assurance from its Privacy Policy that information gathered from users
online would not be associated with their personally identifiable information.
Shortly thereafter, the FTC launched an investigation into whether
DoubleClick's collection of consumer information constituted an unfair and
deceptive trade practice. Id.
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various state laws governing privacy, and common law invasions
of privacy and trespass to property. 149
In a significant opinion, the district court rejected each of
these claims and dismissed the complaint, marking the first
time a court dealt substantively with company-sponsored
information harvesting, and invasions of consumer privacy by
computer monitoring. In doing so, the court drew several
conclusions that extended property rights in the information to
harvesters, rather than to the individuals themselves. The court
first distinguished DoubleClick's property rights to the cookies
in questions from the privacy rights of the parties, subjugating
the latter to the former. In stark contrast to the principles set
forth by both Locke and Warren and Brandeis, the court's
opinion suggested that an individual's personal identifying
information is the property of the company that harvests it, not
of the consumer. Rather than construing the information as a
property held by the consumer, the court placed a primary value
on the company's property rights to the information. 150  In a
powerful assertion of DoubleClick's rights over the cookies
placed on the individual hard drives, the court observed:
"Even if we were to assume that cookies and their
identification numbers were 'electronic
communication[s] . . in electronic storage,'
DoubleClick's access is still authorized.... In every
practical sense, the cookies' identification numbers
are internal DoubleClick communications-both 'of
and 'intended for' DoubleClick. DoubleClick
creates the cookies, assigns them identification
numbers, and places them on plaintiffs' hard
drives."1 5
1
In other words, the opinion suggested that the cookies were the
ultimate property of DoubleClick, irrespective of the consumer's
proprietary interests in the information, and should take
precedence over the privacy rights of the individual consumers
149 Id. at *500, *507.
150 As a basic matter, the court held that the cookies placed on
the individual hard drives were not in "electronic storage" under the ECPA,
because they remained on the plaintiffs computers virtually indefinitely, and
the ECPA was intended only to protect communications held in interim
storage by electronic communication service providers. Id. at 511-13.
151 Id. at 513.
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themselves. The court explained that users generally-
unwittingly-contractually authorize Web sites to gather
information because the Web sites they visit may allow banner
advertisements to gather information. 152  Consequently, the
court reasoned that the visit itself suggested consumer consent
to such monitoring. 15 3
Thus, given the property rights accorded to DoubleClick,
the court held that DoubleClick could not be held liable for any
invasions of privacy that the cookies themselves cause. Because
the cookies do not actually store information, but instead merely
identify browsers associated with particular information, the
court observed that nothing could legally preclude third parties
from obtaining this information by agreement. 154 In a striking
observation, the court observed that "[t]he cookies and their
identification numbers are vital to DoubleClick and meaningless
to anyone else."1 55 It also found that the cookies are akin to
''purely internal administrative data" meant only for
DoubleClick, not for the consumer. 15 6 Here, the court explained
that virtually "all" plaintiffs are "unaware" that the cookies
exist, that they have identification numbers, and that the
numbers are critical to DoubleClick's operations. 157 The court
analogized that a cookie was akin to a barcode placed on a
business reply card. 158 Barcodes and identification numbers,
like cookies, are meaningless to consumers, but valuable to
companies. 159
Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiffs claims under
the Federal Wiretap Act, which provides for criminal
punishment and a private right of action against any person
who intentionally intercepts an electronic communication for the
purpose of committing a tortious act in violation of federal or
152 Id. See Alexander H. Burke, Information Harvesting on the
Net, 14 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 125, 134 (2002); see also Chance v. Avenue
A., Inc., 165 F. Supp.2d 1153, 1161 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
153 Id. See also Chance, 165 F. Supp2d at 1161. For an opposing
view, see Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 13.




158 Id. But see Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 9 (disagreeing with this
view).
159 Doubleelick, Inc., at 515.
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state law. 160  Here, the court implicitly suggested that the
presence of profit motives or ordinary business practices could
reasonably immunize trespass of a person's confidential
information. The court opined that even if it found that
DoubleClick committed every act alleged in the Complaint, the
mere commission of a tortious act does not prove a tortious
purpose. Citing congressional commentary, it pointed out
"[t]here are, of course, certain situations in which consensual
electronic surveillances may be used for legitimate purposes ...
without intending in any way to harm the nonconsenting
party."161 Because DoubleClick's motives were determined to be
commercial in nature, not illegal or tortious, there was no
evidence to raise the question of whether DoubleClick acted with
a tortious purpose, and the court dismissed the claim.16 2
In reaching these conclusions, however, the court actually
reversed a number of perceptions among the U.S. public
regarding the entitlement to informational privacy. For
example, the court's opinion wrongly suggests that such tracking
information-and the act of tracking the information itself-are
activities that are somehow "meaningless" to the actual
consumer. This observation is belied by the court's own opinion.
Indeed, after rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, the court appeared
to recognize that DoubleClick's actions did violate normative
expectations of informational privacy. The court, for example,
concluded its decision by declaring that the consumer privacy
concerns raised in the litigation were "not unknown to
Congress," and predicted that congressional action on privacy
protection was a likely possibility. "Congress is aware of the
conduct plaintiffs' challenge and is sensitive to the privacy
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 The court observed, "DoubleClick's purpose has plainly not
been to perpetuate torts on millions of users, but to make money by providing
a valued service to commercial Web sites." Id. at 519. In analyzing the
plaintiffs' third claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1030, the court also found that the aggrieved plaintiffs did not plead a
cognizable cause of action because they had failed to allege facts that could
support the finding that the alleged injuries-invasion of privacy, trespass to
personal property, and misappropriation of confidential data-met the $5,000
threshold requirement. Because the plaintiffs could have, at no cost to
themselves, prevented DoubleClick from collecting personal information by
selecting options on their browsers or by using an "opt-out" cookie from
DoubleClick's Web site, the Court found that any remedial economic losses
were insignificant, "if, indeed, they exist at all." Id. at 520.
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concerns it raises," the court concluded, plainly recognizing that
the injury visited on the plaintiffs was problematic, even if not
cognizable by preexisting legislation.16
3
In many ways, the Court's treatment symbolizes the
growing divide between expectation and reality that
characterizes the state of informational privacy in cyberspace.
On one hand, the court clearly recognized the rhetorical force
behind entitlements of informational privacy and its
accompanying expectations in cyberspace, but on the other
hand, it placed a greater value on the property rights of the
monitoring company itself. In this context, as well, principles of
informational privacy, fail to protect against the surreptitious
collection of data; rather, property rights become reified through
its subordination.
II. THE CONVERGENCE BETWEEN CONSUMER AND PIRACY
SURVEILLANCE
The developments that I have outlined above-the
increasing prominence of an electronic persona, and the
increasing subtleties behind monitoring the electronic persona-
may seem distinguishable, but they become even more
intimately related in the peer-to-peer context, particularly
where copyright enforcement is concerned. Indeed, the confused
and somewhat fearful way both public and private entities have
responded to peer-to-peer file sharing demonstrates an
interesting convergence of interests between anti-piracy
advocates and harvesters of personal information. The end
result is a regime of surveillance that quietly mimics regimes of
consumer monitoring: here, intellectual property owners have
sought to find ways to protect their works from unauthorized
use, thereby creating a new mode of monitoring that crosses the
boundaries between commercial self-interest and prurient
intrusion on informational privacy. And, just as undesirably,
such regimes have led both public and private entities to
respond even more forcefully than necessary, seeking to erode
not only the peer-to-peer networks that have sprouted
throughout the Net, but the protection of informational privacy
and identity.
163 Doubleclick, Inc., at 520.
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In the previous section, I argued that perceptions of
informational privacy and anonymity in cyberspace have
inevitably led individuals to perceive a mantle of anonymity that
they might not enjoy in real life. 164 Add to this another element:
peer-to-peer file-sharing programs that permit the exchange of
copyrighted content from each other's hard drives. 165 Obviously,
the seduction-and danger-of the peer-to-peer world is that it
enables the seemingly anonymous and widespread distribution
of content, such as film, music, software, and text.
Unsurprisingly, the potential for unauthorized transmission of
copyrighted works has led some to characterize the Internet, for
better or worse, as a "pirate utopia."166 Yet despite the clear risk
of panoptic surveillance discussed in the previous section, peer-
to-peer networks are permeated with a high perception of
cooperation and trust between users, which raises the question
of why, in the face of such risks of detection, individuals
continue to cooperate so readily in sharing their files with
others. 167
For some time, file sharers believed that no one was
watching as millions continued to upload and download
copyrighted files with impunity. According to Professor Lior
Strahilevitz, an additional explanation for such cooperative
behavior stemmed from "charismatic code," which involves
"technologies that magnify cooperative behavior and mask
uncooperative behavior in peer-to-peer networks."168 Since peer-
to-peer applications are designed to encourage cooperation by as
many users as possible, they harnessed actual members of the
community to enforce norms of file sharing and to encourage
164 A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information
Ocean: Living With Anonymity, Digital Case, And Distributed Databases, 15
J.L. CoM. 395, 462-464 (1996).
165 See Hari Balakrishnan, et. al., Looking Up Data in P2P
Systems, 46 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 43 (2003).
166 See Hakim Bey, The Temporary Autonomous Zone, in CRYPTO
ANARCHY, CYBERSTATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS 401 (Peter Ludlow ed., 2001)
(comparing online communities to our perception of pirate communities).
167 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms,
and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File -Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L.
REV. 505, 508 (2003); see also Michael Feldman et. al., Free Riding and White
Washing in Peer to Peer Systems, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM SIGCOMM
WORKSHOP ON PRACTICE AND THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN NETWORKED SYSTEMS
228 (2004), at http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1016527.1016539.
168 Strahilevitz, supra note 167, at 510.
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reciprocity. 169 Another explanation for widespread complicity in
copyright infringement is provided by Professor Tim Wu, who
argues that peer-to-peer networks exploit an important
ambiguity regarding ethics of home copying. 170 Unlike norms
against stealing in real space, which are generally well-
established, peer-to-peer networks are designed to "look and feel
more like non-commercial home copying [of copyrighted
content]," thereby blurring the distinction between "stealing"
and "copying." 17
1
Part of the reason for the growth of such strategies
ultimately stems from the nature of copyright law itself.
Copyright law has traditionally relied on private entities-
owners, private detectives, creators-for its execution. Although
the No Electronic Theft Law Act ("NET Act"),172 for example,
provides for criminal prosecutions for infringement (even where
no monetary profit or commercial gain can be derived from the
infringing activity), most copyright actions tend to involve
private, rather than public, modes of enforcement. A decision to
enter into a lawsuit over infringement is completely
discretionary to the copyright owner, 173 as is a copyright owner's
ability to silence the speech of others through actions for
infringement. Moreover, copyright law is infused with
gatekeeper concepts, in that third parties often play key roles to
169 Id. at 534. In one example, a Gnutella screen falsely
represented to users: "The other half of Gnutella is giving back. Almost
everyone on GnutellaNet shares their stuff." Id. at 550.
170 See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 685
(2003).
171 Id.
172 No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147 (1997)
(codified in the sections of 17 & 18 U.S.C.). Under these provisions,
individuals can also be held civilly liable for actual damages of lost profits.
Id. Online infringement of copyrighted music is punishable by up to three
years in prison and $250,000 in fines, or six years for repeat offenders. See
Karen J. Bernstein, The No Electronic Theft Act: The Music Industry's New
Instrument in the Fight Against Internet Piracy, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 325
(2000) (discussing the NET Act and sentencing guidelines under it); Michael
Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 235, 250-52
(1999) (discussing changes in the criminal law after the passage of the NET
Act); Heather Jacobson & Rebecca Green, Computer Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 273, 288-92 (2002) (discussing the NET Act and other acts regarding the
illegality of online piracy).
173 This observation extends to the patent context as well. See
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prevent infringement. 174 Following this model, copyright law
has traditionally imposed liability on parties who were capable
of copying and distributing works, like book publishers, record
manufacturers, film studios, and others capable of producing
works on a massive scale. 1
75
Yet, partly due to the outcome of various cases in the
peer-to-peer context, particularly Grokster, liability has been
shifted towards individual users, rather than software
intermediaries. 176 As a result, in the wake of Napster and the
DMCA, peer-to-peer file sharing has become the new proxy for
criminality and infringement. 177 Just as the law's failure to
protect individual privacy has facilitated the creation of
consumer surveillance, it has also enabled intellectual property
owners to develop similarly panoptic strategies to address the
problem of piracy. Intellectual property owners have responded
to peer-to-peer file sharing in a way that exposes a clear synergy
between consumer monitoring and copyright enforcement. They
have done so by attempting to expand the law to control the
dynamics of Web architecture, informational privacy, and
anonymity, and by enabling intellectual property owners to
detect and defend their products against unauthorized uses.
Today, the seemingly intractable problem of digital piracy
has led to the creation of massive offensives-criminal, civil, and
international-spearheaded by private intellectual property
owners. Private companies routinely join forces with law
enforcement officials to investigate and prosecute individuals for
trafficking in pirated materials. 178 The music industry has also
174 See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53-54 (1986).
175 See Wu, supra note 170, at 710.
176 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154, 1164-1166 (9th Cir. 2004).
177 See Aaron M. Bailey, A Nation of Felons: Napster, the NET
Act, and the Criminal Prosecution of File-Sharing, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 473
(2000) (offering a treatment of the criminal implications of illegal file
sharing).
178 See RIAA, RIAA Releases Mid-year Anti-Piracy Statistics, at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/press200l/100901. asp (last visited Oct.
17, 2003) (reporting that the RIAA works closely with federal, state, and local
officials, and that it aided in 1,762 arrests and indictments in the first six
months of 2001). In 1999, for example, Jeffrey Levy, a student at the
University of Oregon, pled guilty to criminal copyright infringement for his
use of school computers to post software and music on the Web for others to
download. See Ashbel S. Green, Net Piracy Gets First Conviction: UO
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launched a calculated attempt to shift the political and economic
costs of copyright enforcement onto third parties, particularly
ISPs. 179 A constant drumbeat of threatened suits, both direct
and contributory, has resulted in a host of measures taken by
ISPs out of fear of liability for copyright infringement. 180 The
recording industry's armies of anti-piracy investigators routinely
crawl through the Internet, including university networks,
searching for and logging presumed unauthorized uses of
copyrighted material. 18 1
As part of this attack on consumer downloading, the RIAA
relies on using the term "piracy" to denote an alarmingly
expansive array of activities. The use of the concept of piracy to
refer to the unauthorized duplication of original commercial
products,18 2 or counterfeiting,1 8 3 dates back to the nineteenth
Student, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 21, 1999, available at 1999 WL
5367412. In announcing the prosecution's case, Assistant Attorney General
James K. Robinson declared:
Mr. Levy's case should serve as a notice that the
Justice Department has made prosecution of Internet piracy
one of its priorities .... Those who engage in this activity,
whether or not for profit, should take heed that we will bring
federal resources to bear to prosecute these cases. This is
theft, pure and simple.
Id
Today, the Department of Justice has listed intellectual property
crimes as one of its key priorities. See Katie Dean, Ashcroft Announces
Assault on Piracy, wired.com, October 14, 2004.
179 See infra Part III. The RIAA, a trade association whose
membership produces ninety percent of all sound recordings in the United
States, fights "a well-nigh constant battle against Internet piracy, monitoring
the Internet daily, and routinely shutting down pirate Websites by sending
cease-and-desist letters and bringing lawsuits." Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999); RIAA,
What the RIAA Is Doing About Piracy, at
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/riaa.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003)
(describing the RIAA's strategy of using subpoenas that require ISPs to
identify the operators of sites that host infringing files).
180 See text accompanying notes 258-369.
181 As part of this program, anti-piracy forces have also implicitly
equated Internet piracy with other types of undesirable criminality. One
method focuses primarily on consumer education; the RIAA actively
propagates the notion that downloading MP3s, or copying other copyrighted
works, is simply another form of theft. See RIAA, Penalties of Piracy, at
http://www.riaa.com/ issues/piracy/penalties.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003)
(defining different copyrights and outlining possible penalties for copyright
infringement).
182 Anderson v. Nidorf, 26 F.3d 100, 101 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994)
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century.18 4 Today, however, the term also suggests the growing
power of content owners to discursively define much more
expansive controls over access to content itself.185 Suddenly, for
the RIAA's purposes, it seems that downloading music for
personal purposes is "piracy," equated via sheer rhetoric to
organized, usually criminal, counterfeiting of intellectual
property. So, too, is sharing music, lending someone a tape, or
perhaps even recording a sample of music on an answering
machine. All of these acts, seemingly innocuous and innocent
just a few years ago, today arguably fall under the rubric of
"piracy," a metaphor suggesting that these acts are somehow
(quoting from Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2311 (1982)); see also Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d at 1072
(discussing piracy as the unauthorized copying of copyrighted materials).
183 As Judge Posner observed, "[p]iracy and the infringement of
copyrights, titles (presumably of books, songs, products, services, and so
forth), and slogans (advertising and other) are simply different forms of theft
(broadly conceived) of information." Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan
Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d 1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994).
184 See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454 (1818) (describing
an alleged use of a flour manufacturing machine as "piracy").
185 Indeed, the term "piracy" is now ubiquitous throughout media
commentary on intellectual property law, a largely unhelpful but rhetorically
powerful term that is often bandied about by lawyers and activists to denote
a vast array of seemingly "illegal" activities. See Jessica Litman, War
Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 342-50 (2002). Litman states:
Piracy used to be about folks who made and sold large
numbers of counterfeit copies. Today, the term 'piracy' seems
to describe any unlicensed activity .... Content owners argue
that the reason consumers are now pirates is that technology
now makes it possible for small-scale unauthorized users to
commit grand theft. From the so-called pirates' point of view,
though, they are doing the same sort of things unlicensed
users have always done-making copies of things for their own
consumptive use, sharing their copies with their friends, or
taking the works apart to see how they operate. What has
changed is not the behavior but the epithet. Content owners
are understandably concerned that in a digital environment,
conduct that used to be harmless might have the same effect
as the commercial sale of large numbers of counterfeit copies.
They have managed to persuade a substantial segment of the
public that if behavior theoretically could have the same effect
as piracy, it must be piracy, and must therefore reflect the
same moral turpitude we attach to piracy, even if is the same
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contemporaneously equivalent to crossing the high seas,
invading a ship, stealing its contents, and threatening life. 186
This strategy has been effective. 187  The RIAA has
threatened ISPs and universities with contributory infringement
suits if they do not act immediately to reveal the identity of
subscribers, terminate the subscribers' Internet connections,
and issue generalized threats of criminal prosecution to the
student body. 188 In April 2003, the RIAA took another step,
186 The RIAA's Web site, for example, declares that piracy is "old
as the Barbary coast, new as the Internet." Its announcement observes:
No black flags with skulls and crossbones, no
cutlasses, cannons, or daggers identify today's pirates. You
can't see them coming; there's no warning shot across your
bow.... Today's pirates operate not on the high seas but on
the Internet, in illegal CD factories, distribution centers, and
on the street. The pirate's credo is still the same-why pay for
it when it's so easy to steal? The credo is as wrong as it ever
was. Stealing is still illegal, unethical, and all too frequent in
today's digital age. That is why RIAA continues to fight
music piracy." RIAA, Anti-Piracy, at http://www.riaa.com/
issues/piracy/default.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003). The
RIAA defines music piracy in four specific categories: (1)
pirate recordings, or the unauthorized duplication of only the
legitimate recordings, minus the trade packaging normally
associated with the music product; (2) counterfeit recordings,
or unauthorized recordings of the prerecorded sound as well
as the unauthorized duplication of original artwork, label,
trademark, and packaging; (3) underground or "bootleg"
recordings, or unauthorized recordings of live concerts or
those broadcast on radio or television; and (4) online piracy,
involving the unauthorized uploading of a copyrighted sound
recording to make it publicly available, downloading the
sound recording from the Internet site (even if it is not
resold), or certain uses of "streaming" technology from the
Internet.
Id.
187 In the first half of 2001, for example, the RIAA announced
that its efforts "led to a record number of arrests, raids, illegal product
seizures, guilty pleas and convictions." See RIAA, RiAA Releases 2001
Physical Anti-Piracy Figures, at
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/040502.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2003)
(discussing copyright enforcement methods utilized in 2001).
188 In 2003, the RIAA sent letters to every university and college
in the United States, as well as the top one thousand corporations, reminding
them of their obligations as ISPs. See RIAA, Actions Taken by U.S. Music
Community to Step Up Public Education Efforts in Just the Past Twelve
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filing suits against four college students accused of using
internal college networks to facilitate file trading, 189 and
announcing its plan to sue others. Since then, over six thousand
people have been sued for copyright infringement, including a
twelve-year-old girl. 190 As a result, ISPs have also taken up the
mantle of copyright enforcement: employers and universities
have banned the use of file sharing software, fired employees for
engaging in acts of copyright infringement at work, and
threatened to prosecute and expel students for their file sharing
activities. 191 Some colleges refuse to permit individuals to send
MP3 files at all, irrespective of whether the files fall under fair
use or are taken from the public domain. 192 A multitude of ISPs
act immediately after receiving notice from intellectual property
owners, taking down Web sites and terminating Internet access
for their subscribers with little concern for whether or not the
alleged infringement is actually taking place. 193
189 See Reuters, RIAA Sues College File Traders, WIRED NEWS,
Apr. 3, 2003, at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,58340,00.html.
190 Katie Dean, Movie Studios Sue File Traders, WIRED NEWS,
Nov. 16, 2004, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0, 1412,65730,00.html.
Kristen Philipkoski, Battle Not over for File Sharers, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 23,
2003, at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/O,1412,61714,00.html.
191 Consider the recent letter issued to students at Pennsylvania
State University, which warned:
The software, record, and movie industries are
stepping up their enforcement of copyright laws. They are
using computer technology to detect those who run servers or
simply download something they have no right to possess.
The likelihood of being caught is growing every day and
prosecutions will become more frequent. . . . Messing up your
future is a steep price to pay for music or a video.
Rodney Erickson, Provost, An Important Message on a Key Issue from the
Provost (Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with author).
In September 2002, the administrators of the University of Southern
California warned students that using peer-to-peer file sharing networks
could force the university to deny network access to students, warning that
"the entertainment industry has been 'obtaining snapshots' of Internet IP
addresses and a list of files being traded by people across the country." See
Brad King, USC to Students: No Sharing Files, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 13, 2002,
at http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,55159,00.html.
192 See E-mail from Rebecca Tushnet, Fordham University, to
Sonia K. Katyal, Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law
(Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with author) (noting that sending MP3s to university
email accounts is not permitted).
193 See, e.g., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Unsafe Harbors:
Abusive DMCA Subpoenas and Takedown Demands, available at
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In the following section, I offer a new reading of the
implications of the various cases involving peer-to-peer
transmissions, arguing that the DMCA's treatment of
contributory liability-as well as other anti-piracy initiatives-
perpetuates a conflict between privacy, speech, and intellectual
property that feeds into the creation of private regimes of piracy
surveillance.
A. ORIGINS OF PIRACY SURVEILLANCE
Just as the law's failure to enact robust protections for
informational privacy facilitates the creation of consumer
surveillance, it has also played a mediating role in enabling
intellectual property owners to develop similar strategies to
address the problem of piracy. In this section, I offer a new
reading of Napster, arguing that the DMCA's treatment of
contributory liability-as well as other anti-piracy initiatives-
perpetuates a conflict between the protection of informational
privacy and intellectual property. 194 As this section will argue,
the Napster court's adoption of a knowledge standard for
contributory liability has unwittingly transformed Internet
Service Providers into potential copyright enforcers, a factor
that has hastened the development of piracy surveillance on the
Internet.
1. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
AND PEER-TO-PEER JURISPRUDENCE
Until Napster was announced, anti-piracy laws, though
pervasive and expanding in power, largely escaped the public
eye. Yet on February 12, 2001, the Ninth Circuit dealt a
substantial blow to the file sharing community when it affirmed
http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/20030926 unsafe harbors.php (last visited Jan. 21,
2004) (offering examples of ISPs forced to take down specific, non-infringing
information); Privacy & Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-
to-Peer Networks and the Impact of Technology on the Entertainment
Industry.* Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Privacy &
Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations]
(statement of Lorraine Sullivan) (observing that Time Warner, Sullivan's
cable provider, was "forced" to release her personal information to the RIAA).
See also infra Part III.




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/7
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
in part a preliminary injunction against Napster, Inc., a
corporation that developed software to facilitate the
transmission of MP3 files. 195 Napster's search and "hotlist"
functions allowed users to search for a particular song or to keep
a list of previously accessed users handy so that they could be
notified if others from their hotlist were logged into the system.
Most significantly, Napster software maintained a rough index
of files available to facilitate transfer of MP3 music, a factor that
suggested an element of centralization to its peer-to-peer
format. 196
On this proposition, the RIAA claimed that Napster users
were engaged in the "wholesale reproduction and distribution of
copyrighted works, all constituting direct infringement."' 197 In
addition to Napster, the suit named a number of anonymous
Jane Doe defendants consumers who had been using Napster-
and various universities, including Yale University, the
University of Southern California, and Indiana University,
alleging that they were complicit in the infringement. 198 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit observed that Napster's users violated
two of the copyright holders' exclusive rights: the rights of
reproduction and distribution. 199
At the time, almost no scholars looked beyond the
relationship between law and technology to focus on the effect of
195 Id. at 1011. For discussions of Napster and its various
implications, see Michael W. Carroll, Disruptive Technology and Common
Lawmaking: A Brief Analysis of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5 (2002) (discussing the implications of the Napster
decision); Stephanie Greene, Reconciling Napster with the Sony Decision and
Recent Amendments to Copyright Law, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 57 (2001) (discussing
the effects of the Napster decision on copyright law); Raymond Ku, Creative
Destruction of Copyright, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002); Glynn Lunney, The
Death of Copyright, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001), Neil Netanel, Impose a Non-
Commercial Use Levy, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2003); Peter Yu, P2P and
the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005);.
196 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.
197 Id. at 1013. In April 2000, when Metallica filed suit against
Napster in Los Angeles District Court for copyright infringement and
racketeering, it delivered to Napster 60,000 pages of documents identifying
the usernames of people who made Metallica songs available online and
demanded that Napster block them from using the service. Fisher & Yang,
supra note 69, at Case Study 1: Napster. Napster complied and blocked
317,377 users from using its service the following month. Id.
198 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
199 Id. at 1013-15.
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Napster and the DMCA on informational privacy and the
protection of personal identity, an omission that looms large four
years later. Yet Napstes neat standard of contributory liability
created a power-sharing agreement of sorts, in which
intellectual property owners shouldered the responsibility to
police the Internet for evidence of unauthorized uses, and ISPs
faced the responsibility of disabling access to these infringing
works after receiving proper notice under the DMCA.200 In turn,
the law has privatized the protection of copyright, creating
incentives for content owners to engage in self-help surveillance
of consumer activities through peer-to-peer frameworks.
Following the DMCA, the Napster court established a set
of directives for ISPs to follow in addressing the infringing
activities of their users. 20 1 Under these provisions, an ISP is
required either to identify the subscriber and/or to take down
the posting as long as minimal assertions of a "good faith" belief
in infringement are met. 20 2 The governing law has held that
"one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
200 See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, and
Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on HR. 2281 and HR.
2180 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO,
Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Propert
(statement of Roy Neel, President, United States Telephone Association). As
Neel explained:
We believe that the task of ferreting out copyright
infringement on the Internet should fall to the copyright owner.
Today, copyright owners have access to a large array of
Internet search engines and 'spiders' to sniff out material they
know belongs to them (unlike the ISPs, who cannot be certain
who may have recently purchased which copyrighted material).
Once the copyright owners discover infringement, they can
bring it to the attention of the ISPs. It is at this point that the
ISPs can sensibly act.
Id
201 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027-28; see also Alfred C. Yen,
Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1881-82
(2000). The DMCA also relieves ISPs of monetary liability for temporary
storage, passive transmission, or retransmission of materials, provided that
the ISP meets certain structural and technological requirements. The actual
words of the DMCA exempt an ISP from contributory liability for copyright
infringement unless the ISP has notice of the infringing material and has
failed expeditiously to remove it. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C) (2000).
202 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3); Yen, supra note 201, at 1881.
52
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/7
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer. 20 3
Thus, if an ISP "learns of specific infringing material available
on [its] system and fails to purge such material from the system,
[it] knows of and contributes to direct infringement. '" 2
0 4
Moreover, if the ISP engages in any "personal conduct that
encourages or assists the infringement," it is also liable for
contributory infringement.20 5 The actual words of the DMCA,
however, exempt an ISP from contributory liability for copyright
infringement unless the ISP has proper notice of the infringing
material and has failed expeditiously to remove it.206 This
means that unless the ISP has notice that one of its sites
contains pirated MP3 files, it is under no obligation to search
out such infringing material on its servers. Liability is also
limited where an online provider is "unwittingly linking or
referring users to sites containing infringing materials. 2 07
These DMCA standards were largely instituted to strike a
middle ground between two opposing standards: one that
required actual knowledge of copyright infringement (an
approach favored by ISPs), and another that instituted strict
liability (favored by copyright owners).208 As a result, ISPs face
liability in situations where the provider had actual knowledge
of the third-party infringement, or where constructive
knowledge could be inferred from "facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent." 209 Taken together, these
203 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).
204 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
205 Id. at 1019. In applying these tests, the court concluded that
Napster "knowingly encourage[d] and assist[ed] the infringement of
plaintiffs' copyrights," because Napster had both actual and constructive
knowledge that its users exchanged copyrighted music. Id. at 1020; see also
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (defining and discussing contributory
infringement).
206 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)
(2000).
207 Id. (quoting the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2000)).
208 See Nil Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R.
2441 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 35 (1995).
209 See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online
Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearings on H.R. 2280 Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong., 82 (1997).
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measures, at first glance, might suggest that the DMCA was
relatively responsive to the concerns of ISPs in avoiding liability
for the infringing activities of their subscribers. Yet, if one looks
closer, it is clear something is missing from this picture: an
asserted commitment to consumer privacy. Although the
DMCA, as well as the Napster opinion, were admirable attempts
to set forth a framework for contributory liability for ISPs,
building on the substantial body of literature and law on third-
party liability, they failed to establish or affirmatively suggest
the need for any privacy protections for individual subscribers.
Further, the DMCA neither offered any guidelines for detecting
piracy, nor did it even require substantive judicial oversight or
confirmation of a legitimate copyright dispute. As a result,
standards that require evidence of actual or constructive
knowledge raise the difficult and vexing question of whether,
and how much, ISPs are indirectly encouraged to monitor their
consumers in order to escape liability. These areas directly
impact consumer privacy and autonomy in countless and
invisible ways; and yet are often overlooked by courts and
commentators.
These problems become particularly acute when we turn
to the peer-to-peer world, which was "not even a glimmer in
anyone's eye when the DMCA was enacted."210 The DMCA has
a section entitled "Protection of Privacy," which provides that an
ISP is not required to monitor its service or to affirmatively seek
facts indicating infringing activity, except to the extent that
standard technical measures require.2 11 But these "standard
technical measures" are notoriously difficult to define in the
wake of changing norms of technology and surveillance. The
more consumer surveillance technologies alter the fabric of
cyberspace, and expand to unmask and record the activities and
identities of Internet subscribers, the more difficult it becomes to
define and construct standard technical measures, as well as to
appropriately protect expectations of privacy in response.
Moreover, the vast array of ways in which ISPs and intellectual
property owners have embarked on an endless journey-
irrespective of this provision-through the Internet to detect the
identities of those engaging in allegedly unauthorized uses of
210 In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38
(D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Alliance for Public Technology,
et al., at 6), rev'd Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet
Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
211 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(m) (1999).
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their material clearly raises due process and speech concerns, a
factor that I focus on in Part III.
Consider, for example, the difficult relationship that ISPs
have with their subscribers after Napster. Here, ISPs play a
key role in enforcing copyright law for two reasons. First, they
serve as the conduit by which the intellectual property owner
identifies the subscriber, and second, under the DMCA, they are
forced either to take down the infringing material or to
terminate Internet access to the subscriber. Thus, they are
often the only barriers between ordinary citizens and the
surveillance measures used by content owners to identify
them.212  As a result, ISPs are often caught between two
conflicting motivations: the need to protect others' intellectual
property and the need to protect their consumers' privacy,
autonomy and freedom of expression.
Why has this occurred? Part of the answer involves the
Napster opinion itself, which requires evidence of actual
knowledge of specific acts of infringement, but then fails to
explain what constitutes acceptable methods of searching for
such information. 213  Absent specific information which
212 See WIPO Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property, supra note 200, at 77 (statement of Robert W.
Holleyman II, President, Business Software Alliance). Holleyman stated:
"Often in conducting internet anti-piracy cases, we
can locate the source of the material as a particular site on a
service provider's system, but because the Internet is
essentially an environment replete with 'aliases,' we cannot
determine the identity of the person. This makes it quite
hard to proceed with prosecution, and it would be a valuable
addition to the approach taken by the bill for it to also provide
incentives for service providers to share information, under
appropriate circumstances, about the infringer's identity."
Id.
213 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021 ("[1f a computer system operator
learns of specific infringing material available on his system and fails to
purge such material from the system, the operator knows of and contributes
to direct infringement."). Absent specific information that identifies
infringing activity, a court cannot hold a computer system operator liable for
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system allows
for the exchange of copyrighted material. Id. Despite this balance of interests
between copyright owners and ISPs, some privacy advocates previously
expressed concerns that the processes used to identify the direct infringer
gave "too much latitude to those who might pursue fishing expeditions" for
evidence of infringement. WIPO Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
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identifies infringing activity, the Napster court concluded that a
computer system operator cannot be held liable for contributory
infringement merely because the structure of the system allows
for the exchange of copyrighted files.2 14 Instead, the Ninth
Circuit chose to require specific knowledge of infringing
material, thereby effecting a crucial, and overlooked, transition
into piracy surveillance. 2 15 By placing the burden on copyright
owners to identify potential infringers, Napster and the DMCA
expanded the reach of private regimes of copyright enforcement.
Moreover, under the DMCA's "safe harbor" provisions,
codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512, certain service providers may avoid
contributory liability if they fulfill certain highly specialized
conditions. These safe harbors apply to ISPs that may be: (a)
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for infringing
material; (b) caching, or temporarily and intermittently storing
infringing material; (c) hosting a user who may store infringing
material on a network that is controlled or operated by or for the
ISP, as long as the ISP acts expeditiously to remove or deny
access to the material, among other requirements; and (d)
linking or referring users to an online location that contains
infringing material by using information location tools like a
directory, index, or hypertext link, among others.216 Sections
(b), (c) and (d), however, require ISPs to comply with the notice-
and-takedown process, which requires the provider to
"expeditiously remove or disable access to" infringing material
Courts and Intellectual Property, supra note 200.
214 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020. Indeed, to the Napster court's
credit, it did attempt to carve out a small area for permissible peer-to-peer
transmission by recognizing the possibility for substantial non-infringing
uses of Napster. The court declined to impute liability to Napster on the
basis of its peer-to-peer file sharing technology alone. Being governed by
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984), the Napster court observed, "We are compelled to make a clear
distinction between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster's
conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the system." Napster, 239
F.3d at 1020.
215 The court decided that Napster's service could continue, as
long as the music industry provided notice to Napster of the unauthorized
copyrighted works and files available on the system. After the decision was
remanded to the district court, the music industry began the difficult process
of filtering authorized from unauthorized titles, a project that was bitterly
opposed by Napster executives, who continued to ask the Ninth Circuit for
relief from the intrusive measures used to search for files on the system. See
Associated Press, Judge Keeps Heat on Napster, WIRED NEWS, July 12, 2001,
at http://www.wired.com/news/ mp3/0,1285,45184,00.html.
216 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2000).
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upon receipt of a "notification of claimed infringement" from a
copyright owner that complies with certain requirements. 217
Once proper notice is given, the burden of compliance then shifts
to the service provider. If the provider fails to comply with the
notice-and-takedown request, then it may lose its immunity
under the DMCA.218
As a result, the DMCA has led to the creation of a new
kind of surveillance that enables content owners to search the
Internet for unauthorized distributions of their products and
creations-indeed, an entire industry has sprung up, seemingly
overnight, that searches through individuals' hard drives, Web
sites, and chat rooms to find evidence of infringement. The
notice-and-takedown provisions have two other aspects that are
especially important: first, they are typically limited to
situations where the ISP is "hosting" an online site at its own
servers; for this reason, the ISP receives a limited scope of
immunity as long as it removes or disables access to the site.
Second, and equally significant, the DMCA provision also
provides for a "counter-notification" procedure that enables the
Web site owner to dispute accusations of infringement. As a
result of these guidelines, intellectual property owners have
undertaken a program of monitoring for piracy, and ISPs have
developed a response system that acts almost immediately to
"take down" allegedly infringing material in order to avoid
allegations of contributory liability. 219
217 See Recording Industry Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Verizon
Internet Services., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
218 See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Notice and Takedown
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 2002,
available at http ://www.brownraysman.com/pubs/articles/pdf/020211.pdf; and
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(B)-(g)(3) (2000). Finally, the statute also provides for
limited damages and attorney's fees if material is improperly removed as the
result of a misrepresentation. See id. § 512(f).
219 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due
Process, and Internet Dispute Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151 (2000).
Thornburg states:
The notice and take-down provisions of the DMCA are
... privately-operated. They depend on turning the ISP into
the copyright holder's enforcer. Thus a private copyright
holder complains to a private ISP, which in turn privately
implements the remedy of disabling access to the challenged
portions of a Web site. Unless the Web site owner files a
lawsuit, the entire process takes place out of the public eye.
It is commenced by a private party in a private setting and
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Today, just a few years after the passage of the DMCA
and the release of Napster, the war over digital copyright
protection has continued to escalate. As courts continue to
interpret the reach of Sony, they have indirectly altered the
relationship between copyright and privacy. For example, in
Grokster, the Ninth Circuit, affirming the decision of the district
court, held that the defendants were not liable for either
contributory or vicarious infringement, due to the number of
current and future noninfringing uses of the software; and
because of the lack of centralization, supervision, and control
over its end users. 220  Because the software lacked the
centralized search index and mandatory registration
characteristics of Napster, the defendants were unable to patrol,
control, or manage the activities of their end users. The decision
said little about the specific issue of consumer privacy, but
suggested a clear delineation between the particular software
design, which ostensibly lacked the ability to block access to
individual users, and the responsibility to safeguard, monitor,
and control the actions of their users. 221  Since none of the
communication between defendants and users created a point of
access for filtering or searching for infringing files (the
infringing material was exchanged by peers directly, instead of
through a centralized server), the defendants clearly lacked the
ability to police their users. 222 Given the defendants' inability to
police, the court seemed to suggest no need or ability to regulate
their activities, suggesting that the defendants' had little
responsibility, unlike Napster, to monitor the uses of its
subscribers. In short, the lack of centralization and control
enabled users to engage in activities without significant
enforced by another private party. There is no court, no
hearing, and no decision on the issue of copyright
infringement.
id. at 189.
For a discussion of similar issues in the European context, see Sjoera
Nas, The Multatuli Project ISP Notice & Take Down, Oct. 1, 2004, at
http://www.bof.nl/docs/researchpaperSANE.pdf.
220 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380
F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
221 See Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1165 ("[G]iven the lack of a
registration and log-in process, even Grokster has no ability to actually
terminate access to filesharing functions, absent a mandatory software
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supervision from the defendants, and thereby allowed the
defendants to escape liability.223
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit, just briefly, touched
more directly upon the issue of privacy and privacy-enabling
technologies, suggesting a greater degree of responsibility to a
peer-to-peer defendant to monitor subscriber activity. Unlike
Napster and Grokster, which enabled a relatively transparent
exchange of files, Aimster actually encrypted files before
circulating them. Thus, the presence of encryption became
terribly relevant to the outcome: while the Seventh Circuit
observed that encryption had valuable, non-infringing uses in
fostering privacy, it also created the potential for social costs by
facilitating unlawful transactions. Consequently, the court
concluded that "a service provider that would otherwise be a
contributory infringer does not obtain immunity by using
encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of the unlawful
purposes for which the service is being used."224 Following Sony,
the court observed that, "[b]y eliminating the encryption feature
and monitoring the use being made of its system, Aimster could,
like Sony, have limited the amount of infringement. '" 225 Given
Aimster's failure to do so, the court concluded that "its ostrich-
like refusal to discover the extent to which its system was being
used to infringe copyright is merely another piece of evidence
that it was a contributory infringer."226 In the end, Aimster
suggests some degree of supervision of encrypted files is
required in order to escape liability, irrespective of the original
software design (or even the purpose of encryption itself).
When we compare the standards set forth in Napster,
Aimster, and Grokster, we should see a relatively clear
mandate: the greater the centralization, the greater the need for
supervision; the greater the presence of encryption, the greater
the need for supervision. In other words, the presence of
privacy-enhancing technologies, like encryption, demands, and
actually requires more surveillance in order to escape liability.
In other words, Aimster suggests a stark irony: the use of
223 Clearly, in the end, this factor, while favoring a finding of
non-liability for the defendants, set the stage for the RIAA's eventual decision
to sue end users instead.
224 In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 650-51 (7th
Cir. 2003).
225 Id. at 654.
226 Id. at 655.
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privacy-enhancing technologies requires one to undertake
privacy-eroding practices like surveillance in order to avoid
liability in the peer to peer context.
2. THE LEGACY OF VERIZON
In late July of 2002, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) contacted Verizon seeking the identity of a user
of "a computer connected to the Verizon network that is a hub
for significant music piracy."227  Verizon, citing consumer
privacy concerns, refused to provide the information, and the
RIAA filed suit under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), in a test case that involved the reach of the DMCA's
special subpoena provision, known as Section 512(h).228 In the
past, these subpoenas (which disclosed the subscriber's name,
address, and contact information) almost always involved
individuals who stored the infringing material on the ISP's own
servers, thereby making it possible for the ISP to "take down"
the infringing material.
However, in this case the allegedly "infringing"
information was stored on the user's own computer hard drive,
not on Verizon's servers. 229 Consequently, Verizon refused to
comply with the subpoena, explaining, "[n]o files of the
Customer are hosted, stored, or cached by [Verizon]."230
According to Verizon, the DMCA did not authorize a subpoena
227 Brief for RIAA at 1, In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 240
F.Supp.2d 24, No. 02-MS-00323 (D.D.C. 2003), available at
http://www.riaa.com/news/filings/pdf/verizon/motiontoenforce.pdf, (on file
with the Yale Journal of Law and Technology).
228 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). As Verizon's Vice-President Sarah
Deutsch explained, "If the RIAA's interpretation [of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act] is accepted, there is no way we can continue to ensure our
customers' privacy rights as we understand them today." Chris Marlowe,
RIAA, Verizon Tiff Revolving Around Customer Privacy, HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Aug. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WL 24791730.
229 See Brief for RIAA, supra note 227, at 7. On July 24, 2002,
the RIAA delivered a letter along with the subpoena alleging that a computer
on Verizon's Internet service was "distributing to the public for download
unauthorized copies of hundreds of copyrighted sound recordings owned by
RIAA member companies." The letter, consistent with the notice
requirements of the DMCA, specified the subscriber's IP address, along with
a list of the recordings it made available for downloading. Apparently, the
individual in question made these files available by Kazaa, a peer-to-peer file
sharing mechanism. See Brief for Verizon at 6, In re Verizon, supra note 227.
230 Brief for RIAA at 8, In re Verizon, supra note 227.
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when the offending material is stored on a person's home
computer, as opposed to the Verizon network, since the
applicable provision is addressed to "material that resides on a
system or network controlled or operated by or for [a] service
provider."231 Because the individual's files resided on the home
computer, and not the network, Verizon contended that it was
"not involved with its subscriber's activities, except at most, as a
passive conduit within the meaning of subsection 512(a). '232 It
claimed that the subpoena was limited only to "[i]nformation
residing on systems or networks at direction of users."233 Again,
since the material was stored on a person's home computer, and
not Verizon's servers, Verizon contended that the DMCA did not
require it to release the subscriber's identity to the RIAA.
According to Verizon, the RIAA was seeking to expand
Section 512(h) notification to cover "a]] Internet users" who
stored material on their home servers, not just ISPs who stored
infringing material on their networks. 234 Verizon stated that
the RIAA proposed "a dazzlingly broad subpoena power that
would allow any person, without filing a complaint, to invoke the
coercive power of a federal court to force disclosure of the
identity of any user of the Internet, based on a mere assertion in
a form.., that the user is engaged in infringing activity."235
In response, the RIAA threatened to subject Verizon to a
suit for contributory infringement, explaining that the safe
harbor provisions of the DMCA only protect an ISP from liability
for its own acts of copyright infringement, and not from
refraining to respond to a valid subpoena seeking the identity of
231 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2000); Brief for Verizon at 3, In
re Verizon, supra note 227; Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 29. For this reason
alone, Verizon argued that neither § 512(c)(3)(A) or §512(h) was applicable.
Brief for Verizon, In re Verizon, supra note 227.
232 Brief for Verizon at 3, 7, In re Verizon, supra note 227.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 3.
235 Id. Verizon argued:
Even if only users to the Kazaa peer-to-peer file-sharing software are
considered, RIAA's proposed construction of subsection 512(h) would allow
RIAA to obtain subpoenas requiring service providers to identify any or all of
the more than 100 million users who have downloaded Kazaa software, one
million of whom are Verizon subscribers. Id. at 3-4.
Alternatively, Verizon proposed a solution: The RIAA should initiate
a "John Doe" lawsuit against the individual, and then issue a discovery-based
subpoena under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to force Verizon to
identify the infringer. Id. at 5.
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one of its subscribers. 236  Verizon claimed that the DMCA
provisions clearly demonstrated that Congress contemplated the
issue of material residing on its system. Verizon explained that
if the material were stored on the person's individual computer,
and not Verizon's network, it would have been impossible to
disable access to it. Indeed, the only way Verizon could
conceivably comply with the DMCA's provisions would be to
cancel the user's subscription account, an overbroad sanction
that would terminate the user's access to applications that had
nothing to do with the alleged infringement. 237 Had Congress
intended such a result, it responded, it would have drafted a
clearer statute towards that intention.238 "If all that is required
is an assertion of suspected infringement and a 'freestanding'
notice of infringement," Verizon predicted, "any copyright owner
could issue such a subpoena."2
39
Given the fact that almost everyone can be a copyright
owner in cyberspace, Verizon contended that the RIAA's
construction would result in a world where anyone who wants to
assert copyright infringements may do so and obtain the
identity of another person through the DMCA's subpoena
power.240  The result would potentially expose the identity of
anyone in cyberspace. 241 As one letter from a coalition of ISPs
warned:
"We are concerned that the RIAA's legal strategy -
using a subpoena process in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act to obtain personal information about
subscribers of basic Internet service - may have
legal and technical consequences that exceed the
stated purpose of this effort. Little is known or
understood about this initiative, how individuals
are being targeted, what is being done with the
information, what is being done to facilitate
compliance with subpoena requests and pay for the
236 Brief for RIAA at 14, In re Verizon, supra note 227.
237 Brief for Verizon at 5, In re Verizon, supra note 227.
238 Id. at 16.
239 id. at 21.
240 Id. at 21-22.
241 id. at 23.
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resulting costs, how long the information will be
kept, and how it is being protected."242
In the end, the district court's decision accomplished just what
Verizon feared most. It found that the subpoena power in the
DMCA applied to a]] ISPs within the scope of the DMCA.243 The
court rejected any distinction between material stored on
Verizon's servers and those stored on home computers. It
concluded that the subpoena provisions applied both to those
ISPs that just offered connections to the Internet, as we]] as
those who stored information on their servers at their users'
direction. 244  To justify its position, the court cited another
provision of the DMCA that clearly defined "service providers" to
include both types of ISPs-those that merely offered the
transmission, routing, and provision of connections and as well
as those that stored information on their servers. 245 The court
stated that one had to evaluate the applicability of the subpoena
in line with the statute as a whole, not by a piecemeal,
constrictive interpretation. 246
As a result of the initial ruling, copyright owners were
able to obtain a subscriber's identifying information based on an
asserted good-faith belief of copyright infringement, even when
the offending material was not stored by the ISP. The district
court's interpretation of the DMCA did not require any notice to
242 See Letter from Kevin S. McGuiness, Executive Director,
NetCoalition.Com, to Mr. Cary Sherman, President, RIAA (Aug. 11, 2003) (on
file with author).
243 In re Verizon, Inc., 240 F. Supp. at 26.
244 Id. at 32-33.
245 See id. at 31 (discussing the textual definition of "service
provider").
246 The court explained:
[The DMCA subpoena provision] is written without
limitation or restriction as to its application. It is entitled
"Subpoena to identify infringer" - not "Subpoena to identify
infringer storing copyrighted material on a service provider's
network." . .. If Congress intended to restrict or limit the
subsection (h) subpoena authority based on where the
infringing material resides, one would expect to see that
limitation spelled out in subsection (h). And if Congress
intended to limit subsection (h) subpoenas strictly to service
providers under subsection (c), it certainly could have made
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be given to the subscriber in the event of a subpoena. Nor did
the DMCA subpoena provision, in and of itself, offer any
mechanism for the subscriber to assert any substantive rights
on his or her behalf. Likewise, there were no provisions for
damages should the subpoena result in the improper revelation
of a person's identity; and finally, and perhaps most important,
little judicial oversight existed to ensure that only meritorious
disclosures of the subscriber's identity took place. 247
In the end, the Verizon case went to the D.C. Circuit on
appeal and was reversed, but only after nearly four hundred
individuals had already been sued by the RIAA, their identities
publicly exposed to the media.248  The appeals court
resoundingly rejected the district court's construction,
concluding that both the terms of Section 512(h) and the overall
structure of Section 512 direct that a subpoena may only be
issued to an ISP that is actually storing the infringing material
on its servers. 249  Given that Verizon was not storing the
information on its own servers, the RIAA could not identify the
relevant "material to be removed or access to which is to be
disabled" under the terms of the DMCA. 250 The court explained:
247 See Brief for Appellant at 30-31, Recording Indus. Ass'n of
Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-
7015, 03-7053) (consolidated appeals). Since the district court's
interpretation provided for little judicial oversight (indeed, the district court's
oversight over a subpoena is largely ministerial, rather than substantive), a
number of unfortunate disclosures could happen. One example was offered
by Parry Aftab, Executive Director of WiredSafety.org, an organization that
works towards greater online security. He suggested that as a result of the
DMCA subpoena provision, stalkers, sexual predators, and perpetrators of
online fraud will be able to pierce the anonymity of individuals by finding
their IP addresses, asserting a belief of copyright infringement, and obtaining
a DMCA subpoena for their name and address. Aftab offers the sobering
example of a violent child rapist who used the Internet to find a map and
layout of a boys' school dormitory, predicting that the DMCA subpoena
provision radically raises the risk of in-person confrontations between
predators and potential victims. Declaration of Parry Aftab at 2, Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, No.
03-MS-0440 (D.D.C. 2003).
248 See Kristen Philipkoski, Battle Not over for File Sharers,
WIRED NEWS, Dec. 23, 2003, at http://www.wired.com/news/
digiwood/0, 1412,61714,00.html.
249 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs.,
Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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"No matter what information the copyright owner
may provide, the ISP can neither 'remove' nor
'disable access to' the infringing material because
that material is not stored on the ISP's servers.
Verizon can not remove or disable one user's access
to infringing material resident on another user's
computer because Verizon does not control the
content on its subscribers' computers."25
1
The court explained that the language of the DMCA also
clearly distinguished between actually terminating a
subscriber's account and removing or disabling access by others
to the infringing material resident on the subscriber's
computer. 252 Moreover, the court found that the notice-and-
takedown section squarely applied to situations where the ISP
hosted, cached, or stored infringing material; it did not apply to
situations where the ISP is simply routing infringing material to
or from a personal computer (as in the peer-to-peer context).253
Thankfully, as a result of the Verizon ruling on appeal,
the RIAA and others are now required to file a lawsuit against
the individual pursuant to Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and then to institute normal discovery-based
procedures in order to determine the identity of a purported
infringer. 254 Because a copyright owner is now required to file a
lawsuit against the purported infringer, a judge will have
substantive discretion over whether to grant the subpoena. 255
251 Id. at 1235.
252 Id. Given that these two different remedies were clearly
specified by the terms of the DMCA, the court found that Congress must have
intended to distinguish the two. Id.; see DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(i)
(2000) (authorizing injunction restraining ISP "from providing access to
infringing material"); id. § 512(j)(1)(A)(ii) (authorizing injunction restraining
ISP "from providing access to a subscriber or account holder . . .who is
engaging in infringing activity . . . by terminating the accounts of the
subscriber or account holder").
253 See Verizon, 351 F.3d at 1237.
254 In contrast to Section 512(h) of the DMCA, which does not
expressly require the filing of a complaint, Rule 27 requires the filing of a
petition that demonstrates that "the petitioner expects to be a party to an
action cognizable in a court of the United States but is presently unable to
bring it or cause it to be brought." FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1); see infra Part IV.
255 See Philipkoski, supra note 190. It bears noting that a
Canadian court, when faced with the identical question, reached an even
more protective conclusion. In the case of BMG Canada v. Doe, No. T-292-04
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Yet, despite the outcome of Verizon, and the Supreme
Court's eventual refusal to grant certiorari, the relationship
between copyright and privacy continues to be a muddled, and
largely contentious, collision of principles. For example, as
Verizon shows, the DMCA and Napster each failed to articulate
a clearly defined standard for proper notice of a user's
infringement, an omission that has led to substantial confusion
regarding the required substance of an accusation. 256 Is an ISP
required to wait for a court order to terminate access to an
individual when notified by a copyright owner that she has
traded files on Napster or Kazaa, assuming that she is engaging
in direct infringement, to avoid liability as a contributory
infringer? Or, should an ISP immediately terminate a user's
subscription if it receives notice of infringement? If so, what
constitutes proper notice?257 In a very recent case, MPAA v.
(Can. Mar. 31, 2004), in which a variety of Canadian record labels sought
disclosure of the identities of 29 subscribers who allegedly made copyrighted
files available to others, the Court applied a rather rigorous test, which
required it to explore whether privacy concerns trumped the public interest
in disclosure. In the end, the court concluded that downloading a song for
personal use fell within the private copying exception in Canada's Copyright
Act, and that, significantly, uploading copyrighted files did not constitute
infringement because merely placing a file in a shared directory did not
actually authorize infringement. Part of this conclusion is attributable to the
court's conclusion in Muzak Corp. v. Composers, Authors, and Publishers
Assn. of Canada, 2 S.C.R. 182 (1953) (observing that one does not 'authorize'
infringement by authorizing the mere use of equipment that could be used to
infringe). In the end, the court observed that it did not find "any real
difference between a library that places a personal copy on a shared directory
linked to a P2P service," and absolved liability entirely.
256 The Verizon court observed:
Nothing in the Act itself says how we should
determine whether a notification "includes substantially" all
the required information .... Clearly, however, the defect in
the RIAA's notification is not a mere technical error; nor could
it be thought "insubstantial" even under a more forgiving
standard. The RIAA's notification identifies absolutely no
material Verizon could remove or access to which it could
disable, which indicates to us that § 512(c)(3)(A) concerns
means of infringement other than P2P file sharing.
Id. at 1236.
257 Moreover, although the DMCA does provide some guidance
for proper notice requirements, they are actually much more difficult to
ascertain than they seem. For example, in order to provide "effective notice,"
the DMCA requires a written communication that includes a number of
elements, such as: identification of the copyrighted work or works claimed to
have been infringed (or a list of such works at the site); information
"reasonably sufficient" to permit the service provider to locate the material,
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Rossi, the Ninth Circuit held that the governing standard under
the DMCA required a subjective, not objective, determination of
infringement. 258 In that case, which involved a notice-and-
takedown situation, the MPAA failed to perform the necessary
as well as the complaining party; and, most significantly, a "statement that
the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the
manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or
the law." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iv)-(v) (2000). The Napster court failed to
further clarify these provisions, referring only to the need for copyright
owners to refer to "specific infringing files." A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001). Since Napster, three cases have
noted substantial confusion regarding this point. See ALS Scan, Inc. v.
RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001); Arista Records, Inc.
v. Mp3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
29, 2002); Hendrickson v. Ebay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
258 See MPAA v. Rossi, 2004 WL 2725717 at 1 (9th Cir. Dec. 1,
2004). In that case, a person advertised, on a website called
internetmovies.com, the following contents: "Join to download full length
movies online now! new movies every month!"; and "NOW
DOWNLOADABLE." All of the links were non-operable, and no movies could
actually be downloaded from the site. Id. at *3. Under the DMCA, when a
copyright owner suspects his copyright is being infringed, he or she must
follow the notice and takedown provisions set forth in § 512(c)(3) of the
DMCA, which provide (in part):
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of
claimed infringement must be a written communication
provided to the designated agent of a service provider that
includes substantially the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to
act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is
allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have
been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single
online site are covered by a single notification, a
representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is
to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and
information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address,
telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail
address at which the complaining party may be contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is
not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (emphasis added).
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diligence to confirm that its allegations of infringement were
false. 259 In that case, the Ninth Circuit patently refused to enact
a standard that required a "reasonable investigation into the
allegedly offending website, 260 and instead ruled that Congress
intended that the DMCA "protect potential violators from
subjectively improper actions by copyright owners." 261 In other
words, a copyright owner's subjective belief that infringement
was occurring was enough to trigger the notice-and-takedown
process. No further investigation or confirmation is required; a
good-faith allegation is sufficient under Rossis lenient standard.
In the end, ISPs face a classic difficulty in this context:
whether they should side with their customers, requiring a
court-ordered injunction to terminate a person's subscription
under the rubric of protecting privacy; or whether they should
remain ever-vigilant against piracy and terminate an account
holder's subscription based on mere subjective, good-faith notice
from the copyright owner. Largely due to this conflict, some
ISPs might refrain from engaging in active content detection of
their users' accounts, choosing instead to wait until they receive
notice of infringement from law enforcement officials. Others, of
course, might prudently relent at the first accusation of
infringement, handing over their subscribers' identities and
terminating their access at the first possible opportunity. 262
And still others, as I shall describe below, might institute
proactive technical measures to monitor their subscribers'
activities and prevent them from undertaking activities that
might raise the risk of copyright infringement (whether or not it
actually takes place). The more privatized the enforcement, the
more disparate (and uncertain) the outcome.
259 Id. at * 2-3.
260 Id. at *2.
261 Id. at *3.
262 For a helpful explication from an ISP point of view, see Sjoera
Nas, The Daily Practices of an ISP in Dealing with Complaints About Illegal
Content, Presentation in Brussels, Nov. 12, 2002, available at
http://www.xs4all.nl/overxs4all/auteursrecht/lezing.html (transcript of
presentation by Sjoera Nas, Public Affairs Officer of XS4ALL Internet
Rightswatch Conference, stating that "[p]roviders are systematically torn in
splits between freedom of expression and requests to take down offensive,
damaging or illegal content").
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B. SPECTERS OF PIRACY SURVEILLANCE
In August 2001, the Ninth Circuit, in a debate of
unprecedented visibility, refused to install certain software that
would enable monitoring of their computers to detect the
downloading of music, streaming video, and pornography. 26 3
The software was a filtering device ostensibly designed to
prevent overloading the network system-but the judges
believed that the alleged purpose behind its installation was
broader. They feared that third parties would use such
"content- detection" monitoring policies to identify individuals
who engaged in file sharing or other potentially nefarious
activities at work. A firestorm of controversy ensued. The
judges ultimately defied the administrative order, disabled the
software, and issued a host of statements publicly criticizing the
administrative decision. 26 4 As Judge Alex Kozinski put it:
"At the heart of the policy is a warning - very much
like that given to federal prisoners - that every
employee must surrender privacy as a condition of
using common office equipment. Like prisoners,
judicial employees must acknowledge that, by using
this equipment, their 'consent to monitoring and
recording is implied with or without cause.'...
The proposed policy tells our 30,000 dedicated
employees that we trust them so little that we must
monitor all their communications just to make sure
they are not wasting their work day cruising the
Internet."
2 6 5
Even though the larger policymaking body of the federal court
system, the Judicial Conference, disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit, and chose to continue using the monitoring software, its
decision angered some federal workers, highlighting the
tradeoffs that many universities and employers have made in
263 See Neil A. Lewis, Rebels in Black Robes Recoil at
Surveillance of Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2001, at Al.
264 Id.
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order to prevent being saddled with a lawsuit for contributory
liability. 266
As this example demonstrates, the problem of piracy has
led some private entities to respond even more forcefully than
necessary, seeking to destroy not only the peer-to-peer networks
that have sprouted across the Internet, but the very boundaries
of privacy, anonymity, and autonomy in cyberspace. 267 Even
despite the outcome of Verizon, fear of suits for contributory
infringement has led to regimes of institutional monitoring from
ISPs, colleges, and private entities. 268  Some schools have
utilized monitoring regimes that bar students from sharing
certain types of files; others undertake less invasive bandwidth
monitoring practices; and still others continue to closely monitor
students' and employees' activity out of fear of suits for
contributory liability. 269
266 See Judges Bar Use of Court Computers for Pornography,
Large Personal Files, 70 U.S. L. WK. 2183 (2001) (reporting that that the
administrative court banned Gnutella, Napster, Glacier, and Quake from
court computers claiming that it had found no legitimate court use).
267 Even though the original Napster filed for bankruptcy after a
long standstill, it is now regarded as a legitimate service - notwithstanding
the host of replacements, each more decentralized than the previous one,
which have risen up to take its place. Kazaa, for example, at one point,
claimed sixty million users around the world and twenty-two million in the
United States, enabling far more illegal downloading than Napster ever did.
Thankfully, however, many colleges are turning to license-based services to
avoid some of the legal costs from unauthorized p2p use. Todd Woody, The
Race to Kill Kazaa, WIRED, Feb. 2003, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.02/kazaa-pr.html ("In the first six
months of 2002, CD sales fell 11 percent - on top of a 3 percent decline the
year before.") Charles C. Mann, The Year the Music Dies, WIRED, available
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ll.02/dirge.html (Feb. 2003). At the
same time, sales of blank CDs jumped forty percent last year. Id.
268 A related problem also involves protection of student records.
Under the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. §
1232g(b)(2) (2000), educational institutions cannot disclose personally
identifiable information about a student from an "education record" except
where a subpoena has been lawfully issued, and as long as the educational
institution notifies the student in advance of complying with the subpoena.
See Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Misc. Act. No. 1:03-
MC-10209-JLT (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 2003).
269 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; Nick Reed, Computers
Seized in File-Sharing Raid, THE LANTERN OF OHIO ST. U., May 27, 2003,
available at http://www.thelantern.com/news/2003/05/07; and Scott Carlson,
Tending the Net: Computer-Discipline Offices Offer a Human Touch When
Investigating Student Complaints, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 7, 2002
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The result is a protracted, and largely invisible, web of
surveillance that tracks many of the same instrumentalities
involved in current privacy litigation.270 This article defines
piracy surveillance to encompass particular types of monitoring
that: (1) are performed by private, non-government entities; (2)
encompass extrajudicial determinations of copyright
infringement; and (3) are extralegal in nature; that is,
surveillance that takes place entirely outside of ongoing
litigation.
As this section will illustrate, the advent of piracy
surveillance alters the definition and application of intellectual
property rights. As Part I suggested, property concepts have
traditionally served to shield-and to protect-the privacy
interests of individual owners as well as third parties. In
contrast, piracy surveillance radically transforms-and
extends-the reach of intellectual property rights by enabling
copyright owners to detect, deter, and prevent acts of potential
infringement by third parties. The RIAA defends its efforts,
maintaining that it:
"is acting no differently than anyone in this country
whose property rights have been violated and who
is faced with a decision whether to press a legal
claim: we are making a judgment as to whether
pursuing a particular lawsuit is appropriate given
the circumstances."271
Yet there is a crucial difference between this analogy
between property rights in real space and intellectual property
rights in cyberspace: freedom of expression and anonymity. As I
have argued, many individuals harbor expectations of privacy in
(discussing the institution of NEThics Campus police).
270 For example, some forms of piracy surveillance use "smart
agents" or "bots," which have been the subject of litigation in other contexts.
See infra Part I-A; eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058,
1060-61 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1354 n.4
(Cal. 2003); Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual
Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179,
187 (2001); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the
Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561,
570-71 (2001); Laura Quilter, Note, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace
Trespass to Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 423-24 (2002).
271 Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations, supra note 193, at 8 (testimony of Mitch
Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA).
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cyberspace, believing that their personal identifying information
is only shared with third parties with their consent or pursuant
to a valid subpoena. Piracy surveillance eviscerates this
expectation by creating an institutional monitor to detect
acquisition and use of copyrighted materials. Because these
methods of surveillance often involve extrajudicial
determinations of infringement, they necessarily involve speech-
based judgments, often enabling a copyright owner to determine
for himself or herself whether or not individuals are engaging in
fair use. The malleable standard for subjective "good faith"
infringement allows creative activities that might fall within a
"grey" area of fair use-sampling, space shifting, other
transformative works, etc.-to become, effectively, automatically
subject to the permission of the copyright owner for their
circulation and publication. 2
72
Moreover, under the DMCA, there are no regulations
governing the detection of alleged acts of infringement through
file sharing, or through any other medium. The RIAA-or any
other copyright owner-is not required to explain, justify, or
even share its detection methods with the public. Nor does the
DMCA require any performance of "due diligence" to ensure that
infringement is occurring; the Act provides little substantive
definition of "good faith infringement." Thus, piracy
surveillance methods, for all their asserted efficacy, also herald
the growing encroachment of a panoptic architecture over
constitutionally protected values such as speech, privacy, and
due process. Finally, proponents of piracy surveillance also
subscribe to a logic of vigilantism: as they are designed and
implemented by private, non-state entities, they invite equally
intrusive counter- surveillance responses from ordinary citizens.
1. MONITORING
Like many techniques involving consumer surveillance,
copyright owners in cyberspace rely heavily on the use of "smart
agents." Here, they are used to identify acts of perceived
infringement, and, in light of the outcome of Verizon, copyright
272 Here, the user may be able to restore the material through
the "put back" procedure set forth in 512(g)(2), but this requires the service
provider to wait a certain number of days after receiving a counter-
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owners can now quickly identify and contact a perceived
infringer. In cyberspace, the RIAA maintains a team of Internet
specialists and an automated twenty-four-hour Web crawler, a
"bot" that continually crawls through the Internet to identify
allegedly infringing activities. 273 A "bot" is a shortened term of
''robot" and essentially refers to a program that is capable of
crawling from one server to another, compiling lists of Web
addresses that possess certain characteristics (in this case, those
that offer unauthorized titles of copyrighted material).274 One
Web crawler, run by Copyright.net, crawls through a person's
hard drive looking for uploaded copies of particular songs in
peer-to-peer networks like Gnutella, Aimster, and Napster.275 It
singles out individual hard drives containing an uploaded
copyrighted song, matches the computer's Internet address to its
ISP, and serves notice to the ISP, requesting that the ISP
terminate the person's online connection until she removes the
offensive copy.276 The RIAA's software robot, dubbed Copyright
Agent, has served more than one million copyright violation
notices to ISPs on behalf of seven hundred and fifty song writers
and performers. 277
Many of the RIAA's tactics remain shrouded in secrecy,
prompting one Congressman to hold hearings on the scope and
method of the recording industry's tactics. 278 In one recent case,
273 See RIAA, What the RIAA Is Doing About Piracy, at
http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/riaa.asp (last visited Dec. 05, 2004).
274 See What's a Bot, at http://www.botspot.com/common/
whats bot.html (last visited Dec. 05, 2004) (describing "bots" as a form of
artificial intelligence that digs through data).
275 See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Software Foils Bootleg Tunes, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 28, 2001, at IC (describing a new technology that
detects bootlegged songs on personal hard drives). As one report stated,
"[the] Ranger [bot] is scouring the globe-Web sites, chat rooms, newsgroups
and peer-to-peer file-sharing sites-spanning 60 countries, searching in
English, Chinese and Korean .... Ranger is 24-7. Ranger is relentless."
Frank Ahrens, "Ranger" vs. the Movie Pirates: Software Is Studios' Latest
Weapon in a Growing Battle, WASH. POST, June 19, 2002, at H1.
276 Ahrens, supra note 275, at Hi.
277 Id. See also Robert G. Gibbons & Lisa M. Ferri, The Legal
War Against Cyberspace Piracy, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1999, at 1 (observing that
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers uses automated
software to locate sites containing the music of any of its members). Another
program, known as MediaForce, uses similar tactics internationally as well.
See lain Ferguson, MediaForee Still Trying to Block Aust Piracy, at
http ://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/0,2000061744,20271820,00.htm (Feb.
5, 2003).
278 See Associated Press, RIAA Tactics Under Scrutiny, WIRED
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in which a Brooklyn woman was accused of offering more than
nine hundred songs on Kazaa, the RIAA used a library of digital
fingerprints, called "hashes," as well as metadata tags, which
are often relied upon by forensic investigators in computer
hacking cases, to rebut her claim that the songs shared on her
computer were from compact discs that she had legally
purchased. Using these tools, the RIAA traced several song files
on the woman's computer to files she had downloaded through
the Napster service.27 9 The fingerprints were used to dispute
her claims of legitimate space shifting, and to show that the
source for file sharing did not involve a legitimate purchase of
CDs.280
NEWS, Sept. 16, 2003, at http://www.wired.com/news/
digiwood/0,1412,60460,00.html. Senator Norm Coleman held a series of
hearings on September 30, 2003, entitled Privacy & Piracy: The Paradox of
Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and the Impact of Technologies
on the Entertainment Industry. At the hearing, a music representative
explained:
To gather evidence against individual infringers,
RIAA typically uses software that searches the public
directories available to any user of a peer-to-peer network.
These directories list all the files that other users of the
network are currently offering to distribute. By logging onto
these open networks and searching for recordings owned by
RIAA's members just like any other user, the software finds
users who are offering to distribute copyrighted music files.
When the software finds such a user, it downloads a sample of
the infringing files, along with the date and time it accessed
the files, and locates the user's Internet Protocol ("IP")
address. Additional information that is publicly available
allows RIAA to then identify the infringer's Internet Service
Provider.
Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, supra note 193, at 8 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman
and CEO, RIAA).
279 See Ted Bridis, RIAA Discloses Some Methods of Tracking,
AP ONLINE, Aug. 28, 2003, available at 2003 WL 62378104.
280 See id. According to the RIAA, some of the files offered for
download by one particular defendant (who operated under the pseudonym
"nycfashiongirl") contained media information that also suggested that they
were "ripped" by someone other than the defendant. See Opposition of
Recording Industry Association of America to Motion of Intervenor to Stay
Motion and Enforce Subpoena at 11-13, In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc.,
217 F.R.D. 239 (D.D.C. 2003) (Misc. Act. No. 03-MC-804-HHK/JMF),
available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/JaneDoe v RIAA!RIAA-opp.pdf. For
other files, the RIAA matched hashes from the defendant's sound files to
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Even before a judicial case is filed, these strategies of
private enforcement utilize a cleverly decentralized system,
wherein the copyright owner is burdened with the cost of
detecting infringement, and the ISP is burdened with the need
to balance threats of contributory infringement with the
importance of protecting the consumer from illegitimate threats
and undue disclosure. Under the DMCA's expedited subpoena
provisions, the RIAA sends out notices to ISPs to force them to
identify the site operator, or end-user. 281 Once it identifies the
site operator, the RIAA may send that person a warning email,
may send messages to the ISP, or may even initiate litigation.282
At some schools, automated Web crawlers detect where
downloading takes place. 283 When it is located, the RIAA sends
letters asking the school to take action against the alleged
infringer. 284  To reinstate her account, the infringer must
remove the offending title and replace it with an encrypted copy
of the song that allows the rights holder to restrict how it will be
used.285  Some schools engage in copyright infringement
detection even without assistance from the RIAA: the
University of Florida uses Icarus, which scans the network for
file-sharing activity. If caught once, students are warned and
281 See RIAA, What the RIAA Is Doing About Piracy, supra note
273.
282 Id.
283 At universities, the RIAA has instituted a "Soundbyting
campaign," which it claims to have resulted in a fifty-five percent drop in the
number of music sites on university servers offering illegal downloads.
According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the University of Wyoming
used a program that "fingerprinted" all network traffic in order to detect
unauthorized copying. The program also copied everything sent over the
network in order to detect the exchange of sound files-emails, grade reports,
documents, and the like, including the collection of unauthorized information.
See Elec. Frontier Found., Universities Should Resist Network Monitoring
Demands, at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/university-monitoring.pdf (last visited
Dec. 04, 2004).
284 Liza Porteus, Beware of the Music Downloading Spies, U-
WIRE, Oct. 26, 2000, at http://www.uwire.com. Monitoring goes beyond just
looking at the name of a file. Id. Other companies have devised ways to
identify music files based on their actual sound. Jon Healey, New
Technologies Target Swapping of Bootlegged Files, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001,
at C1. Still other companies, such as Cyveillance, Ewatch, and Cybercheck,
assist customers in protecting their brands by using customized software to
track trademark infringement, copyright infringement, counterfeiting, and
the bootlegging of music and movies. See Gibbons & Ferri, supra note 273.
These companies may also search for any association of brand names with
pornography, and search for any damaging rumors in chat rooms. Id.
285 See Gibbons & Ferri, supra note 277.
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kicked off for 30 minutes, the second time, they are kicked off for
5 days; the program also eliminates file sharing, prevents online
gaming, and sending files over instant messenger. 286 Once it
sees heavy bandwidth usage and the data stream looks like
music or a file being shared, it stops the student's connection.
Here, monitoring techniques carry an almost perfect
explication of the panoptic metaphor regarding behavioral
control. In one example, Carnegie Mellon decided to check the
public folders of 250 student computers connected to the
university network, and found hundreds of MP3's for
distribution from 71 machines; students lost their in-room
connections for the rest of the semester. 287  Panoptic
architecture offers a rather inexpensive means of producing
discipline-no chains or locks are needed; all that is required is
that the people perceive the risk of surveillance. 28 8 The risk that
the copyright owner is always watching, always searching,
always monitoring, facilitates compliance. 28 9  From the
copyright owner's perspective, peer-to-peer surveillance allows
for near-perfect automated detection, and creates a risk of
disclosure that deters would-be infringers from sharing files.
Under this technology, it matters little whether or not the RIAA
is actually investigating or monitoring file transfer: The goal of
such strategies is to create a perceptible risk of detection. This
risk of detection and disclosure, in turn, is precisely what
facilitates compliance. Consider, for example, the reports
suggesting file sharing dropped by nearly half since the filing of
the initial Verizon lawsuit. 290  By utilizing technologies that
facilitate constant monitoring of file-sharing activity, the music
286 Matt Buchanan, Don't Fear MediaDefender, WASH. SQUARE
NEWS, Oct. 9, 2003 at http ://www.nyunews.com/opinion/columnists/
5884.html.
287 Kelly McCollum, How Forcefully Should Universities Enforce
Copyright Law on Audio Files?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 19, 1999.
288 FOUCAULT, supra note 92, at 202.
289 GANDY, supra note 91, at 10.
290 See Jefferson Graham, Lawsuits Help Cut Song-Swapping in
USA by Half, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2004, at 1B (reporting on a study finding
that unauthorized online song swapping has been cut in half since record
companies started suing swappers in the fall of 2003); Associated Press,
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industry has managed to deter infringement and instill fears of
identity disclosure among file sharers.291
Before the Verizon case was filed, peer-to-peer norms
continued to support the sharing of files, ostensibly because file
sharers perceived that they faced little risk of prosecution or
disclosure of their identities. Yet peer-to-peer technology has
enabled intellectual property owners to model their efforts after
methods of consumer surveillance. 292 After Verizon, peer-to-peer
networks are no longer anonymous, amorphous communities
characterized by unique social norms and noncompliance with
copyright laws. 293 Rather, the use of smart agents, coupled with
the risk of identity disclosure, has pierced the protection of
anonymity that many file sharers expect.
Techniques of piracy surveillance can be used, either
directly or indirectly through an intermediary, to detect
infringement or to penalize perceived infringers. Most
significantly, each of these techniques is private in character, in
the sense that each of these methods is administered and
utilized by a non-government entity, and is governed by few
restrictions. Since surveillance activities are usually
extrajudicial in character-that is, no judicial determination of
infringement has been made-little recourse exists to defend
oneself against an accusation.
There are significant drawbacks to such surveillance.
Even though the RIAA claims to engage in due diligence to
confirm evidence of infringement, the technology can easily
291 Graham, supra note 293. Aside from demonstrating panoptic
strategies of surveillance, these techniques also rely on strategies of
discretionary nonenforcement. Recently, the RIAA announced that it had
decided to pursue investigations against individuals who offer "substantial"
amounts of music online to others over peer-to-peer services. See Privacy &
Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations,
supra note 193, at 7-8 (testimony of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO,
RIAA). Yet it did not to elaborate on what it meant by "substantial,"
presumably hoping to deter everyone from sharing files-from the person
who offers thousands of song titles to the college student offering only a few
songs. See id.
292 See generally Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, supra note 193 (testimony of Mitch
Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA).
293 For excellent reading on this topic, see Strahilevitz, supra
note 167; Wu, supra note 170.
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mistake legitimate files for copyrighted works. 294  This can
impose a great burden on an author's freedom of speech that
extends to anyone targeted by monitoring technologies. For
example, Warner Brothers, owner of the copyright to Harry
Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone, sent a notice to ISP UUNet
asking it to disable a user's Internet access because of a single
(allegedly infringing) file titled harry potter book report.rtf295
More recently, the Business Software Alliance incorrectly
targeted a company that used software called OpenOffiee,
notifying the company that it was making unauthorized copies
of Microsoft Office available, simply because its "bot" detected
the use of the word "office" in the program. 296
In another, more public incident, the RIAA sent out more
than two dozen letters that incorrectly targeted institutions
suspected of posting copyrighted music on their servers.2 97 In
one example, the RIAA's Web crawlers had zeroed in on an MP3
copy of a song by a group of astronomers posted by an
astrophysics professor named Peter Usher, which the RIAA
confused with popular artist Usher Raymond. 298 In another
example, the RIAA apologized to a national broadband provider
for sending a cease-and-desist letter that alleged illegal activity
294 See generally Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, supra note 193, at 8 (testimony of
Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA) (observing that an RIAA
employee "manually reviews and verifies the information"); see also Piracy of
Intellectual Property on Peer-to-Peer Networks: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 23-33 (2002) [hereinafter Piracy of Intellectual
Property, Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Courts] (statement of Gigi
B. Sohn, President, Public Knowledge).
295 Piracy of Intellectual Property, Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts, supra note 294, at 24 (statement of Gigi B. Sohn,
President, Public Knowledge).
296 See Declan McCullagh, BSA (Microsoft) Screws Up, Targets
OpenOffice Distribution, POLITECH, at http://www.politechbot.com/p-
04511.html (Feb. 28, 2003).
297 Gil Kaufman, RLlA Admits Piracy Goof, ROLLING
STONE.COM, at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/newsarticle.asp?nid=18053
(May 14, 2003).
298 Id. The song was sung by an astronomy group called The
Chromatics, about a gamma ray satellite designed by Penn State; the RIAA
sent the take-down notice to the university, which then threatened to take
down the entire site within 48 hours. Unfortunately, the incident took place
during the final examination period. See Complaint from Recording Industry
Almost Closes Down a Penn State Astronomy Server, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., May 23, 2003.
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on a subscriber's File Transfer Protocol site.299 The contents of
the letter read that the site illegally "offers approximately 0
sound files for download."300 In another instance, Wal-Mart sent
a Section 512(h) notice to a comparison-shopping Web site that
allowed consumers to post prices of items sold in its stores,
claiming incorrectly that its prices were copyrighted when they
were in fact uncopyrightable facts. 30 1  Other "bots" have
generated DMCA notices for films or court documents that are
part of the public domain. 30
2
These problems have been exacerbated, rather than
mitigated, by the recent filing of lawsuits against individuals
engaged in copyright infringement. In one situation, the RIAA
obtained the identity of an individual, and proceeded to file a
copyright infringement action against a 66-year-old
grandmother who had never downloaded any songs and did not
even own a computer equipped with file-sharing software. 30 3 In
another case, the RIAA used a DMCA subpoena to sue an
individual whose IP address allegedly did not match the one the
RIAA investigated for downloading songs.30 4
Moreover, many individuals poorly assess the risk of
online surveillance and continue to engage in online activities
without realizing the risk of exposure. 30 5 Many people have no
299 Declan McCullagh, RIAA Apologizes for Erroneous Letters,
CNET NEWS.COM, May 13, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1025-
1001319.html.
300 Id. The letter continued, "Many of these files contain
recordings owned by our member companies, including songs by such artists
as Creed." Id.
301 See Brief of Amici Curiae Alliance for Public Technology, et
al., in Support of Appellant Verizon Internet Services and Urging Reversal at
12, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015, 03-7053) (consolidated appeals); Declan
McCullagh, Wal-Mart Backs Away from DMCA Claim, CNET NEWS, at
http ://news.com.com/2100-1023-976296.html (Dec. 5, 2002).
302 See McCullagh, supra note 299. In one instance, the Internet
Archive was sent a DMCA notice by a copyright owner who mistook films in
the public domain for a copyrighted movie; see also Universal Studios
Stumbles on Internet Archive's Public Domain Films, at
http://www.chillingeffects.org/ notice.cgi?NoticeD=595 (last visited Dec. 6,
2004) (containing an erroneous DMCA notification of unauthorized use of
Universal Motion Pictures).
303 Id.
304 Joseph Menn, Group Contends Record Labels Have Wrong
Guy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2003, at C2.
305 See Good & Krekelberg, supra note 89.
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idea what they are sharing online, and with whom. In such
circumstances, the law rarely steps in to validate consumer
expectations of privacy or to educate citizens regarding the
limits of their rights in cyberspace. To illustrate this point,
consider this case. On July 2, 1999, a customer-support
specialist for Road Runner, a high speed ISP, received a call
from an anonymous male who told the specialist that he was at
a friend's house, scanning other computers, and had viewed
child pornography on a computer that he believed Road Runner
serviced. 30 6 The computer's owner had activated its printer and
file sharing mechanism, which allowed others to view the
images stored on its hard drive. 30 7 The caller gave the specialist
the computer's IP address, the directory, and the file names in
which the images were located. 30 8  Shortly afterward, the
specialist located the computer with the corresponding IP
address and viewed two images of a sexual nature involving
children.309
After escalation in the management structure and
consultation with its corporate attorney, Road Runner then
contacted the FBI and recommended that it obtain a court order
to procure the subscriber's information. 310 The United States
Attorney's Office agreed and located the subscriber's home
address, telephone number, email address, and general account
information. 311 A special agent then called the home and spoke
with one of the email subscribers, Michael Kennedy, who stated
that he always left his computer on and connected to the
Internet. 312 When asked if he could share any "concerns" with
Road Runner's service, Kennedy responded that he "thought the
company should warn customers about the possibility of
someone else trying to enter their computers through the
Internet. 313  After the FBI obtained a search warrant and
officials went to search the house, Kennedy admitted that he
had downloaded onto his hard drive pictures of young boys
306 United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (D. Kan.
2000).
307 Id. at 1107 n.7.
308 Id. at 1106.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 1107.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 1108.
KATYAL
80
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/7
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
engaging in sexual acts.314 He claimed not to know the identity
of the person from whom he had downloaded the images, and
that he did not think that anyone would discover he had
downloaded the pictures.315 Shortly after a grand jury returned
an indictment for his arrest, Kennedy turned himself in.
316
Notably, the court resoundingly rejected every argument
Kennedy raised in support of his expectation of privacy,
suggesting that individuals who engage in file-sharing activities
essentially have no right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment's right to protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The court rejected Kennedy's assertions that Road
Runner trampled on his Fourth Amendment rights when it
divulged his subscriber information to the government because
he had failed to demonstrate an "objectively reasonable
legitimate expectation of privacy in his subscriber information,"
since he had activated his computer's file sharing mechanism. 317
The Kennedy court analyzed the privacy issues Kennedy
raised by turning to the test articulated in Katz v. United
States, in which the Court established that a "search" takes
place only when a government violates an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy.318  "[W]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection," the Kennedy
court repeated, quoting from Kat. 319 In other words, because
Kennedy had voluntarily "turned over" information to third
parties, like the ISP, the court concluded that he had no




317 Id. at 1110.
318 Id. Under Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967),
the test for a constitutionally "unreasonable search" is two-fold: first, it
requires that a person exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy; and second,
that the expectation of privacy be one that society also recognizes as
reasonable. In analyzing the second question, the Court later opined that
"'[the] test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to conceal
assertedly "private" activity,' but instead 'whether the government's intrusion
infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth
Amendment."' California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986) (quoting Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S 170, 181-83 (1984)).
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"When defendant entered into an agreement with
Road Runner for Internet service, he knowingly
revealed all information connected to the IP
address 24.94.200.54. He cannot now claim to have
a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his
subscriber information."' 320
The court's recitation of Katz highlights some of the most
severe difficulties with protecting informational privacy in the
information age. Kennedy demonstrates the discontinuity of
expectations of privacy and anonymity; a person might share
information under a subjective expectation of anonymity
(supported, perhaps by the ISP's assurances of consumer
privacy), even though a court might reach the opposite
conclusion. 321
In sum, under Katz, it appears unclear whether a person
can legally possess a reasonable expectation of anonymity and
engage in file sharing at the same time, even though, practically
speaking, many individuals do so quite readily. The court
suggested that Kennedy's use and activation of a file sharing
mechanism essentially meant that files contained within his
hard drive could be considered public-not only his numerical
subscription information, but the actual content of his files as
well. 322 Currently, the DMCA, as it is written, contains no
protection for anonymous speakers in the face of accusations of
infringement. 323 And, as the mistaken examples in the previous
section demonstrate, the risk of exposure is not limited to clear-
cut cases alone, but to anyone who may be caught within the
panoptic Web of copyright enforcement. In sum, the Kennedy
case, and others like it, highlights a troubling contradiction
regarding perceptions of informational privacy online:
individuals poorly assess the reality of transparency, leading
them to expect anonymity, even when engaging in illicit
320 Id.
321 In some of the cases relied upon in the Fourth Amendment
context, a person's identity is already known or ascertained through other
means, and usually protected by additional regulations to support privacy.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738, 741 n.5 (1979) (noting that the pen
register did not disclosure the content of Smith's communications).
322 Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; see also United States v.
Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at **4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000)
(holding that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
which is voluntarily conveyed to a third party).
323 For elaboration of this point, see infra Part III.
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activities that are open to private surveillance. As one author
observes, a person's expectations of privacy in such
circumstances may be wildly varied, suggesting that many do
not understand the extent to which the technology itself collects
information or monitors the online activities of an ISP's
subscribers. 324 As we will see, Kennedys gutting of Fourth
Amendment protections carries special weight when we turn to
the question of criminal copyright infringement for peer-to-peer
distribution of music and other copyrighted media. When
private citizens act in a law-enforcement capacity, as the ISP or
the anonymous caller did in Kennedy, they can further limit the
scope of an individual's protections under the Fourth
Amendment. 325
2. MANAGEMENT
Digital rights management ("DRM") is another kind of
piracy surveillance that harnesses similar trajectories of
monitoring and record collection in the consumer surveillance
context. 326  Unlike the technology explored in the previous
section, some DRM techniques require an affirmative act by the
consumer to inform the company of her identity prior to using a
copyrighted product. 327 Thus, in this sense, some types of DRM
324 See Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment:
A Skeptical Approach, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 102
(2000).
325 The test for determining whether or not a person is acting as
an agent of the government is whether the private party "in light of all the
circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having acted as an
'instrument' or agent of the state [when the search or seizure occurred]."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). In the Kennedy case,
for example, the defendant argued that the initial warrantless searching of
his computer files violated his Fourth Amendment rights because
government actors did them. United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at
1111-12 (D. Kan. 2000). The court soundly rejected this argument on the
grounds that the government neither knew of, nor acquiesced in the intrusive
conduct, and that Kennedy had made no showing that the government
involvement was significant enough to change the conduct into government
searches. Id.
326 For an excellent summary on the legal and policy issues on
DRM, see Symposium: The Law & Technology of Digital Rights Management,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487-771 (2003).
327 For a helpful, historical piece justifying digital controls, see
Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The
Development of an Access Right in US. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 113 (2003) (arguing that the right to control access to a work is
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cannot function without some encroachment on a user's privacy:
copyrighted products that contain DRM cannot operate without
verification of the user's identity.328  Other techniques can
restrict a computer from "altering, sharing, copying, printing
[or] saving" protected files. 3
29
Some DRM strategies are designed to set and
automatically enforce limits on user behavior' for example, some
music delivery formats that prevent copying (even for space-
shifting purposes) while others restrict the type of devices used
for playback.33 0 Today, DRM also encompasses encrypted media
files, watermarks that identify their users, counters that keep
track of each playback or viewing, and copycodes that control
the duplication of files, thereby allowing a copyright owner to
track whether or not a file is uploaded or digitally shared with
others. 331 Content-scrambling system algorithms can also add a
an integral right of copyright law).
328 See Jeff Howe, Licensed to Bill, WIRED, Oct. 2001, at 140, 147,
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/9. 10/drm.html?pg=l
(describing the technology behind DRM and its potential for revenue). In
another case, Blizzard Entertainment, a games developer, admitted that in
an attempt to deter software pirates, it collected the names and email
addresses of gainers without their knowledge. See Gamemaker Under Fire
for Invasion of Player Privacy, COMPUTERGRAM INT'L, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m0CGN/ n3404/205 7 8 1 0 1 /p 1/article.jhtml
(May 6, 2003).
329 See EPIC, Digital Rights Management and Privacy, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/drm (last visited Dec. 6, 2004). For more on DRM
technologies, see Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic
Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Pamela
Samuelson, DRM land, o, vs.} the Law, 46 CoMM. ACM 4, at 41-45 (April
2003), available at http:// www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/
papers/acmv46_p41.pdf. There is also a fair amount of literature on trusted
computing as well, which implements security features in computer
hardware. See Eben Moglen, Free Software Matters: Untrustworthy
Computing, Aug. 11, 2002, available at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/
publications/lu-22.html; Richard Stallman, Can You Trust Your Computer?
GNU Project, at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.html; Seth
Schoen, Trusted Computing.' Promise and Risk, at
http://www.eff.org/infrastructure/ trusted computing/2003/001_tc.php; Ryan
Roemer, Trusted Computing, Digital Rights Management and the Fight for
Copyright Control on Your Computer, 2003 UCLA J of L & TECH. 8 (2003);
Lessig, Code at 127; Chad Woodford, Note, Trusted Computing or Big
Brother? 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 253 (2004); Megan Gray, The Legal Fallout
from Digital Rights Management Technology, 20 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW
20 (2003).
330 See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 575, 580 (2003).
331 Howe, supra note 328, at 142. The code, however, that
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further, geographic restriction that ensures that DVDs only play
in designated regions.3 3 2 Still other technologies can report back
on the activities of individual users, which can be used for a
variety of purposes, including marketing.333 Other programs
can be designed to disable access to a work after detecting an
unauthorized use, ensuring that constant monitoring takes place
to ensure compliance with the terms and conditions of a
license.
334
It makes sense, both economically and practically, to ask
a copyright owner to internalize the costs of enforcement
through such management systems. Yet these systems often
involve the ability to preclude fair use, one of the key limitations
on a copyright holder's exclusive scope of rights. 335 As two
commentators observe, "[u]nless DRM systems include a 'judge
on a chip,' they will remain incapable of determining whether a
enables the anti-piracy software is widely believed to be installed in home
and office hard drives, thereby opening the door to more anti-piracy
measures. See Privacy Advocates Slam Industry Plan for Hard Drives, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Jan. 18, 2001, availahle at 2001 WL 2840879. In 2001, television
makers endorsed a new copy-protection scheme that installs certain
technology in television sets to block the making of digital copies of television
shows. See Jube Shiver, Jr., Company Town TVMakers Take a Side on Anti-
Piracy Technologies Media, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2001, at C5 (describing how
television makers are backing a new copy-protection scheme). The
technology, known as FireWire, uses a combination of user-authentication
and encryption to determine whether digital content should be transmitted
from one device and can limit the number of copies generated. Id.
332 Cohen, supra note 330, at 581.
333 Id.
334 Id. The Uniform Commercial Code validated self-help
provisions in its Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA),
formerly known as U.C.C. 2B. The provisions, which covered contracts in
"computer information," provided that upon material breach of a contract, the
licensor can prevent a licensee from using the product and repossess the
property; another provision permitted the use of other self-help remedies as
long as they could be accomplished without a breach of the peace. Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA), §§ 701, 815(b) (last
revisions or amendments completed 2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm (last visited Dec. 6,
2004). See also Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-
Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1089 (1998); Craig Dolly, The Electronic Self-
Help Provisions of UCITA: A Virtual Repo Man?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 663
(2000); David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments on Julie
Cohen s "Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, " 13 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1151, 1154 (1998).
335 See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of
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user is copying part of a work for purposes of piracy or
parody."336 Moreover, since many of these strategies also fail to
protect consumer privacy, they also display a striking
convergence of piracy and consumer surveillance. Consider the
use of anti-piracy technologies that prevent users from
converting, or "ripping," software tracks into an MP3 format
from a CD. Such technology, called Digital Content Cloaking
Technology, requires users who desire digital copies to provide
personal information in order to track the customer's listening
habits. In one suit over the use of such technology, labels
attached to the product failed to disclose that the company
tracked, stored, and disseminated personal identifying
information of the consumer. 337
Digital Rights Management, therefore, replicates a
convergence between consumer and piracy surveillance that can
be built into a variety of technologies, from copyrighted products
to computer hardware. Like many other types of "trusted
computing" efforts, it offers an extrajudicial mediator to decide
the boundaries of acceptable use of copyrighted products,
potentially eviscerating the vitality of fair use in the process. 338
Moreover, with DRM's brand of piracy surveillance, the law
either fails to step in, or when it does, risks enabling a degree of
self-help that is both invasive and replicates the panoptic
structures I identified earlier. In theorizing this point,
particularly the panoptic overlap between piracy and consumer
surveillance, consider the following example. SONICblue makes
ReplayTV digital video recorders ("DVRs") which enable
336 C.J. Alice Chen & Aaron Burstein, Foreword to Symposium:
The Law & Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 487, 491 (2003).
337 See Benny Evangelista, Suit Challenges CD Copyright
Scheme, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 2001, at C3 (reporting on a lawsuit claiming
that consumer rights were violated by new anti-piracy technology). In the
end, the copyright owner agreed to ensure that its digital downloads were
anonymous, to purge all of its customers' identifying information, and to
place a warning label on further CDs that the CD in question would not work
in DVD or CD-Rom players from then on. See Consumers Win One Against
Copy Protection, Feb. 22, 2002, at http://www.polarityl.com/pcrrl6.html; Tom
Spring, Face The Music: Suits Pending over Copy Controls, Apr. 11, 2003, at
http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,93904,00.asp; Sunncomm and
Music City Records Agree to Resolve Consumer Music "CD-Cloqueing" Law
Suit by Providing Better Notice and Enhancing Consumer Privacy, Feb. 22,
2003, available at http://www.techfirm.comsunnsett.pdf (press release).
338 See Julie Cohen and Dan Burk, Fair Use Infrastructure for
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J. L. TECH. 41 (2001).
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television viewers to make digital copies of copyrighted
television programs, to skip commercials, and to send copies of
televised programs to other ReplayTV users.33 9 The plaintiffs in
a recent action, mostly motion picture studios, filed suit arguing
that the activities of DVR owners constituted direct copyright
infringement, and that the makers of the DVRs were
contributorily liable as well.340
To buttress their claims, the plaintiffs demanded all
documents and information that SONICblue possessed on its
customers, particularly the television shows they recorded, and
other data showing their viewing habits. 341  Even though
SONICblue did not possess this information, the plaintiffs
demanded that it reengineer its product to collect the data.342
SONICblue refused, contending that it feared the information
gathered could be used to file a host of suits against private
individuals for acts of direct infringement. 343 The magistrate
judge overseeing the case agreed with the plaintiffs and ordered
SONICblue to install surveillance software to detect possible
infringement and to record the viewing habits of individuals. 344
Not surprisingly, the magistrate judge's order unleashed a
firestorm of controversy. "To require companies to spy on their
customers in order to report suspicious activity to the movie
studios is a complete invasion of privacy, particularly to those
individual customers who don't even have the option of opting
out," observed one representative of a free speech watch
339 Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Liberties and Consumer Groups in
Support of Defendants' Objections to Magistrate Judge's Discovery Order at
1, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, Inc., No. CV 01"9358FMC(EX),
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2002, available at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/replaytv/amici brief eick order.pdf.
340 Id.
341 Id. Ironically, SONICblue had previously decided not to
monitor its subscribers' usage due to cost and privacy considerations
(especially given the public outcry over reports that one of their competitors,
TiVo, used such monitoring practices). See Id. at 3.
342 Id. at 1.
343 Jane Black, Faceless Snoopers Have the Upper Hand,
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, June 5, 2002, at http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/j un2002/tc2002065_2710.htm.
344 Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, Inc., No. CV 01"
9358FMC (EX), 2002 WL 1315811 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2002); see Court
Reverses Order for ReplayTV to Collect and Turn over Customer Usage
Information, ADLAW By Request, June 10, 2002, at
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group. 345 The order was swiftly reversed by a district court
judge, who concluded that such requests "impermissibly
require[] defendants to create new data which does not now
exist."
34 6
Although the surveillance issue was not directly
addressed, the outcome of the dispute illuminates the tradeoff
between privacy and increased piracy enforcement identified
with respect to DRM technologies. In the wake of such conflicts,
the law gains a predatory potential to traverse boundaries
between private and public, creating a panoptic governance over
individual acquisition and use of copyrighted material. In this
climate, copyright holders may be able to force ISPs to reveal
private information, including logs of the programs downloaded
by individuals, any record of consumer activity, and Web sites
visited. 347  And it may not matter whether the individual
actually committed acts of copyright infringement - the
accusation itself may be sufficient to warrant exposure of one's
personal identity, as the DMCA provisions illustrate.
Such lawsuits raise the important question of how courts,
legislators, and intellectual property owners can balance these
interests of privacy and prevention of piracy. 348 Congress itself,
345 Court Reverses Order for ReplayTV to Collect and Turn over
Customer Usage Information, supra note 344.
346 Order on Parties' Motions for Review of Magistrate Judge's
Discovery Order of Apr. 26, 2002, at 3, Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
ReplayTV, Inc., No. CV 01-9358FMC(EX), 2004 WL 57219 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
2004).
347 See Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously A Closer
Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981
(1996):
The activity of profiling, per se, is not new. It is a
well-established practice through which businesses of all
types seek to learn as much as possible about customers who
show interest in their products or services. For transactions
that occur in 'real' (as opposed to digital) space, however, the
ability to profile one's customer base is limited to some extent
by customers' willingness to self-report-for example, by
filling out product registration cards. In contrast, profiling in
the digital age holds out, for the first time, the tantalizing
promise of 'perfect' information, because digital
communications can be structured to create detailed records
of consumer purchases and reading activities.
Id. at 988.
348 It bears noting that not all DRM technologies invade
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in the pre-Internet age, already expressed a strong concern
about the moral and administrative difficulties behind private
enforcement of copyright in the home. In the 1970s, home-use
recording from radio and television broadcasts was discussed in
committee hearings, floor debates, and reports from the Office of
Copyrights, and each evinced similar concerns regarding
invasion of the spatial privacy of the home and the enforcement
issues it would create. 349 For example, during one colloquy,
Barbara A. Ringer, a representative from the Office of
Copyrights, recognized the potential problem of unauthorized
video recordings finding their way into the market. At that
time, she stated that although this was a problem that Congress
might face in the future, it could not be met by carrying
copyright enforcement into the home. Her testimony observed:
"I do not see anybody going into anyone's home and preventing
this sort of thing, or forcing legislation that would engineer a
piece of equipment not to allow home taping."35 0
individual expectations of privacy, however. See, e.g., Stefan Bechtold,
Value-Centered Design of Digital Rights Management, at
indicare.berelecon.de/tiki-print-article.php?articlelD=39 (outlining some
DRM technologies that respect privacy and fair use); Fred von Lohmann,
Reconciling DRM and Fair Use: Preserving Future Fair Uses? at
http://www.cfp2002.org/fairuse/lohmann.pdf.
349 For example, in June 1971, Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the Judiciary met in hearings on the sound recording
amendment. Representative Beister of Pennsylvania engaged in the
following revealing dialogue with Ms. Barbara Ringer, then Assistant
Register of Copyrights:
MR. BEISTER. I can tell you I must have a small
pirate in my own home. My son has a cassette tape recorder,
and as a particular record becomes a hit, he will retrieve it
onto his little set. Now, he may retrieve in addition
something else onto his recording, but nonetheless, he does
retrieve the basic sound. And this legislation, of course,
would not point to his activities, would it?
MISS RINGER. I think the answer is clearly, "No, it
would not." I have spoken at a couple of seminars on video
cassettes lately, and this question is usually asked: "What
about the home recorders?" The answer I have given and will
give again is that this is something you cannot control. You
simply cannot control it.
Prohibiting Piracy of Sound Recordings: Hearings on S. 646 and H.R. 6927
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 22
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The Office of Copyrights continued to hold this view
throughout the years of legislative revision.351 As the original
Sony court observed, this position developed in part from a
concern about invasion of the individual's privacy in the home:
"As Ms. Ringer testified, home recording simply
cannot be controlled. Nobody is going into anyone's
home to prevent it .... Of course, not all activity is
made legal by virtue of occurring in a private home.
Congress can constitutionally legislate against
some activity which may occur in the home, but
doing so necessarily requires caution. Here,
legislative history shows that, in balance, Congress
did not find that protection of copyright holders'
rights over reproduction of their works was worth
the privacy and enforcement problems which
restraint of home-use recording would create."35 2
Looking back, it is resoundingly clear that the advent of
technology has changed this original determination, particularly
where the DMCA is concerned. Today, DRM technologies and
other forms of piracy surveillance routinely govern and restrain
one's at-home activities and usage of cultural products. DRM
allows for the privatization of copyright enforcement; it
eliminates judicial oversight and precludes an adversarial forum
for the consumer's protection. 353  These systems operate
automatically and panoptically, without the benefit of a
complaint, response, third-party determination, or even a
modicum of judicial involvement. 35 4 In other words, copyright
enforcement has encroached, and integrated itself, into the
home.
3. INTERFERENCE
A final method, significantly more unilaterally aggressive
than the others, involves the use of smart agents that interdict
transmissions. Here, companies use similar "bot" technology to
351 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.
Supp. 429, 446 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
352 Id.
353 See Matt Jackson, Using Technology to Circumvent the Law:
The DMCA's Push to Privatize Copyright, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
607, 609 (2001).
354 See Thornburg, supra note 219, at 189.
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search for a file and then, once found, drown the connection with
so many requests that it prevents anyone from accessing any of
the person's files, legitimate or not.355  Other technologies
simply interrupt a download as it occurs. 356 According to one
company that produces interdiction software:
"MediaDefender's computers hook up to the person
using the P2P protocol being targeted and
download the pirated file at a throttled down speed.
MediaDefender's computers just try to sit on the
other computers' uploading connections as long as
possible, using as little bandwidth as possible to
prevent others from downloading the pirated
content....
The goal is not to absorb all of that user's
bandwidth but block connections to potential
downloaders. If the P2P program allows ten
connections and MediaDefender fills nine, we are
blocking 90% of illegal uploading."357
Note how the speaker assumes that all ten connections
involve infringing files. Still other software creates spoofing,
which involves the creation of phony media files and dumping
them, en masse, onto peer-to-peer networks. 358 Spoofed files are
often corrupt or damaged, and produce static, popping, cracking
noises, or complete silence. 35 9  Another strategy involves
355 See Piracy of Intellectual Property, Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts, supra note 293, 23-33 (statement of Gigi B. Sohn,
President, Public Knowledge) (discussing interdiction); see also Matt Bai,
Hating Hilary, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 95, 97 (discussing several anti-piracy
techniques), available at http ://www.wired.com/wired/
archive/1 1.02/hating.html?pg=1.
356 Healey, supra note 284. For example, once IpArchive's
technology spots an unauthorized transfer, it can stop the transfer and send a
notice directing the user to an authorized source for the file. Id Importantly,
the company will not identify the sender or the recipient, for privacy reasons.
Id. In contrast, another program, Vidius, does identify the Internet
addresses of the senders and recipients, and can often access names and
contacting information if the ISP complies with the request. Id.
357 Piracy of Intellectual Property, Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts, supra note 293, at 42. (statement of Randy Saaf, CEO,
MediaDefender).
358 See Bai, supra note 355, at 97.
359 See Stephanie C. Ardito, The Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention
Act, INFO. TODAY, Sept. 2002, at 18 (describing the countermeasures that
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redirection, which draws upon the use of a decoy song file that
activates a Web browser that takes the person to a legitimate
site to purchase music. 360 A program called "freeze" locks up a
computer system for a variable period of duration-also
displaying a warning about downloading music. 36 1 Another
program, called "silence," scans a computer hard drive for
pirated music and then attempts to delete the files. 362
Interdiction and spoofing are currently widely used
throughout the peer-to-peer file sharing community, and have
vastly increased in use during the last several months. They
were also the primary subjects of a bill, introduced in the
summer of 2002 by Congressman Howard Berman, which would
award copyright holders an exemption from various laws
proscribing computer break-ins when seeking perceived
pirates. 363 (Some forms of interdiction, for example, bear strong
resemblance to a traditional "denial of service attack," a crime
which is illegal under state and federal anti-hacking statutes,
including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).364
Representative Berman argued that the vast increase in piracy,
coupled with the continuing decentralization of peer-to-peer
networks, made such efforts necessary, pointing out that the law
has long allowed property owners to use self-help to protect their
property and citing examples of DRM to support his position.36 5
copyright holders have employed to combat the growth of P2P networks).
Moreover, because most users who upload MP3 files usually make all of their
files immediately available to others, spoofed files can quickly spread beyond
the RIAA's own servers, and infect the entire network. See Strahilevitz,
supra note 167, at 584-85.
360 See id.
361 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Zapping the Music Pirates, THE
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, May 6, 2003, at 1.
362 Id.
363 See Peer-to-Peer Piracy Protection Act of 2002, H.R. 5211,
107th Cong.; see also James S. Humphrey, Debating the Proposed Peer-to-
Peer Piracy Prevention Act: Should Copyright Owners Be Permitted to
Disrupt Illegal File Trading over Peer-to-Peer Networks, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
375, 375 (2003); see also Alex Salkever, Taking the Piracy Fight Too Far,
Bus. WK. ONLINE, at http ://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/ju12002/tc2002079-7636.htm (July 9, 2002).
364 See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
365 See Salkever, supra note 363; see also Press Release, Howard
L. Berman, Berman Introduces Legislation to Foil Peer to Peer Piracy (July
25, 2002), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca28_berman/
piracy-prevention act.html (citing software companies that make their
software inoperable if their terms of use are violated, and cable operators
that use electronic countermeasures to thwart the theft of their signals).
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One possible advantage to these "interference" methods of
surveillance is that they do not carry the same risks of identity
disclosure as the other two methods, because they are focused on
preventing infringement from occurring (rather than penalizing
or monitoring the infringer). A peer-to-peer connection is simply
disabled, rather than identities recorded and exposed. But it is
easy to imagine the likelihood of copyright owners creating other
programs that do carry these risks.366 One potential avenue, for
example, involves the spreading of "snitch" files that would
actively collect information, such as the identity of the infringer,
a list of files available for uploading, and the IP addresses of
recipients of infringing uploads. 36 7 It could also be programmed
to replicate itself as others accessed certain files, and could be
passed on to other infringers. 368 This incriminating information
could conceivably be used to generate cease and desist letters or
criminal referrals. 36 9
As these strategies suggest, the creation of safe harbors
for such "corporate vigilantism" involves some risk that
copyright owners might easily overstep their boundaries by
extrajudicially determining that infringement has occurred, and
damaging a computer or Internet connection as a result. Piracy
surveillance techniques are developed and purchased by
industries that seek to realize significant profits by inventing
ways to deter and detect infringement. Under these regimes,
the consumer becomes a helpless entity, unable to negotiate or
even contact the copyright owner when a person's online
activities are detected.
In the absence of public rules governing such behavior,
and with the parties' abilities to engage in discussions with one
another lacking, both offenders and non-offenders will become
governed and monitored by the same regime. Fair use defenses
366 See Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations, supra note 193, at 1-3 (statement of Derek S.
Broes, Executive Vice President of Worldwide Operations, Brilliant Digital
Entertainment, Inc. and Altnet, Inc., criticizing programs that have "hacked
applications and broken ranks with accepted rights of privacy on the Internet
to spy on user behavior, analyze their files and generally divert intended
actions of technology solutions selected and being used by end users").
367 See Joseph D. Schleimer, Electronic Countermeasures to
Copyright Infringement on the Internet: Law & Technology, J. INTERNET L.,
Nov. 2001, at 1-3.
368 Id.
369 Id. at 3-4.
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can be circumvented by private control. Moreover, because so
much piracy surveillance takes place outside of the boundaries
of government regulation, the "private" regime of piracy
surveillance will likely be rewarded with another, equally
protective individual self-help regime by individuals: encryption.
Encryption creates a kind of "robust anonymity" that can sever
the link between certain types of personal information and the
person to whom it relates.37 0
Obviously, encryption is a type of privacy-enhancing
technology that aids both law abiding and law evading citizens.
But, as applied to the piracy surveillance scenario, particularly
in the wake of Aimster, encryption will have distributional
consequences on the nature of legitimate speech in cyberspace.
Risk-averse individuals who are fearful of detection from
copyright enforcers (either because they are actually pirating
materials or are treading on a "grey area" of fair use) will be
encouraged to encrypt their messages or files to escape
detection. 371 As such, files that normally would be broadcast in
cyberspace will be kept from the viewing eye of the public. In
some circumstances, where the files represent perfect
replications of copyrighted songs, the use of encryption might be
desirable, because encryption prevents use by the general
public, thereby reducing the number of infringing transactions.
On the other hand, where the file represents something that
arguably falls within a "grey area" of fair use (like the song in
question in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music),372 risk-averse
creators might opt for encryption to avoid detection in
cyberspace. This narrows the scope of the audience reached for
370 As Jerry Kang explains, encryption uses a cryptographic
algorithm and a key to encode a message into ciphertext. The intended
recipient uses a key to decode the message back into its original form. If the
cryptographic algorithm is strong, and the key properly selected and kept
secret, it is infeasible for an unauthorized party to intercept the ciphertext
and decrypt it back into plaintext. See Kang, supra note 125, at 1242.
Encryption will, increasingly, play a powerful role in the facilitation of
darknets, which are thought to represent a newer, and more private,
community for file sharing. See, e.g., Heather Green, The Underground
Internet, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 15, 2003, at 80.
371 See, e.g., Robert Kay, Next-Generation File Sharing With
Social Networks, at http:///www.openp2p.com/lpt/a/4671 (last visited Dec. 5,
2004)
372 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-75




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 7 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol7/iss1/7
YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
a work, reducing the demand for certain works and eventually
deleteriously affecting the incentive to create.
Moreover, as Professor Jerry Kang points out, the legality
of some encryption methods is often uncertain. 373 As peer-to-
peer jurisprudence suggests, information exchanges might get
more privatized through encryption, but the more privatized
these exchanges become, the more courts appear willing to
require added degrees of surveillance and control. Consider the
outcome of Aimster, which clearly suggested the need for
software redesign to preclude encryption, and to encourage
consumer monitoring. The presence of encryption, in that case,
served to highlight the software developers' own "willful
blindness," thereby opening up the doors to contributory
liability. Finally, encryption methods also have the undesirable
effect of encouraging a potentially wasteful "arms race" between
entities that may attempt to develop technologies to overcome
encryption and those that seek to develop ways to protect it.
The constant use of resources for the protection and fencing of
information appears to be one of the few ways in which
individuals might be able to protect themselves from unwanted
surveillance. Finally, while these surveillance activities fall
within the twilight boundary between the protection of privacy
and property, they also implicate a radically different view of
copyright law than has been previously thought possible,
altering the costs and benefits of copyright enforcement.
III. TOWARDS A REGIME OF PANOPTIC PUBLICATION
Part II outlined a number of ways in which intellectual
property owners have privately sought to enforce copyright
restrictions on cultural products and to detect unauthorized uses
of their products. This result has significant effects on privacy,
freedom of speech, and copyright itself-particularly where
expression falls within "grey areas" of the fair use doctrine. As
the protection and control of intellectual property expands, the
protection of informational privacy shrinks. As a result, speech
suffers. Consumers are forced to internalize the costs of their
loss of anonymity and will curb their expression by restricting
their conduct to that which is unquestionably insulated from
liability. This phenomenon, in turn, can reduce the number of
373 See Kang, supra note 125, at 1242.
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works created and disseminated, but can also quite drastically
affect the way individuals experience and use cultural products.
How does piracy surveillance affect the incentives for
creativity? Imagine that every activity you did on the Internet
that involved the fair use of someone's copyrighted work -
reviewing a photograph, creating a collage of copyrighted
expressions, quoting certain texts, commenting on existing texts
- was immediately subject to the permission of the copyright
owner. Or, worse yet, imagine the copyright owner was capable
of recording your activities and curtailing them if it deemed
them to constitute "infringement." Where would your rights lie,
particularly with respect to your freedom of expression or right
to defend your activities from scrutiny? One risk-averse
response might be to curb your behavior to prevent
embarrassing or unwanted intervention from copyright owners.
You might, then, erase detailed references to cultural products
in your writing, avoid using language that resembles
copyrighted speech, maybe even avoid certain forms of
commentary, parody, fan fiction, collage, or sampling entirely.
The eventual result would be a gradual chilling of creative
behavior; the constant, silent, assertion of surveillance for
infringement might eventually deter you from speaking at all.
This section argues that the nature of copyright has
become fundamentally altered by the use of piracy surveillance
in a regime of "panoptic publication." Under this regime, anyone
who publishes information in cyberspace - whether a
commentary on a particular book, or a work that draws upon
existing work - can be subjected to an extrajudicial
determination of infringement. In this way, copyright's bundle
of rights becomes extended in two major ways. First, a
copyright owner, through the guise of piracy surveillance, is
endowed with a near-perfect ability to control and monitor
others' use of a work, potentially circumventing fair use or other
expressive defenses; and second, a copyright owner, under the
DMCA, becomes endowed with the ability to unmask the
identity of any author on the Internet, as long as a sufficient
accusation of infringement is made under the DMCA.374
374 This risk has softened somewhat in the wake of Verizon, but
the actual words of the DMCA, still unclear, could give rise to a contrary
interpretation by another court. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v.
Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting
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As I have suggested, piracy surveillance methods involve
some relative tradeoff between an individual's interests in using,
expressing, or disseminating intellectual property (and in
protecting her identity from disclosure), and the interests of a
third-party copyright enforcer. Just as an individual might
place a high value on protecting her privacy or autonomy from
invasion, a third-party enforcer may place a high value on
protecting her property from unwanted use or infringement.
The question, then, is how judges and legislators should balance
these interests appropriately.
In this section, I will analyze both the arguments for and
against such surveillance, and argue that any proposed, private
benefits to individual copyright owners have not considered the
substantial social costs for such surveillance regimes on non-
offending individuals. Obviously, one benefit of piracy
surveillance is somewhat clear: a reduction in the harm caused
by copyright infringement. But this benefit must also be
weighed against the various costs involved, which include the
potential of piracy surveillance to: block access to certain types
of legitimate information, prevent fair use of cultural products,
expose anonymous speakers, mistake legitimate files for
illegitimate ones, and cast a wide net of groundless accusation.
As this section will argue, proponents of such systems often fail
to recognize these substantial costs for non-offenders, such as
risk-aversion, the possibility of mistake, and over-deterrence of
speech and fair use.
Let me begin by clarifying that I am not arguing that the
types of piracy the RIAA seeks to deter are - or should be -
immune from liability. Rather, my concern in this Article is to
protect other types of expression - fair uses, anonymous speech
- that can become wrongly caught within the panoptic web of
surveillance. Consider, for example, the world of fan fiction,
remixes, or even alternative commentary tracks for DVDs. All
of these are areas of creativity, each of which can be subject to
varying degrees of fair use defenses, and which can be monitored
and potentially silenced under the current DMCA regime. 375
The very purpose of copyright is to ensure that a balance exists
that under the DMCA, "a subpoena may be issued only to an ISP engaged in
storing on its servers material that is infringing or the subject of infringing
activity," not to an ISP that is merely serving as a conduit for data
transmitted between two Internet users).
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between control over private ownership and expression in order
to create incentives for more speech creation. Yet piracy
surveillance eviscerates this balance between control and
expression, leading to an inescapable logic of vigilantism.
Instead of protecting the creation of cultural products, piracy
surveillance has transformed copyright into a regime where
copyright owners are legally empowered with a variety of means
to panoptically identify, classify, and threaten potential pirates;
and, in doing so, are made capable of controlling the public's
access to cultural products to an unprecedented degree, thereby
reducing the incentives for further speech and creation.
A. PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY
The underlying logic behind piracy surveillance is
inextricably tied to real space principles, suggesting that
intellectual property is equivalent, in both form and content, to
other types of properties in real space. Thus, proponents of
piracy surveillance point out that comparable measures of
legalized self-help (like the right of repossession or defense of
property) are traditionally available to property owners in real
space; thus, the same should be available to intellectual
property owners in cyberspace. 376 This is true: A property owner
is permitted, under the law, to take certain actions to recover
stolen possessions, and is granted some immunity from
trespassing on others' land for that purpose. Yet there is a
crucial difference between such strategies in real space as
opposed to cyberspace: Self-help methods in real space are
traditionally premised on maintaining, not destroying,
preexisting boundaries between private and public space. For
this reason, self-help strategies in real space reify, rather than
erode, the architecturally-created balance between spatial
protections for privacy and protection of property discussed in
Part I of this Article. Indeed, both the common law and the
U.C.C. have extended self-help allowances to property owners
with a few important caveats: both bodies of law limit the right
to enter private property in order to repossess items to those
376 See Email from Alec French, Minority Counsel, House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property,
on behalf of Rep. Berman, to Declan McCullagh, Chief Political
Correspondent for CNET News.com (Sept. 4, 2002) (explaining the copyright
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circumstances where some degree of consent or acquiescence has
been shown, and usually in circumstances where an existing
contract has been breached.3 77
Thus, given that the law traditionally creates exceptions
to the law of trespass to permit self-help repossession of chattels
kept on private property, courts usually justify these limitations
only if the actors can accomplish them without a breach of the
peace, and with the consent of the private property owner.378
Other cases require some notification before taking unilateral
action. 379 Moreover, case law from real space suggests that even
trespassers enjoy some expectations of privacy from
unreasonable searches and seizures. 380 Above all, any force
must be reasonable under the circumstances, and a person is
liable for any harm done in the exercise of these privileges. 381
No case has ever held that an entry into one's home, without the
consent of the owner, is justifiable self-help. 38 2
The use of piracy surveillance scenarios in cyberspace
shatters this traditional balance between the protection of
property and the protection of privacy. After all, intellectual
377 See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-
Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1101-02 (1998); see also Pamela
Samuelson, Embedding Technical Self-Help in Licensed Software, COMM. OF
THE ACM, Oct. 1997, at 13.
378 Samuelson, supra note 377, at 15; see generally Douglas Ivor
Brandon et al., Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in
Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L. REV. 845 (1984) (exploring the
permitted use of self-help in various legal areas).
379 See, e.g., Jon K. Wactor, Self Help: A Viable Remedy for
Nuisance? A Guide for the Common Man's Lawyer, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 92
(1982) (collecting case law on this point).
380 See People v. Schafer, 946 P.2d 938, 944-45 (Colo. 1997)
(recognizing trespasser's rights to privacy in sealed tent); see also Luke M.
Milligan, Comment, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Trespassers:
Searching for the Legitimacy of the Government-Notification Doctrine, 50
EMORY L.J. 1357, 1360 (2001) (discussing trespasser privacy expectations and
protection provided by state and federal courts).
381 Brandon, supra note 378, at 861; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 198 (1965) (discussing "Entry to Reclaim Goods on Land
Without Wrong of Actor").
382 See James R. McCall, The Past as Prologue: A History of the
Right to Repossess, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 58 (1973). Repossessors are usually
barred from forcibly entering a person's home, for example. See also Butler v.
Ford Motor Credit Co., 829 F.2d 568, 570 (5th Cir. 1987); Dearman v.
Williams, 109 So. 2d 316, 321 (Miss. 1959); Kirkwood v. Hickman, 78 So. 2d
351, 356 (Miss. 1955).
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property is not real property, and a number of particularized
rules govern the use of intellectual property. A host of statutory
exceptions (including fair use) limit an owner's exclusive control
over intellectual property.383 Moreover, self- help analogies from
real space often fail to consider the costs of such invasion on a
non-offending individual. Instead of serving as a passive
constraint to protect from invasions of real property (like a lock
or fence), some piracy surveillance techniques (like the use of
smart agents for monitoring) are instituted without probable
cause or notice to the user and carry the potential to eviscerate
one's anonymity. 38 4 In sum, the premise of piracy surveillance
suggests the need to revisit the importance of recognizing the
cost of technologies of invasion on consumer autonomy and
access to information.
Here is where the panoptic metaphor is so prescient.
Constant monitoring alters online behavior in inescapable ways
one's speech, surfing habits, use of cultural products, and even
identity itself. In this sense, piracy surveillance has deleterious
implications for autonomy. Consider Lawrence Lessig's
commentary on this point:
383 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). For example, "although one
enraged musician testified to Congress that copyright infringement was
'theft,"' the literal equivalent of someone "walk[ing] into a record store,
grab[bing] what they wanted and walk[ing] out," that is not precisely the
case, as even the Supreme Court has recognized. Bailey, supra note 141, at
488; see also Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217 (1985)
("[I]nterference with copyright does not easily equate with theft, conversion,
or fraud.").
384 Consider a real space example. In one piracy surveillance
strategy, researchers created equipment that detects the faint radio signals
emitted regularly by computers. A special code installed in the software
would allow monitors to identify the software the computer is currently using
by broadcasting certain signals. Using the technology, anti-piracy groups
could detect the number of signals emanating from a company's office to
determine infringement. New British Anti-Piracy Solution Based on
Intelligence Techniques, TELECOMWORLDWIRE, Mar. 2, 1998, available at
1998 WL 5141163. Now, compare this with recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, which only just recently observed that the use of sense-
enhancing technology to gather information about the interior of a home
constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
pointing out that the very core of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence involved
the right of a man to retreat into his own home, free from governmental
intrusion. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-34 (2001). Indeed,
Kyllo holds that the use of devices that are not used in general public to
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If you walked into a store, and the guard at the
store recorded your name; if cameras tracked your
every step, noting what items you looked at and
what items you ignored; if an employee followed
you around, calculating the time you spent in any
given aisle; if before you could purchase an item
you selected, the cashier demanded that you reveal
who you were- if any and all of these things
happened in real space, you would notice. You
would notice and could then make a choice about
whether you wanted to shop in such a store....
In cyberspace, you would not. You would not notice such
monitoring because such tracking in cyberspace is not similarly
visible."385
For this reason, as Julie Cohen points out, technologies
that force changes in user behavior decrease the zone of
autonomy that a]] users enjoy with respect to the enjoyment of
intellectual goods: 386  Both by directly constraining private
behaviors related to intellectual consumption and by enabling
creation of detailed and permanent records of such consumption,
these technologies have the potential to change dramatically the
way people experience intellectual goods.38 7
Proponents of piracy surveillance contend, following
Kennedy, that a person does not enjoy any reasonable
expectation of privacy in material that he or she might leave
open for public view, display, or use, especially music files that
can be uploaded to others. The Verizon trial court echoed this
point, observing, where an ISP subscriber "opens his computer
to permit others, through peer-to-peer file sharing, to download
materials from that computer, it is hard to understand just what
privacy expectation he or she has after essentially opening the
computer to the world."3 8 8 But this point fails to consider the
other policy concerns that turn on the importance of protecting
non-offending individuals from unwanted surveillance in
385 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw
Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 504-05 (1999).
386 Cohen, supra note 330, at 580.
387 Id.
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cyberspace. As the Ninth Circuit just noted in Theofe] v. Farey
Jones:
The subpoena power is a substantial delegation of
authority to private parties, and those who invoke
it have a grave responsibility to ensure that it
is not abused. Informing the person served of his
right to object is a good start, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(a)(1)(D), but it is no substitute for the exercise of
independent judgment about the subpoena's
reasonableness. Fighting a subpoena in court is
not cheap, and many may be cowed into compliance
with even overbroad subpoenas, especially if they
are not represented by counsel or have no personal
interest at stake.38 9
Unlike analogies in real space, piracy surveillance does
not entail formal notice, consent, or negotiation between the
parties. Nor does it protect constitutional assurances of
anonymity. Individuals who are caught within the panoptic
Web of piracy surveillance have little protection: Any of their
uses of cultural products, or expression, is subjected to the
governing, extrajudicial gaze of a copyright owner. Under the
DMCA subpoena provision, for example, it does not matter
whether the person has actually infringed on a copyright or not
- all that matters is that the owner has a subjective "good faith
belief' that the infringement has occurred. 390 The same can also
be said of DRM technologies, which entirely circumvent judicial
oversight in favor of automatic copyright enforcement.
Moreover, piracy surveillance implicates two particular
rights, both connected to autonomy: first, the right to speak
anonymously; and second, the right to receive information. To
389 341 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2003).
390 DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2003). But see Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1231
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the RIAA's attempts to obtain the identity of
Verizon subscribers accused of unauthorized sharing of copyrighted files is
not authorized under the DMCA's subpoena provision); Katie Dean, RIAA
Strikes Again at Traders, WIRED NEWS, Jan. 21, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,61989,00.html (describing the
RIAA's filing of 532 "John Doe" suits against individuals it has accused of
illegal file-sharing, in response to the D.C. Circuit's ruling that the DMCA
does not authorize the RIAA's attempts to subpoena ISPs to obtain the
personal information about the ISPs' subscribers).
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its credit, the Verizon court duly acknowledges that some lower
courts have held that the First Amendment recognizes a right to
anonymity, both in real space and on the Internet.391 But the
court limited the scope of this right by pointing out that courts
have usually embraced a right to anonymity in situations
involving "core First Amendment expression."392  By drawing
this unduly stark line between First Amendment rights of
expression and copyright infringement, the court mistakenly
presumed that the individual in question - indeed, every
individual potentially subject to a DMCA notice - was already
guilty of infringement, and thus was not entitled to any First
Amendment protections. 393
Extrajudicial determinations of copyright liability are
particularly precarious, especially where disclosure of
anonymity is at risk.394  In MeIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, the Supreme Court found that an Ohio law
violated the First Amendment because it prohibited the
distribution of anonymous campaign literature. 395 In that case,
the Court held that when a statute places burdens on "core
political speech," it will apply a heightened degree of scrutiny to
the statute, and uphold it if it is "narrowly tailored" to advance
an "overriding state interest."396 This recommended balancing
test is essential to preserving the important discursive values
supported by anonymity, and necessitates a careful balancing of
the rights of the speaker with the interests of law enforcement.
In stark contrast, in Verizon, the district court blithely rejected
this view, observing:
[T]his is not a case where Verizon's customer is
anonymously using the Internet to distribute
speeches of Lenin, Biblical passages, educational
391 In re Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 259; see also Sony Music
Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
392 In re Verizon, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
393 Id. at 260.
394 Yet as one lawyer observes, "many people converse on the
Internet anonymously unaware that they have become the subject of a
subpoena seeking their identity before it is too late to quash the subpoena."
EFF & Liberty Project Defend Anonymous Poster Against Third-Party
Identity Subpoenas to ISPs, 14 EFFECTOR 1 (Feb. 7, 2001) (quoting Nicole
Berner, counsel for the Liberty Project), at
http://www.eff.org/effector/HTML/effect14.01.html#I.
395 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
396 Id. at 347.
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materials, or criticisms of the government -
situations in which assertions of First Amendment
rights more plausibly could be made. . . . [T]he
purpose of protecting anonymous expression is to
safeguard those 'who support causes anonymously'
and those who 'fear economic or official retaliation,'
'social ostracism,' or an unwanted intrusion into
'privacy.'39 7
Yet the court missed the significance of the issue at stake.
By short-circuiting consideration of the appropriate balancing
test that McIntyre advocates, the Verizon trial court assumed,
without deciding, that the individual's activities in question
constituted direct infringement, and thusly were undeserving of
anonymity. By ascribing to the RIAA's private, extralegal
determination of infringement, the court failed to perform the
balancing test that McIntyre recommends, and deferred instead
to the prior judgment of a private party.
One might rightfully ask why the law should even
attempt to protect the interests of individuals who are engaging
in massive, illegal (and often criminal) levels of copyright
infringement. Shouldn't they be held accountable, and why
should privacy matter here at all? The obvious answer to the
former question is yes; indeed, it is absolutely true that the
RIAA has restricted its use of the subpoena provision, to date, to
the most egregious infringers, situations where a court would
likely agree with the RIAA's assessment of liability in most
cases. 398 However, aside from these cases, there is substantial
confusion over what, exactly, constitutes "copyright
infringement" in other contexts, and this is why privacy becomes
so important. Napsteis immediate conflation of file sharing
with copyright infringement masks a host of complexities
regarding the extent to which fair use defenses, or space
shifting, might conceivably apply in such contexts. While the
397 In re Verizon, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (quoting, in part,
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150, 165 (2002)).
398 Privacy & Piracy, Hearing Before the Senate Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations, supra note 193, at 7-8 (testimony of Mitch
Bainwol, Chairman and CEO, RIAA) ("RIAA is not seeking a subpoena as to
everyone who is illegally distributing copyrighted recordings. Rather, at this
time, RIAA is focusing on egregious infringers, those who are engaging in
substantial amounts of illegal activity.").
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RIAA has admirably shown some restraint in choosing to pursue
only egregious uploaders of multiple files, the DMCA provisions
allow anyone to invoke these procedures to unmask a speaker's
identity. Aside from the risk of identity disclosure, in dealing
with the large numbers of notice-and-takedown requests they
receive, few ISPs have the time or ability to investigate whether
the substance of the accusation is meritorious or not. As I have
shown, mere accusations of infringement provide powerful
mechanisms for silencing others under the DMCA. 399  So,
although an actual infringer cannot assert a First Amendment
defense, the DMCA's provision, coupled with the increasing
spectre of piracy surveillance, wrongly presumes guilt before
innocence, thereby eviscerating protection for anonymity.400
Moreover, aside from the failure to balance protections for
anonymity with copyright, piracy surveillance also raises
concerns about autonomous access to information. In real space,
for example, a consumer of copyrighted material enjoys
anonymity: the copyright owner does not know the identity of
the person who reads, listens, or watches certain material. 40 1
However, some forms of piracy surveillance alter this critical
balance of interests between the consumer and creator,
permitting a copyright owner to have the right to unmask the
identity of an end user.40 2 In Stanley v. Georgia,40 3 a case which
suggested the importance of intellectual privacy, the Supreme
Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibited making private possession of obscene material a
crime. In that case, the Court recognized that the valid
399 See Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F.Supp.2d 556
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that Does had a limited First Amendment right to
protection of identity). As Professor Jed Rubenfeld has emphasized,
copyright restrictions inherently raise First Amendment concerns because
they turn speech into property; and by doing so, they are capable of making
people liable for speaking, thus creating a "private power over public speech."
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,
112 YALE L.J. 1, 25 (2002) (emphasis omitted).
400 As one court observed, "If Internet users could be stripped of.
anonymity by a civil subpoena enforced under the liberal rules of civil
discovery, this would have a significant chilling effect on Internet
communications and thus on basic First Amendment rights." Doe v.
2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D.Wash. 2001).
401 See WIPO, Hearing on HR. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, supra note 199, at 12 (statement of Marc Rotenberg,
Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center).
402 Id. at 14.
403 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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governmental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity
could not justify its insulation from other constitutional rights,
particularly those implicated in a statute forbidding the mere
possession of obscene materials. 40 4 As the Court observed:
This right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to
our free society. Moreover, in the context of this
case - a prosecution for mere possession of printed
or filmed matter in the privacy of a person's own
home - that right takes on an added dimension.
For also fundamental is the right to be free, except
in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy.405
Those values easily translate into the context raised in
this Article, where the DMCA's provisions extend piracy
surveillance into the home activities of many citizens, resulting
in a tradeoff in terms of the autonomy and freedom of ordinary
citizens to access information. This is particularly true with
respect to DRM, but similar analysis could also underline the
other surveillance techniques I have identified. In Stanley, the
appellant asserted the right to read or observe what he pleases,
to satisfy his own intellectual needs in the privacy of his own
home. 40 6 Importantly, the Court rejected the proposition that
the obscene character of the materials meant he had no right to
possess them, observing, "[w]hatever may be the justifications
for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they
reach into the privacy of one's own home."40 7  The same
observations apply to the effects of piracy surveillance, where a
person could be precluded from undertaking a host of activities
involving the use and possession of copyrighted material in one's
own home.
Even in a university context, private copyright
enforcement thus exacerbates the risk of intrusion, where, as
Griswold has pointed out, the "right of freedom of speech and
press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the
right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read and
freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach -
404 Id. at 568-70.
405 Id. at 563-64 (citation omitted).
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indeed the freedom of the entire university community."408 As
one university representative has testified regarding the DMCA:
[T]he legislation's notice and takedown procedure
would have a different impact on institutions of
higher education than it would on commercial
service providers .... Enforcing the "takedown" of
material in response to a notice of alleged
infringement would have the appearance of
suppression of speech, particularly in a setting
where fair use makes the legality or illegality of a
particular infringement claim less than crystal
clear .... 409
Consider the implications of the music industry's request
to allow its computer experts to scan all computers at the
University of Melbourne for sound files and email accounts so
that it could gather evidence of copyright infringement. 410
Under Stanley and MeIntyre, a court should have to perform a
balancing test to examine whether the incursion of privacy was
justified by the assertion of copyright infringement. "If the First
Amendment means anything," the Stanley Court powerfully
observed, "it means that a State has no business telling a man,
sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at
the thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds."411
B. DUE PROCESS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
A piracy surveillance advocate might argue that these
areas of copyright enforcement and surveillance are no different
than monitoring activities taken in real space to protect one's
property. After all, if someone publishes something on the
Internet, or makes certain files available, he or she should know
that intellectual property owners will routinely monitor such
uses in order to protect copyrighted work from unauthorized
408 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citations
omitted).
409 See WIPO, Hearing on HR. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, supra note 199, at 73-74 (1998) (statement of Charles
E. Phelps, Provost, University of Rochester).
410 See Lamont, supra note 4, at 3.
411 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
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reproduction. But there is a difference in cyberspace:
anonymity. Piracy surveillance creates a world in which
copyright owners can set the terms of use, police consumers,
record and expose their personal information, and penalize
potential infringers - all, to a varying extent, outside of the
boundaries of state control.
A further justification that may be offered for granting
the province of piracy surveillance to individual copyright
owners, rather than an ISP or the government, turns on
institutional competence and efficiency considerations: A private
copyright owner, rather than another entity, should internalize
the costs of his detection of infringement because the copyright
owner has the appropriate incentives to do so. Two concerns
weigh against creating the type of privatized regime of copyright
enforcement that currently exists under the DMCA: the first
turns on identity; the second turns on the importance of judicial
oversight and due process concerns.
Even if it is efficient and desirable to place the burden on
a copyright owner to detect infringement, the need for robust
judicial safeguards are obvious, particularly where values of
speech, expression, and fairness are implicated. The point of
copyright law is not to create a stand-alone, self-contained
regime, where copyright issues are resolved without attention to
other common law or constitutional values, like due process,
freedom of speech, or privacy. Yet the DMCA propagates an
isolationist tendency by failing to require copyright owners to
conform to the constitutional protections normally afforded to
citizens under the First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments. The
Verizon trial court maintained, in contrast, to this view:
[T]he DMCA neither authorizes governmental
censorship nor involves prior restraint of
potentially protected expression. Section 512(h)
merely allows a private copyright owner to obtain
the identity of an alleged copyright infringer in
order to protect constitutionally-recognized rights
in creative works; it does not even directly seek or
restrain the underlying expression (the sharing of
copyrighted material). Thus the DMCA does not
regulate protected expression or otherwise permit
prior restraint of protected speech. It only requires
production of the identity of one who has engaged
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in unprotected conduct - sharing copyrighted
material on the Internet. 412
This observation, at first glance, is rhetorically powerful,
particularly as applied to the facts in Verizon. But the
statement also overlooks the interplay of three other elements:
(1) the gatekeeper role of the ISP, which faces the threat of
contributory infringement if it does not act immediately to
silence the offensive conduct; (2) the potential for strategic
motives of a copyright owner, who may be tempted to file notices
for spurious reasons; and (3) the fact that the subpoena
provisions are not limited solely to individuals who upload
copyrighted songs (an admittedly clearer issue of infringement),
but apply to anyone who offers, obtains, or creates allegedly
infringing material on the Internet. Since the words of the
DMCA permit a preliminary unveiling of identity, Section 512
can give rise to serious due process concerns, for the accused
herself as well as the ISP, if the subpoenaed party lacks the
ability to object.413
As Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell
explained, the rationale for public law enforcement often turned
on the role of information about the identity of violators. 414
When victims of harm naturally know who injured them,
allowing private suits for harm will motivate victims to initiate
legal action and use that information to enforce law.415 (That is
why the enforcement of tort and contract law is private in
nature.) In contrast, if victims do not know who injured them,
or if it is difficult to identify or apprehend perceived criminals,
412 In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 261
(D.D.C. 2003).
413 See Brief of Amici Curiae United States Industry Association
et al. at 5, In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C.
2003) (No. 02-MS-0323). See also Matthew Amedeo, Shifting the Burden:
The Unconstitutionality of Section 512 (H) of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act and Its Impact on Internet Service Providers, 11 CoMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 311 (2003). The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
guarantees a party adequate procedural safeguards before a deprivation of a
property or liberty interest. The seminal requirements of due process have
been set forth for years: "notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
[to] afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
414 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory
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public enforcement may be more desirable. 416 According to
Polinsky and Shavell, public enforcement is made even more
desirable if inducements to private parties to supply information
are somehow inadequate, in the sense that they encourage
wasteful efforts to locate violators, or if they encourage the use
of force in gathering information and capturing violators, for
example. 417 Thus, public enforcement is usually preferred when
effort is required to identify and apprehend violators. 418
These observations become particularly important when
we consider the effects of the DMCA subpoena power on citizen
expression in cyberspace. The DMCA section, as it is written,
empowers anyone who alleges "unauthorized" use of a
copyrighted work to obtain a subpoena with the identity of any
Internet user - without the institution of ongoing or anticipated
litigation, or even notice to the user herself.4 19 Moreover, piracy
surveillance techniques, in and of themselves, do not
demonstrate a predisposition towards the kind of discretionary
non-enforcement that is typically demonstrated by public
prosecutors and law enforcers. 420 Instead, piracy surveillance
methods are calibrated to be overbroad by design in order to
deter the widest possible breadth of infringement.
Returning to Polinsky and Shavell's point, the problem of
anonymity, coupled with the low standard of proof, lays the
groundwork for the possibility of "overfishing" for violators. The
fact that it is of little cost for the copyright owner to file and
serve a DMCA subpoena means that it is not necessary that the
copyright owner have a high probability of success in filing




419 Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant Verizon
Internet Services and Urging Reversal at 2, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015,
03-7053) (consolidated appeals). Verizon may have softened this risk,
however. See Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1236-37 ("[Tlhe
subpoena power of § 512(h) [of the DMCA] applies only to ISPs engaged in
storing copyrighted material and not to those engaged solely in transmitting
it on behalf of others.").
420 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private
Enforcement of La w, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42-43 (1975).
421 See Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Error, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME 1: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 1029, 1038 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds.,
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probability that the offending expression itself will be deterred
after the notice is served. Given that the responsibility for
enforcing a copyright rests with the ISP, who then faces the
responsibility of "taking down" the infringing material, cutting
off Internet access to the client, or facing contributory liability,
the ISP might respond immediately, and in some cases fail to
afford prior notice or enable an impartial, independent
determination. 422
Indeed, the need for judicial oversight becomes
particularly pronounced where fair use and speech are
concerned. As anyone who practices copyright litigation will
attest, sorting out competing claims of infringement and fair use
is time-consuming, fact-specific, and deeply prone to strategic
manipulation. Yet piracy surveillance allows copyright owners
to circumvent access to a fair, adversarial, and impartial forum.
Mere accusations of infringement can displace court-ordered
determinations. In sum, piracy surveillance techniques also fail
to consider two significant costs to non-offenders: overdeterrence
of speech and evisceration of fair use. These two elements,
taken together, paradoxically convert copyright from a regime
that governs the illegitimate uses of private properties into a
regime that governs all speech and expression in cyberspace,
even when it is only tangentially related to the copyright owner
in question.
The effect of this transformation cannot be understated -
both with respect to copyright law, as well as the nature of
cyberspace itself. To understand its effects, it is helpful to recall
that fair use cures a market failure in copyright that may be
created because the possibility of consensual bargain may have
broken down in some way, either because transaction costs are
too high or because agreement is otherwise impossible. 423 Piracy
surveillance, however, eclipses judicial enforcement of fair use,
because a private entity's determination under the DMCA
circumvents access to a fair and impartial forum. Because
private, rather than public, entities are now capable of
determining whether a use is fair or not, the correction of
market failure is largely impossible. Instead, Section 512(h), the
2000) ("In general, the higher the costs which a victim must incur in suing an
injurer the greater must the probability of success be for the victim to sue.").
422 See Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1234.
423 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613 (1982).
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subpoena provision at issue in Verizon, provides no protection
for expression that may be determined, at a later point, to be
fully protected speech. 424
As I have discussed, Napster placed the responsibility to
detect infringement upon intellectual property owners, and the
DMCA's standard for a notice-and-takedown request is
surprisingly subject to manipulative assertions of copyright
infringement. Piracy surveillance advocates might respond by
pointing out, first, that the subpoena provision does not target
actual expression, only one's identity; and second, that most of
the cases falling under the recording industry's purview concern
actual infringement, which is traditionally outside of the
purview of the First Amendment. 425 But these arguments also
presume a clarity between infringement and fair use that is
often illusory. This line may be fairly easy to draw if we are
considering the liability of someone who is uploading hundreds
of files of copyrighted music (something that courts generally
agree constitutes infringement), but is much harder to draw in
cases that involve someone who is downloading music for
parody, fair use, space shifting, or transformative purposes.
Uncertain legal standards, as John Calfee and Richard
Craswell remind us, deter socially desirable behavior through
overcompliance.426 In these circumstances, an extrajudicial
determination of infringement is efficient, quick, but often prone
to mistake, thus laying the groundwork for the uncertainty that
may motivate an over-deterrence of speech. Applying Calfee
and Craswell's observations, the rising probability of
extrajudicial enforcement, coupled with the apparent
uncertainty of an extrajudicial determination, risks deterring
expression. Consider some of the following examples of
4Cmistaken" DMCA notices, i.e. situations in which accusations of
424 See Brief for Appellant at 32, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v.
Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015,
03-7053) (consolidated appeals).
425 Brief of Amici Curiae Motion Picture Association of America,
Inc., et al., in Support of the Recording Industry Association of America and
Urging Affirmance at 12, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 03-7015, 03-7053)
(consolidated appeals) ("Infringers ... do not create speech, they copy it.").
426 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of
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infringement were made in order to silence particular
expression:
" Notice ID No. 232: Church of Scientology
aims to remove links written by individuals
who publish criticisms of its work.
* Notice ID No. 310: Individual attempts to
use DMCA to assert trademark claims,
rather than copyright claims, in order to take
advantage of its takedown provisions.
* Notice ID No. 94: Copyright owner for the
character Barney threatens a DMCA notice
in order to try to remove photo that allegedly
"incorporates the use and threat of violence
towards the children's character Barney
without permission."
* Notice ID No. 348: DMCA claim made
against individual who posted public court
records containing copyrighted images. 427
In one recent case, an electronic voting machine company
flooded ISPs with DMCA notices claiming copyright
infringement in order to remove embarrassing internal e-mails
that were critical of the company. Even though such documents
were arguably covered by fair use, many ISPs removed the
material without challenging the initial determination. 428
427 See Brief of Amici in Support of Verizon's Opposition to
RIAA's Motion to Enforce at 9-10, In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 258 F.
Supp. 2d 6, No. 02-MS-0323, (D.D.C. 2003).
428 See also Paul Roberts, Diebold Voting Case Tests DMCA, PC
WORLD NEWS, at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid, 113273,00.asp
(Nov. 4, 2003). 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), which provides as follows:
Misrepresentations.--Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents
under this section-- (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that
material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification,
shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred
by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's
authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such
misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such
misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity
claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to
disable access to it. These mechanisms are powerful vehicles to deter
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As these examples demonstrate, the DMCA's notice-and-
takedown provisions are often used for a host of reasons that do
not match up with a meritorious assertion of copyright
infringement. Moreover, the exceedingly complex, inconsistent,
and ambiguous case law regarding copyright can often lead
individuals to chill potential expression out of the fear of
liability, particularly when they recognize the potential to
unmask anonymous speech under the DMCA subpoena
provisions.
IV. BALANCING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
In cyberspace, intellectual property and privacy are at an
impasse. There is no way out - the enforcement of each area
faces inherent conflicts with another. Throughout the
development of copyright in cyberspace, intellectual property
rights have slowly and quietly expanded to take precedence over
the privacy and expressive rights of ordinary citizens. Part of
this is due to the expansion of property rights over areas of
intangible information and the absence of strong legislative
protections of informational privacy. Yet, part of it is also due to
a failure among lawmakers and judges to conceptualize a deeper
relationship between property and privacy; there is a current
tendency, shared by many, to separate intellectual property
rights from privacy and to create a hierarchical relationship
between the two. In other words, the law has displayed a
persistent failure to recognize that expansions of control of
intellectual property cause tradeoffs in other areas of consumer
protection- particularly where privacy is concerned. As a
result, we have created a world in which the property rights of
copyright owners are valued over the liberty, property, and
privacy rights of others, suggesting that those principles are
somehow less valuable than those involving commercial self-
protection. 429
Today, even in the wake of Verizon, the rivalry between
intellectual property and privacy persists, even though the
factual scenario has changed. In prior sections, I argued that
Diebold-like situations, but they should be supplanted with the solutions
outlined in Part IV. For more information on the case, see
http//www.eff org/lega1/ISP liability/OPG v Diebold (last visited Dec.16,
2004).
429 See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy
and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1390 (2000).
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copyright law has been irretrievably altered by this panoptic
transformation, because the DMCA (among other areas of
copyright) enables content owners to patrol and monitor the end
user's subsequent expression with little judicial oversight. In
turn, as the Napster and Verizon cases suggest, copyright
owners' ability to monitor peer-to-peer communications also
incurs the potential to unmask the activities, identities, and
expressions of a]] citizens who post information in cyberspace.
Consequently, the risk of implicating non-offenders within the
panoptic snare of piracy surveillance raises the danger of
silencing speech and expression in cyberspace. Thus, rather
than property rights taking precedence over privacy, this section
will argue that the three rights in question - privacy, property,
speech - should be equally valued and protected, rather than
treated as stand-alone regimes.
An adequate starting point, then, is to reexamine
copyright's relationship to privacy. Indeed, the great irony of
this situation is not the intractability of the conflict between
privacy and intellectual property in cyberspace, but the inability
of legislators to fashion a solution that squares with other
constitutional values of property, personhood, and autonomy
under the DMCA. Thus, under my proposed solution, the law
would attempt to reconcile these values with copyright
enforcement by creating a series of entitlements based on the
need for personal protection and anonymity in the face of piracy
surveillance. 430
As this Article has suggested, piracy surveillance
implicates a curious type of private ordering that merges the
boundaries of private and public. While the standards
governing copyright infringement, fair use, and the DMCA were
drafted by Congress (and the judiciary), the actual
implementation of these rules often gets left to the amorphous
and decidedly variant motives of copyright owners. Moreover, in
most copyright cases, the Constitution rarely makes an
appearance if both parties are private, non-state entities. 431
However, under the state action doctrine, constitutional
guarantees can limit the activities of a private party if the
conduct in question is entwined with traditional state functions,
430 See GANDY, supra note 91, at 235.
431 See John R. Thomas, Liberty and Property in the Patent Law,
39 Hous. L. REV. 569, 592 (2002).
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such as education, adjudication, fire, and police protection, or if
the activity is controlled or substantially facilitated by the
government. 432
For these reasons, one sees strong arguments for the idea
that state action is present in almost every stage leading up to a
subpoena or takedown request in the DMCA context. Congress
drafted the relevant provisions, and a judicial body enforces
them after a cursory examination; indeed, the unveiling of a
person's identity is performed by an ISP pursuant to a court
order. 433  Moreover, much of these issues seem particularly
poignant in light of New York Times v. Sullivan,434 in which the
Supreme Court overturned a libel decision regarding a paid
advertisement that criticized a Montgomery city official. The
Court resolved the state action issue by concluding that
"although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the
Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on the
constitutional freedoms of speech and press."
435
The very same concerns that animated the New York
Times case are relevant here. The property rights of the original
copyright owner can be used to trample the copyright/fair use
rights of other creators. As I have suggested, piracy surveillance
involves a clear delegation to the private citizen to determine
what constitutes infringement and what constitutes fair use. As
a result, the DMCA creates a silent web of public and private
interdependence, in which public functions are virtually
ministerial, and private determinations are largely adjudicative.
Given the substantial risk of strategic enforcement of
infringement, the only way to balance the increasing
encroachment on privacy protections is to ensure some level of
hybridity between public and private enforcement.
As I have suggested throughout this piece, laws protecting
intellectual property must be harmonized with other, mostly
constitutional, values. Here, the Fourth Amendment could
serve as a guide, particularly since its jurisprudence has
432 Id. at 593 (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
161-63 (1978)).
433 See id. at 614 (describing the delegation of enforcement
authority by the patent office to private entities).
434 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
435 Id. at 265.
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historically sought to reconcile the tension between protecting
the interests of the public with individual civil liberties.
Following this view, pre-Internet laws that flow from the mantle
of the Fourth Amendment, such as the Privacy Protection Act
("PPA") can offer a path to follow in creating some much-needed
balance between privacy and intellectual property.
The PPA requires a special subpoena when First
Amendment interests in news reporting might be affected by an
ongoing investigation. The origins of the PPA echo of the same
concerns raised by piracy surveillance strategies today. In 1971,
a demonstration at Stanford University Hospital turned into a
violent clash between the participants and police. The Stanford
Daily, a campus newspaper, managed to photograph a number
of participants in the demonstration. 436 Two days afterward, it
published a series of photographs of the clash between the police
and the demonstrators. After it published the photographs, the
police obtained a search warrant to seize material that might
constitute evidence of the criminal activity under
investigation. 437 Hence, at Stanford Daily, the police searched
wastebaskets and rummaged through photographic negatives. 438
The event so incensed the employees at Daily that they filed
suit, contending that the First Amendment barred the use of a
search warrant under circumstances where the entity in
question is a news gatherer not implicated in the criminal
conduct. The Supreme Court disagreed with their position and
held that the First Amendment was not a bar to the use of a
search warrant under those facts.439 In that case, the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit police from
undertaking searches of evidence held by innocent third
parties.440
Congress, reacting to the Court's opinion, enacted the
PPA. The PPA requires intimate judicial involvement and
oversight: It provides for a special subpoena in cases where
there is a danger of interference with the First Amendment
interests of an innocent publisher. It also establishes a general
436 Mark Eckenwiler, Applications of the Privacy Protection Act,
8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 725 (1998).
437 Id. at 725.
438 Id.
439 Id. at 726; Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68
(1978).
440 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 567-68.
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rule preventing the search and seizure of certain types of
materials, specifically called "work product" materials, intended
for publication:
"Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be
unlawful for a government officer or employee, in
connection with the investigation or prosecution of
a criminal offense, to search for or seize any work
product materials possessed by a person reasonably
believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the
public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other
similar form of public communication, in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce ..... 441
The definition of "work product" excludes contraband,
fruits, or instrumentalities of crime, and the PPA actively
requires that suspects of crime be treated with the same
probable cause guidelines that animate the Fourth
Amendment. 442 Though the PPA has not regularly been applied
to Internet-related disputes, it has been successfully employed
in a case where the Secret Service, with the aid of several U.S.
attorneys, seized a multitude of computer-related evidence
owned by the operators and users of a computer bulletin board
who also published books and materials. 443
The PPA should serve as a baseline guiding force in
response to the DMCA's overreach into privacy and First
Amendment expression. For the reasons I have offered, DMCA
subpoenas regarding file sharers on peer-to-peer networks can
raise similar constitutional concerns that can activate PPA
remedies. Moreover, the PPA balances the protection of
individual civil liberties with those of expressive freedom: At the
outset, the law is meant to be applied in conjunction with the
Fourth Amendment, which provides for basic protections of
probable cause and judicial oversight for suspects of
infringement. 444 These basic Fourth Amendment principles -
441 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a) (2000).
442 See Eckenwiler, supra note 436, at 728.
443 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 816 F.
Supp. 432, 440-41 (W.D. Tex. 1993), affd, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
444 Under the PPA, materials may not be seized unless they
constitute fruits or instrumentalities of crime, if there is a danger of physical
injury, or if the person possessing the material probably committed a crime.
See E. Judson Jennings, Carnivore: US. Government Surveillance of
Internet Transmissions, 6 VA. J.L. TECH. 10, 63-67 (2001).
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probable cause, freedom from search and seizure, protection of
privacy - can and should also serve as baseline governing
principles to govern private modes of copyright enforcement.
Thus, if a copyright owner wanted to determine the
identity of a person who might be transmitting or downloading
materials for infringing purposes, the DMCA, like the PPA,
could also require a similar subpoena that raises the standard of
judicial oversight.445  This provision should track the PPA in
several major respects. First, following the PPA, the DMCA
could establish that it is illegal for private piracy surveillance
measures to force an ISP to seize or silence expression that falls
under fair use or First Amendment protection without first
requesting a court order. By making immediate seizures of
protected material illegal, the proposed provision would shift the
cost of mistaken surveillance and silencing to the copyright
owner or bounty hunter. Moreover, by raising the costs of
mistaken detection, and creating greater incentives to reduce
their occurrence, this provision would also ensure greater
protection for fair use and First Amendment interests. Thus,
the proposed amendment would require copyright owners to
request a preliminary injunction or specific court order before
asking an ISP to take down material, remove the subscriber's
access, or disclose a person's identity. It could also provide for
compensation in the event of a mistaken determination or
disclosure.
Second, the DMCA, following its own notice-and-
takedown provision, could provide for a requirement of notice to
be given to the end user prior to disclosure of identity, and could
provide for specific procedures to challenge the disclosure of
one's identity in the event of an asserted fair use defense. Some
may argue that the outcome of Verizon accomplishes many of
these goals by essentially requiring the filing of actual litigation
prior to disclosure of the alleged infringer's identity. Yet, I
would recommend that future courts go further than the Verizon
court did, by also integrating the DMCA subpoena procedure
with a constitutional concern for anonymity. Thus, just as the
445 Moreover, even though piracy surveillance, at present,
involves private actors, a DMCA notice is signed off by a district court. Thus,
state action is arguably present, from the moment of identity revelation to
the moment where an ISP terminates the person's access to the Internet or
disables the account and the specter of criminal copyright infringement under
the NET Act could easily provoke Fourth Amendment concerns.
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PPA or other "John Doe" actions require more than enough
evidence to withstand a motion to dismiss, the DMCA's use of a
subpoena should reflect the need for heightened standards of
justification.446  In such situations where First Amendment
concerns are triggered, the DMCA could require the immediate
appealability of any proposed termination of access, the use of
specially trained magistrates or marshals to carry out Internet
searches, and other procedures that reflect a concern for
individual civil liberties and expression, instead of the unilateral
goal of protecting copyright above all else. 447
Third, it bears noting that none of the anonymity issues
are particularly new in the Internet context - many courts have
already dealt with the question of how to protect the anonymity
of a speaker in the face of a civil suit. In defamation cases, for
example, courts have continued to develop methods to integrate
First Amendment protections of anonymity with the need for
legal resolution. Those methods easily apply to the DMCA
subpoena provision. In one such case, for example, the New
Jersey Superior Court set forth a stringent test for the
disclosure of one's identity, requiring the following elements:
[T]he trial court should first require the plaintiff to
undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters
that they are the subject of a subpoena or
application for an order of disclosure, and withhold
action to afford the fictitiously-named defendants a
reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition
to the application. These notification efforts should
include posting a message of notification of the
identity discovery request to the anonymous user
on the ISP's pertinent message board.
[Second, t]he court shall also require the plaintiff to
identify and set forth the exact statements
purportedly made by each anonymous poster that
plaintiff alleges constitutes actionable speech.
[Third, t]he complaint and all information provided
to the court should be carefully reviewed to
446 See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
447 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 806 (1994).
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determine whether plaintiff has set forth a prima
facie cause of action .... [and] must produce
sufficient evidence supporting each element of its
cause of action, on a prima facie basis, prior to a
court ordering the disclosure .... 448
Applying this test (the Dendrite test), if the plaintiff has
presented a valid cause of action, the court must balance the
First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the
strength of the prima facie case presented, and the necessity for
the disclosure of the anonymous defendant's identity to allow
the plaintiff to properly proceed. The nature of this inquiry is
therefore both substantive and procedural, but enables the
speaker to remain protected from anonymous disclosure for
spurious reasons.
The solution I have outlined accomplishes three primary
goals. First, the special subpoena provisions operate to raise the
standard of proof to protect against spurious claims, and deter
the "overfishing" scenario I have described in Part III. Second,
the proposed burden-shifting and damage award provisions help
to compensate wrongly accused infringers, thereby making
piracy surveillance and meritless accusations more costly.449
Finally, there is another reason for the adoption of this test in
piracy surveillance scenarios: the need to raise the standard of
proof in DMCA subpoenas after Verizon. Traditional "John Doe"
lawsuits require the presentation of enough evidence to
withstand a motion to dismiss, whereas the Dendrite test goes a
step further by requiring an additional level of scrutiny. The
court observed that in cases that implicate First Amendment
rights to anonymity, "application of the motion-to-dismiss
standard in isolation fails to provide a basis for an analysis and
balancing of Dendrite's request for disclosure in light of John
Doe No. 3's competing right of anonymity in the exercise of his
right of free speech."450  Under the Dendrite test, those
suspected of copyright infringement or other illegal acts would
not receive extra protection behind the shield of anonymity, but
448 Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
449 In this way, these procedures reflect similar concerns that are
also governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which requires a lawyer
to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal grounds of any filed
document. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 586-91 (6th
ed. 2003).
450 Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 770.
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would receive an additional recognition of the need for actual
(rather than asserted) proof to unmask potential infringers.
By raising standards of proof for copyright infringement,
ensuring judicial enforcement, as well as the cost of mistaken
detections, courts and legislators can aim to strike a much-
needed balance between property, speech, and privacy. There
must be greater public and administrative oversight over piracy
surveillance. To allow private parties to circumvent
constitutional safeguards in order to silence others' speech is
precisely what the DMCA provisions were designed to prevent.
Consequently, more process - a higher standard of proof, more
judicial scrutiny, and the use of special subpoenas that embrace
First Amendment values - is due. The answer is more
regulation over surveillance, not less, and more judicial
recognition of the value of anonymity to the marketplace of
speech.
One may argue that these solutions are still somewhat
narrow in the sense that they protect the anonymous speaker
alone, and fail to address the other types of monitoring I have
addressed that involve DRM and interference. As I have shown,
piracy surveillance also, problematically, unilaterally permits
private copyright owners to interpret the rules governing
copyright and to prevent their violation. 451 Yet while the private
copyright industry may be in the best position to invest in the
technology to guard against and detect infringement, courts, not
private entities, are in the best position to determine actual
liability. To resolve these difficult scenarios, I propose the
institution of alterations to the DMCA that seek to clarify the
standard of fair use and help to ensure its protection from
intrusion or evisceration by extrajudicial forms of surveillance.
Here, the DMCA could also be revised to specify protection for
the downloading of files containing small portions of copyrighted
material (e.g., samples or film clips); or files exchanged for
educational purposes; or even those that involve space shifting,
commentary, parody, satire, or other purposes that have not yet
451 See also Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously.* A
Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV.
981, 1021 (1996) (suggesting that the public/private distinction that forms the
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been expressly clarified for protection in the technological
context. 452
Clarification of the scope of fair use in such contexts is
necessary for several reasons. First, clarification helps to
provide notice to future individuals of allowable activities in the
face of new technologies, and it helps to clarify the many "grey
areas" that often arise in difficult cases, like those listed above.
This reduces the likelihood that individuals will engage in
overcompliant behavior and avoid exercising their rights of
freedom of speech and fair use. Second, clarification also
enables all parties to recognize the importance of protecting an
individual's entitlement to fair use in the face of technologies
that may impede or prohibit it. It forces individual
manufacturers to carve out certain areas for allowable uses, and
allows the individual to engage in those uses without risking
liability. Third, it also helps to reduce the power, significance,
and scope of extrajudicial determinations. By ensuring that
certain activities remain protected for fair use purposes, private
copyright owners will be prevented from defining for themselves
what constitutes fair use, and will instead be forced to ask a
court to make a particular determination when needed.
Finally, defining the scope of fair use under the rubric of
greater public oversight also advances the goal of due process. 453
As this Article has suggested, piracy surveillance implicates
serious due process concerns, particularly in the scenarios that I
have outlined here: the risk of error is exceptionally high; the
likelihood of strategic, spurious enforcement is similarly
pronounced; and the standard to protect individuals from
unwanted surveillance or extrajudicial determinations is
exceptionally low. Moreover, the reach of piracy surveillance
extends beyond actual copying of an existing work in its
entirety, and could potentially reach the full gamut of
expression on the Internet that implicates fair use of
copyrighted works (like text files that use titles that correspond
to copyrighted works, or written text that builds on prior
452 See Julie Hilden, Should Universities Crack Down on File
Swapping?, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20030304.html (Mar. 4,
2003).
453 Traditionally, due process principles require courts to balance
the government's interest in using the procedures at issue, the risk of error in
those procedures, and the private interest that is affected by the challenged
procedures. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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references). In short, the DMCA provisions govern much more
than piracy - they govern the very essence of speech itself. As I
have suggested, however, by clarifying the scope and
entitlement of fair use, and by precluding extrajudicial
determinations, we can come to a greater balance between
privacy, property, and protection of expression.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that our need to expand
intellectual property protections must be reconciled with the
existing protections for informational privacy and personal
expression. As this paper has argued, it is imperative that we
begin to restore the fragile balance between property rights and
privacy protections by creating parity between real place and
cyber space. If we fail to strike the proper balance between
intellectual property rights and privacy, our constitutional
values of freedom of speech, the "inviolate personality," and due
process-may be sacrificed.
As this Article has suggested, both the protection of
privacy and intellectual property are in crisis in cyberspace,
permitting one to erode protections for the other. Unfortunately,
rather than resolving the conflict between privacy and property,
the law has created an entirely disparate and hierarchical
regime favoring the expansion of property rights at the expense
of consumer privacy and permitting growing incursions into
personhood, autonomy, and the expressive expectations of
consumers. As I have suggested, the only way to resolve these
tensions is to return to the values that animated the letter and
spirit of our constitutional protections, and attempt to use those
values to return some desperately needed balance to the
relationship between privacy and intellectual property.
In sum, this paper has sought to reconfigure our
understanding of intellectual property so that it comports with
our long-established traditions of protecting individual
autonomy, privacy and expression. In doing so, we can come to
a greater understanding of the need for limits on the power of
intellectual property to govern our everyday lives, and the need
for a more nuanced understanding of how the expansion of
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